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TITLE OF THESIS SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN BLACK
AFRICA: 1957-1969

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED MASTER OF ARTS

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED FALL 1974

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DATED

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN

BLACK AFRICA: 1957-1969

by



BILL VICTOR HAYIBOR

A THESIS

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled Soviet Foreign Policy in Black Africa: 1957-1969 submitted by Bill Victor Hayibor in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines changes in Soviet foreign policy toward Africa in the 1957-1969 period. Attention is focused on three sets of variables--African, Soviet, and systemic--which were collectively responsible for the many policy changes. Because of the extent to which Soviets used economic aid for political and diplomatic purposes, trade and aid data will be used as a test for the variations in Soviet interest and attention.

Problems of perception seem to be the central source of Soviet policy difficulties in Black Africa. The Soviets viewed colonial Africa and her relationship with the metropolitan powers, the anti-colonial agitation plus the developments and trends soon after independence through Marxism-Leninism and failed to see Africa's own aspiration. Black Africa's new leaders showed no desire to accept ready-made models uncritically, nor were they willing to welcome a new foreign dominator. Each new nation or group of nations wanted to handle its differing post-independence problems in its own way.

In addition to the situation in Africa, Socio-economic problems in the Soviet Union and her satellite countries contributed to the lessening of Soviet interest in Africa at one time. At another time, on the

international level, China induced a revival of Soviet interest while Berlin and Cuba distracted attention. In the late 1960s Vietnam and the Middle East were the main problem areas which attracted Soviet attention from Black Africa. Meanwhile, military coup d'états systematically replaced some of Africa's leading pro-Soviet governments with pro-Western regimes.

However, the Nigerian civil war opened a new access point into Black Africa when Britain and the United States failed to aid the Federal Military Government adequately. Even before Nigeria, early ideologically directed policies were being gradually replaced by a more balancing of the Soviet's Union's internal factors, the situations in African states and in the international system and the degree of conflict in determining policy preferences in Africa.

No Communist or even true Socialist government emerged in Black Africa in spite of the Soviet Union's efforts. Her advantages, political and diplomatic, were merely temporary. However, she succeeded, at least for a time, in countering Chinese and American efforts in the "new scramble" for Africa. With the détente between the two Super Powers, Soviet interest in Black Africa will come to be pursued more and more through normal diplomatic channels.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Soviet foreign policy in Black Africa between the years 1957 and 1969 was marked by wide variations of degree of interest and interaction. Although there was a noticeable decline in Soviet interest in Black Africa over the same period,¹ simultaneous with this general trend of lessening interest were several marked variations. It is the fluctuations in Soviet interest that this thesis will focus on and analyse.

Although the analysis will be predominantly from the soviet perspective, it should not be assumed that the USSR was the sole or the determinant actor in Afro-Soviet relations. On the contrary, it seems that in the last analysis the Black African country had the more decisive role, for the attitudes or behaviors of an African country often had a greater impact on the relationship than the Soviet overture or response. Guinea's expulsion of the Soviet ambassador and her apparent return to the West in 1961 are examples. If the Ivory Coast, Senegal or Liberia did not want the Soviet Union, no opportunity existed for her to establish relations. Relations between the Soviet Union and the Black African countries must therefore be viewed as a reciprocal phenomenon.

Most literature pertaining to Soviet foreign policy in Black Africa or to the decline of Soviet interest has tended to give disproportionate attention to African developments and to seek explanations from within the continent. When conditions in the Soviet Union and in the international system have been linked with Soviet activities in Africa, the tendency has been to deal with these linkages perfunctorily.

This paper suggests that in addition to internal African determinants, there are two other sets of variables--Soviet and systemic--which had a considerable impact on Soviet interaction with Black Africa. Most scholars are aware of the economic and social problems in the Soviet Union, and international problems such as Berlin, Cuba, the Sino-Soviet dispute, Vietnam and the Middle east. However, few have seen the connections between these developments and the Soviet Union's Black African policy. Nonetheless, these two additional sets of variables seem not only important but even essential to the understanding of Soviet foreign policy in Africa or the Third World in general.

The goal is not to advance a grand theory of, or uncover startling insights into, Soviet foreign policy, but to bring these linkages to the fore for examination and to stimulate further enquiry. It will present and analyse the trends and developments in Africa, the Soviet Union and the International system that contributed to the changes in

Soviet foreign policy in Black Africa in the 1957-69 period. Nor does the thesis claim to represent the most accurate account of what transpired between the Africans and the Soviets in Africa. There can be differing versions of what went on depending on personal interpretations of expert accounts, assuming that the expert accounts were themselves unquestionably unbiased.

The question of objectivity and subjectivity will be discussed under the general topic of misperception in the next chapter, not only because of the influence which that concept has had on the writer and may have on the reader, but because of the way it affected Soviet thinking about Black Africa. Soviet policy was initially characterized by optimism rooted in misperception and unverified assumptions about the politics and societies of Africa, and about Black Africa's relationships with the ex-colonial Western countries. After actual involvement in Black Africa, the Soviets discovered many of their assumptions to have been erroneous. Reactions to earlier mistakes constitute a main source of the variations which characterized their foreign policy in Black Africa. In addition, the general tempo of events and trends of the Cold War, and the nascent Chinese challenge induced a premature Soviet involvement in Black Africa. In such a situation, mistakes were inevitable and confusion a probable result.

Black Africa herself demonstrated little consistency,

increasing foreign policy difficulties for any country interested in the continent. A different version of the Cold War seemed to be in progress: the Casablanca, the Brazzaville and other ideological and political groupings were bitterly pitted against one another. At the same time the Soviets were experiencing domestic economic and social problems apparently linked to their African and Third World policy. Cuba, Berlin, and the Middle East and later Nigeria, called for quick thinking, adjustments and shifts in priorities on the part of Soviet decision-makers. These developments individually or collectively required changes in policy; even at times contradictory policies were undertaken by the Soviets.

Across the time period of the study Soviet attention had been focused on Egypt, Guinea, Cuba, Berlin, the Eastern bloc countries, Chinese activities in Africa, Ghana, Mali, the Middle East, Vietnam, and Nigeria. The shifts in interest and involvement seem to group themselves into three main time periods: 1957-1962; 1963-1965; 1966-1968-1969. It is the purpose of this thesis to explain the patterning of interest and interaction.

Within Africa ideological and political groupings and the general disunity among the states, particularly during the Congo crisis, Guinea's apparent defection to the West and the existence of many different types of socialism undermined Soviet optimism. In the USSR, economic setbacks and the resultant social problems also contributed to the

negative attitude adopted by the Soviet Union toward Black Africa in the early 1960's. After the Congo and Algeria, Cuba and Berlin became the new settings for international tension.

Between 1963 and 1965 there appeared to be an increase in Soviet interest in Black Africa. This time period corresponded with the increasing Chinese influence and popularity in Black Africa. Was the new Soviet attitude a response to the Chinese presence? How effective was Chinese propaganda? What advantages did China have over the Soviet Union? How did Soviet efforts to counteract Chinese influence force Soviet policy into a new direction? Briefly, how did the Sino-Soviet dispute contribute to the changes in Soviet foreign policy in Black Africa?

By the end of 1965, the Soviets had changed their attitudes once again, becoming negative to Black Africa and the the Third World in general. They clearly defined a new policy of non-involvement in Afro-Asian affairs if in their definition such affairs threatened international peace. It became quite clear during this period, for reasons that were African, systemic and Soviet, that Soviet interest in Black Africa had reached a low ebb.

In Africa, Soviet economic aid had proved ineffectual because of inadequate domestic markets for the products of Soviet-sponsored factories. African dislike of Soviet goods, difficult climatic conditions, belated Soviet deliveries,

repayment difficulties experienced by the African debtors, the Ivory Coast's economic success, and the military displacement of Black African governments friendly to the Soviet Union account for the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and Black Africa in the mid and late 1960's. Vietnam and the Middle East occupied Soviet attention in the same period, becoming the new priorities. In the Soviet Union, social problems deriving from economic difficulties plus pressure from the bloc countries resulted in greater attention to these areas.

Soviet-Nigerian relations in the late 1960's seemed a complete reversal of the Soviet Union's original African policy. While Soviet relations with Ghana, Guinea and Mali began in a state of harmony and ended up at the opposite end of the spectrum, her relations with Nigeria moved in the opposite direction. The Soviet-Nigerian relations constitute evidence of the Soviet Union's shifting priorities and changing policies in Black Africa.

In foreign relations mutual advantage is generally what the countries involved desire. However, if the situation becomes uneven with one side gaining a disproportionate advantage steps are usually taken by the losing side to re-establish an equilibrium. These can take the form of demands on the advantaged side. For example, when Ghana realized at one point that she was losing foreign currency to the USSR, she admonished the Soviets to desist from re-selling Ghanaian

cocoa in the world market. Another method to re-establish equilibrium is to underfulfill agreements, refuse to comply with agreements, cut down or even terminate aid commitments. For example, when domestic (and bloc) economic imperatives exerted pressure on the Soviet Union in 1961, she decided to underpurchase the stipulated tonnage of Ghanaian cocoa and trim her aid program.

Some standard works² employ among other measures such indicators as the number of Soviet residents in Black Africa, the number of African students in the Soviet Union or in the Bloc Countries, U.N. votes, trade and aid data to measure Soviet interest in Black Africa. In my opinion, trade and aid arrangements seem to be the most suitable. Many of the other indicators were discarded when analysis proved them ineffectual. Total numbers of Black African residents in the Soviet Union did not (and perhaps could not) vary significantly in accordance with the Soviet changes of policy. These latter indicators seem to be more suitable as tests of a decline rather than of fluctuations. Trade and aid arrangements, on the other hand, seem to be more flexible and capable of following the changes in Afro-Soviet relations.

Finally, although Black African countries and the USSR cast identical votes on particular international issues, the motives were sometimes different, in fact domestically derived rather than expressing similar international perspectives. To take the example of the Congo,

Ghana, Guinea and the USSR voted for the dispatch of UN peace-keeping troops to that troubled country. Later Guinea withdrew her forces, Ghana retained hers and the Soviet transferred trucks and aircraft originally intended for the UN forces to Lumumba's government. For all three countries, the UN forces were being controlled and manipulated by the "imperialist" West. However, though their initial votes were the same, their later reactions were totally different, for their motives were, in reality, to satisfy their national interests. While Ghana wanted to keep the Cold War out of Africa, the USSR wanted to use the Congo as the battleground for it. Two people or groups of people may have a common enemy but may not necessarily be friends. I found it highly unsatisfactory therefore, to use UN votes as indicators of increase and decrease of Soviet interest in Black Africa.

Because of these considerations the size of trade, and the size of, or the offer of, economic aid will be the tests used as a measure of increase or decrease in Soviet interest in Black Africa.

The reader will come across such as "communist," "imperialist," "capitalist," and "neo-colonialist" and variations of these forms. Though it is sometimes hard to use these terms without passion, in no way are they intended to be used in this thesis as terms of derogation. Without passing judgments they are merely descriptive of

different types of status quo and sentiments, and I intend to use them in the conventional sense.

"Black Africa" will mean African countries other than South Africa, Rhodesia and the Arab countries of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. However, developments in both Egypt and Algeria (just as developments in Berlin and Vietnam), promoted international concern so relevant that they cannot be ignored completely. Secondly, these two countries, together with Ghana, Guinea, and Mali formed the core of the pro-Soviet Casablanca Group. The two non-Black African countries are therefore indispensable in any meaningful discussion of the Soviets and the Casablanca Group.

It should be noted that for various reasons not all Black African countries had meaningful relations with the Soviet Union. The "moderate states" and the Soviet Union had a mutual lack of interest in each other. Though the Soviets softened their attitudes toward the moderates after 1962, relations were not more than luke-warm. The thesis therefore mainly concerns those Black African countries which had an active interaction with the Soviet Union. It is only for the sake of comparative analysis that a "moderate state" or a "reactionary state," as the Soviets would say, will be discussed in detail. It is for this reason that the Ivory Coast is singled out for full discussion.

Attention will be focussed on Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the Ivory Coast, and Nigeria in the discussions. Ghana,

Guinea, and Mali were the most "radical" of all the Black African countries. They formed the core of the Casablanca Group and, according to the Soviets, were the most "progressive" of all the sub-Saharan countries. Soviet relations with these three countries were closer than with other African states. It was from these close relationships that the USSR hoped for the best results. Disappointments suffered by the Soviets in their relations with these three countries (with Guinea in particular) had a great impact on Soviet attitudes to the rest of Black Africa. Any meaningful analysis of Black African-Soviet relations must therefore concentrate on these three countries.

The Ivory Coast, on the other hand, because of her "reactionary" orientation failed to merit much Soviet respect and attention. Later relations between the two countries improved. Though Nigeria was not as "reactionary" as the Ivory Coast (in fact, she tried to stay neutral between the "radical" Casablanca Group and the "reactionary" Brazzaville Group) her strong ties with the West made relations between her and the USSR uneasy in the early sixties. From the mid 1960s, however, a remarkable increase in friendliness occurred and had continued since.

The selection is a mixture of French and English speaking countries. The French and the English are the two colonial powers that have made the greatest impression

on the continent of Africa. The selection is therefore representative of Black Africa in the light of her colonial background.

The fact that the selection is all West African is accidental but a rationale can be provided: Ghana (1957) became the first Black African country to attain political independence followed by Guinea (1958). These were very important events for West Africa. Aside from Mali, all these countries lie along the Guinea Coast of the Atlantic Ocean. Portuguese contacts with Black Africa started along that coast; so did Dutch, French, and English contacts. Soviet and Chinese penetration also started in the same area. West Africa has therefore become an important historical as well as international gateway to Black Africa. In late 1950s and early 1960s, West Africa was the political and ideological centre of Africa. The five countries are, therefore, representative of the most important region in Black Africa, if not the whole of Africa during the period under discussion.

The time interval discussed in this thesis is from 1957 to 1969. This time period incorporates such an important event as the attainment of independence of the first Black African country, thus making available the first trade and aid data. This same period incorporates certain important episodes of the Cold War, the worsening of the situation in Vietnam and in the Middle East, the

overthrow of Ben Bella and Kwame Nkrumah, the failure of the Soviets to prevent the Malian coup, and the Nigerian war. Economic difficulties and social discontent in the USSR, and discontent among her satellites also fall within this period. The 1957-1969 time period thus contains all the major events directly or indirectly contributed to the changes in Soviet foreign policy in Black Africa.

CHAPTER 2

MISPERCEPTIONS

This chapter investigates the role of misperception in Soviet foreign policy in Black Africa. When the Soviets established contacts with the newly independent countries of Black Africa, they did so on the basis of certain prior assumptions about those countries. However, after a short period of Soviet presence, empirical evidence of the results of policies based on these assumptions were negative. Corrections had to be made. The attempts made by the Soviets to rectify their mistaken views seem to have been one important source of the variations in their foreign policy toward Black Africa.

Soviet conclusions about Africa derived largely from a misperception of the conditions (trends and events-- political, economic or social) in that continent, and the complacent view that the scientific and technological achievements of the Soviet Union would have a positive effect on Black Africa. What were these conditions in Africa and why were they misperceived? Why did the African leaders appraise the technological developments of the Soviet Union in terms the Soviets had not anticipated?

Before attempting to answer these questions and delve into the larger question of Afro-Soviet relations, it is

necessary to discuss certain theoretical implications concerning the problem of misperception in decision-making. This will entail a close look at the question of ideology, which will facilitate an understanding of how and why the Soviet policy-makers saw in Black Africa what really did not exist, and failed to see what really existed.

Problems of Perception

International relations is concerned with actions, reactions and interactions between and among nations. Action usually ensues from the necessity to establish, maintain, regulate or repudiate a relationship or relationships. Action, reaction or inaction always involves the concept of decision-making (DM), for nations will not act unless and until the decision-makers deem it necessary.

The concept of DM is relatively new in Political Science. Economists had long examined the decisions of investors, producers and consumers, and business administrators had long been interested in the improvement of the DM organization of their executives, while psychologists had been interested in the motives of the individual decision-maker. Political Science took up the concept later.¹

There are many aspects of DM: motives, types, setting, objectivity, organization, situation and perception. However, not all these aspects are relevant here. What is more important for the purpose of this thesis, and for this chapter in particular, is the concept of perception or

rather misperception.

Decision-making means weighing a variety of alternatives until the one which is most suitable is found.² A decision always has a behavioral component. That is to say, a decision is always followed by an action, a reaction or inaction. A wrong decision, ceteris paribus, is usually followed by a wrong action or reaction. Sometimes, however, a decision which is considered right and the best at a given point in time may turn out later to have been wrong. One reason is the inconstancy of the situation--the internal or the external environment, or both.

The reason for mistaken decisions derives not only from the instability of the situation, but also, and more often, from the misperception and the misjudgment of the situation in the first place. Misperception can result from wrong information, correct information wrongly interpreted, anxiety, emotional tension in a crisis situation, or ideological fixation.

Ideology is pre-eminent in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. It is the one variable which is most pertinent to the question of misperception in her policy toward Black Africa. For the purpose of this thesis, Willard A. Mullins' definition of ideology will be used. It is:

. . . a logically coherent system of symbols which, within a more or less sophisticated conception of history, links cognitive and evaluative perception of one's social condition

--especially its prospects for the future--to a program of collective action for the maintenance, alteration, or transformation of society.³

Functionally, the ideology of a society teaches how history should be interpreted,⁴ and explains developments (political, economic, military, and social) in both the domestic and external settings by offering images. Ideology defines foreign policy objectives and interests, and assigns priorities to these objectives and interests. How do decision-makers go about achieving these objectives and satisfying their national interests? Ideology again prescribes and justifies what mode of action is to be taken. It also provides the basis for distinguishing between "friends" and "enemies," explains and justifies tensions and conflicts between and among societies.

Ideology defines what was, what is, what may be, and what ought to be and serves as a perceptual screen through which the decision-makers of a society view the world.⁵ Ideology fosters stereotypes. Stereotypes, according to Walter Lippmann, are the commonest and yet the most subtle of all types of influences. In his words, as a result of our political socialization and indoctrination, "we define first and then see,"⁶ for "we are told about the world before we see it," and "imagine most things before we experience them."⁷ These preconceptions, Lippmann goes on, profoundly control the total process of perception, for

they identify certain objects, facts, and conditions as familiar or strange and accentuate the differences "so that the slightly familiar is seen as very familiar and the somewhat strange as sharply alien."⁸ In short, under the influence of ideology our world-view can become so warped that there is a tendency on our part to "notice a trait which marks [a situation out as] a well-known type and fill in the rest of the picture by means of stereotypes we carry about in our heads."⁹

The influences of ideology as outlined above, in one way or the other, singly or collectively, seemed to have affected Soviet policy toward Black Africa. The discussions which follow in this chapter will attempt to show empirically how the ideological profile of the Soviet Union influenced her policy-makers in their misperception of the conditions in, and in the making of their assumptions about, Black Africa.

The Far-Away Continent

The lack of adequate information about Africa and its peoples, and the lack of sufficient time (because of anxieties about the Cold War) to make a careful study of that continent appear to have been a central source of Soviet mistakes in Black Africa. Direct Soviet contact with Africa constituted a competition with the West and the United States in particular. Mohan Jitendra, speaking

of American interest in Africa, states that "the American objectives in Africa was to fill the 'vacuum' being created by erosion of, and indeed actively to displace, the European colonial presence"; "a collateral objective," Mohan goes on, "was to preclude 'Soviet penetration' . . . and prevent revolution in a region protected and pacified no longer by European power."¹⁰

It had become axiomatic to regard Africa as the West's sphere of influence, a situation which made Soviet penetration seem harder, even apart from American ambitions. Alluding to the competitive spirit behind the ambitions of the two great powers for the Third World, Khrushchev made the Soviet intent clear when he said, "Our interest is to win this competition in the shortest possible time."¹¹

In spite of Soviet optimism, relative to the West, she had only scanty knowledge of Africa. Robert Legvold emphasizing the seriousness of the Soviet problem, states that the "Soviet leaders knew neither Africa nor its leaders very well." Nor could they take any serious steps to study "the nature of African society until the first wave of independent African states appeared right in front of them."¹²

There were specific reasons for the Soviet neglect of Africa. These were: the priority given to Asia; the threat of war or, in other words, the priority given to Soviet internal security, Stalin's failures in China and

Indonesia, and the anti-fascist alliance between Russia and the West. To expand on the first reason, the Soviets, sticklers for defining priorities, paid much more attention to Asia mainly because of reasons of proximity. Legvold sums up this reason when he says,

Geography placed Asia beside Russia and, as a consequence, the successful socialist revolution in Russia created a historic bridge linking the struggle of Asia with the more advanced proletarian struggle in West Europe.¹³

Africa therefore remained a distant continent attracting little attention from Russia.

Not only was Asia closer to Russia, geographically, it also had more political awareness, or "consciousness." In fact when Stalin, in 1925, put the colonies and semi-colonies into three categories. India was given top priority because anti-colonial ferment had already emerged.¹⁴ Peter Worsley commenting on the importance of Asia to the Russian leaders describes Asia as the continent "where the nationalist movements were much older, . . ." and where "varieties of nationalism were developed long before 1917, and became entrenched."¹⁵

In Africa, on the other hand, though there were earlier manifestations of political consciousness, anti-colonialism did not take organized form until after the Second World War. Nor, to state the obvious, did the European colonial presence in Africa make it feasible for the Soviets to make formal contacts with that continent

until after independence. The Soviet attitude towards Africa is expressed in Legvold's question:

But what was there to justify the staking of a substantial Soviet interest in Africa--this dark continent so unimaginably retarded in its social development, so inaccessible to Soviet influence, and so far from the principal theatres of great-power competition?"¹⁶

The second reason why the Soviet leaders neglected Africa until after the Second World War was the fear of another war and the necessity of increasing national security. When in 1928 Stalin decided to consolidate the power of the Kremlin and the strength of his own position (from the fear of a "monumental assault on Russian Society"¹⁷), and when he decided on the "building of socialism in one country" as against the Troskyite idea of a "permanent revolution," he had to shelve the colonial question indefinitely. The disturbing signals which Stalin sensed on the international scene became evident in the Italian invasion of Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) in 1935, the Spanish Civil War (1936), the Japanese incursions into China (1931 and 1937), the German annexation of Austria, the consequences of Munich (1938), and the collapse of the League of Nations. Nor did Stalin's discouraging failures in China and Indonesia augur well for any hope of communizing colonies and semi-colonies. Finally, the establishment of the "united front" and the anti-fascist alliance between Soviet Russia and the Western powers (1941-1945) erected a final wall

between the communists and the colonies, for "consideration for their new Western allies forbade any intervention in colonial affairs."¹⁸ It was hardly possible for the Soviets to concern themselves about Africa during the war period.

For these reasons, the Soviets were not able to gather much information about Africa prior to the mid 1950s; when they did it was too late, for events had overtaken them. Before this time, according to Waldemar Neilsen, "few, if any, scholars ever travelled to that area" [Africa].¹⁹ An even more precise picture is given by Petier Lessing who states that as late as 1957, only two Soviet experts on Africa had visited that continent "and few had ever met an African."²⁰

It is reasonable to assume that if circumstances had been different, the Soviet leadership would have taken time to familiarize itself with Africa and be better prepared before moving in. Ivan Potekhin, the leading Soviet Africanist and special advisor to Khrushchev, had recommended that "an intensive study be made of the mentality of the black man in Africa and that the Russian propaganda activities . . . should take note of the results."²¹ However, in the Cold War period time was short. Nor was the U.S. the only power that the Soviet Union had to try to forestall; she had also to vie with Chinese aspirations. Thus, in addition to the geographical distance the lack of adequate information about Africa and the low level of her political

consciousness made that continent seem very "far away."

It would seem for these reasons that due to circumstances beyond her control, the Soviet Union found it extremely hard to educate herself about Africa and its peoples. Relative to the Western countries, she was virtually ignorant about the continent. Sidney Verba in his assessment of the extent to which foreign policy decision-making is governed by rational processes states that the less information the decision-maker has about the other country and that country's relationships with other countries, the more likely it is "that his behavior will be based upon non-logical influences."²²

Where ignorance prevails, there is a tendency to replace it with unverified assumptions; where scanty knowledge, or inadequate information prevails there is a tendency to supplement it with unverified assumptions following the dictates of our ideologies.

Delusive Signals

Misperception presupposes the existence of some object, fact or condition. There has to be something to perceive or to misperceive. When, therefore, one talks about misperception in Soviet foreign policy in Black Africa, one implies the existence of certain specific developments and trends. What were these developments and trends, and how were they interpreted by the Soviets? These conditions will be analysed from the point of view of history, the

influence of Marxism-Leninism, impediments to democracy, and the absence of capital and a capital owning class.

The Soviet Union had no role in Africa's historical development. There was no record of slavery, of colonial conquest, or of "economic exploitation." This logically gave the Soviet Union a tabula rosa to work with. It was the contrary where Western relations with Africa are concerned; for their slate was not blank. Margaret Roberts makes this point when she asserts that with the colonial exploitation of their extractive industries and primary commodities to the detriment of industry and agriculture, African nationalist leaders came to identify capitalism with the colonial powers.²³

Kenneth w. Grundy, discussing Mali, explains Africa's aversion to capitalism in a similar vein:

Since they associate capitalism with the hated colonial economic structure, it [capitalism] was never really considered as a live possibility. . .²⁴

The anti-colonial sentiment and the struggle for independence struck the awaited chord in Leninism-Stalinism: the final push from the peasants of the colonies and semi-colonies, (the "rear" and "the reserve of imperialism")²⁵ had started and the collapse of imperialism was imminent. Since the developed nations acknowledge only two dominant types of political and economic system, parliamentary democracy cum capitalism and socialism, the rejection of the one system seemed to mean the acceptance of the other.

To the Soviets, therefore, the anti-colonial agitation and the aversion to capitalism meant the espousal of socialism. As Peter Worsley noted, to the Soviets African "independence and socialism went together."²⁶

Who would doubt such a conclusion when, after independence, Sékou Touré, the president of the Republic of Guinea, declares his rejection of "capitalism as a social form of organization because it does not correspond to our stage of development?"²⁷ Or if Modibo Keita, President of the Republic of Mali, declares (in the Lomonosso Institute, Moscow) "You and we are both convinced of the victory of socialism?"²⁸ Or, if Kwame Nkrumah declares he is a "Marxist socialist?"²⁹ Or, if Julius Nyerere of Tanzania states, "I believe that the purpose of socialism was to remove the sin of capitalism . . ." and "that no under-developed country can afford to be anything but socialist?"³⁰ Werner Klatt, alluding to where the wind would blow, states that,

. . . their [the African leaders] experience of their own colonial past was still too vivid to make for objectivity in the comparison between the Western and the socialist historical costs.³¹

Robert Jervis, in his discussion of the sources of concepts, states the importance of history as teacher and as a conditioner of state behavior: "A state's previous unfortunate experience with a type of danger can sensitize it to other examples of that danger." "While this sensitivity", Jervis continues, "may caution that state to avoid

the mistakes of the past, it may also distort the perception of that state and make the present situation look like the past one":³² hence the general suspicion of the West by most African leaders. Since Africans did not want another foreign "master" their past experiences made them suspicious of the Soviets also.

The Soviet intent was to take advantage of this "unfortunate" historical experience and the African suspicion of the West. The anti-colonial agitation in Africa, the general tenor of the political activities on that continent, the logic of the whole situation plus the pronouncements of the African leaders seemed to point to Africa's rejection of capitalism in favor of socialism. These events and trends in Africa were probably some of the reasons Nikita Khrushchev had the confidence to say (at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Moscow 1956), "the chief feature of our epoch is the emergence of socialism from the confines of one country and its transformation into a world system."³³

To the Soviet leaders the attainment of independence in Black Africa meant a serious blow to the economy of Western Europe and to the capitalist system itself. As Ye Zhukov put it, African independence whether won by military or non-violent means "represents a revolutionary process."³⁴ The struggle for African independence and the general trend of political activities on that continent were a "progressive"

effort on the part of Africa's leaders; and to quote Khrushchev, "all progress leads to socialism."³⁵ In the Soviet Union, therefore almost all the signals received from Africa indicated one thing--socialism.

The second variable which promoted socialist tendencies in Africa, and which made the Soviets think that she was falling into their orbit, was the influence of Marxism-Leninism in Africa. Fenner Brockway observed in 1963 that most of the African leaders were then in the forty to fifty year age-group. This means that they were at the end of their student days when World War II was concluded. Students in many parts of Europe were influenced by the general post-war socialist sentiment which was sweeping the continent. In Britain, it was this sentiment which helped push the Labour Party into power in 1945. In Oxford, Cambridge, London, Edinburgh, Manchester and other universities there were socialist sentiments especially among the students who had returned from the war.³⁶ Julius Nyerere, the present President of Tanzania and one of Africa's leading socialists, is a product of Edinburgh.³⁷

Brockway states that in the London School of Economics, attended by many Africans, the teachings of Socialist-oriented Harold Laski exerted a tremendous influence on students. Kwame Nkrumah was a product of this educational institution. (Leopold Senghor, President of Senegal is a product of the Sorbonne.)³⁸ Europe was not the only place

where this socialist sentiment flourished. Black students, both American and African, in the United States formed various groups and attentively followed political developments in Britain. Black students at Lincoln University, where Nkrumah took his first degree, were a noted example. Dr. Azikiwe, later to become the Governor-General of Nigeria, had earlier graduated from the same university.³⁹ As Nkrumah himself points out in his autobiography, his socialist and revolutionary ideas were modeled after the teachings of Hegel, Engels, Mazzini, and particularly by Marx and Lenin.⁴⁰ His first book written in 1962, is almost entirely a lofty Marxist-Leninist polemic against imperialism.⁴¹

There was no organic relationship between the political movements in English-speaking Africa and the political parties in the metropole. The Communist party in Britain, even before its outlawry during the war, was small and weak. The English-speaking colonies, in general, were therefore less exposed to the socialist trends pervasive in Europe than the French-speaking colonies. The French-speaking colonies had a direct relationship with the French Communist party through the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA), the most important political party in French West Africa.

Charles Adrain states that there were two important features of Marxism which affected Sékou Touré of Guinea.

One was the Marxian notion of contradictions, which in the African context Touré believed existed between the African on the one hand and the European on the other. The other Marxian idea was the notion of alienation. Touré, Adrain goes on, explains why Africans feel alienated from the West by accusing the colonialists of neglecting the human aspects of their economic and technical operations. Touré was also influenced by Lenin's concepts of the party, leadership and political organization in general.⁴²

Mali's Modibo Keita was another French African leader who was heavily influenced by Marxism-Leninism. Kenneth Grundy declares that Mali's officials and the ruling party, the Union Soundanaise, was "one of the most Marxist-Leninist-oriented governing regimes in West Africa."⁴³ Because of their former association with the Communist party in the metropole, Guinea, Mali, and Senegal became some of the most Marxist-Leninist-oriented countries in Black Africa.

In addition to Marx and Lenin, the ideas of such Negro revolutionary intellectuals as Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois, and George Padmore served as inspiration for Africa's leaders, especially in the English-speaking territories. Though Du Bois later in his life wavered between Democratic Socialism and Communism, the deep impression of Marx made him "a life-long opponent of capitalism." Similarly, although George Padmore broke away from

Communism in the 1930s "he never forsook his socialist principles."⁴⁴

If the Soviets wanted to contact Black Africa, it is reasonable to assume that those African leaders who were oriented toward Marxism-Leninism should be the ones to form relationships with. It would be unrealistic for the Soviet Union to attempt to influence Black Africa through Tubman's Liberia, through Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, or through Houphouet Boigny's Ivory Coast.

The third variable which estranged Africa from the West was the existence of certain impediments to the development of the parliamentary democratic system. Carl G. Rosberg Jr. singles out some of these impediments.⁴⁵ In the first place the unintegrated nature of African societies made operating a parliamentary system difficult. This unintegrated social system, Rosberg explains, came from the existence of two systems of values--the one held by the rural traditionalists, and the other held by the modernists. This political dualism, Rosberg concludes, did not foster a homogeneity of views and did not augur well for the development of national consciousness or national identity. Rosberg states that cultural, ethnic, or tribal, and historical differences accentuated by uneven economic and social development also contributed to the non-integrated nature of African societies. Unless the peoples of a society are ready and willing to identify

with the nation as against the tribe, ethnic or cultural group, parliamentary democracy has a hard time functioning efficiently.

The second obstacle to democracy, according to Rosberg, was the short duration of Africa's exposure to parliamentary institutions and the brevity of the continent's experience in the functioning of these institutions. Before World War II, not much was done by the European powers by way of state-building and the development of modern democratic institutions. Rosberg's contention is that the anti-colonial agitation and its consequences took up the brief period between The War and independence leaving little time for Africans to practice solving their problems and issues within the parliamentary democratic framework.

However, the view which seems to have stronger historical support and which is more popular in Africa is that there would have been ample time and that the Africans were eager to be exposed to the practice of the parliamentary system. John E. Flint describing the general situation in Black Africa thinks that educated Africans (the only agents for the dissemination of the ideas of the democratic system) were in fact discriminated against by colonial officers as far back as the 1890s. With the system of Indirect Rule (government through traditional chiefs, in most cases illiterate) the discrimination against the educated Africans was intensified.

In Flint's words, "Africans thus found promotion, especially to key posts much more difficult."⁴⁶ Consequent to the system of divide and rule, the traditional "stipend chiefs" came to be "on the whole hostile to educated Africans."⁴⁷

In Nigeria, the British "called a halt to the development of the legislative councils" and failed to "introduce the elective principle."⁴⁸ In fact, as Lucian W. Pye points out, it was the same frustrated Western educated Africans who turned to nationalist agitation for independence.⁴⁹

Rosberg's view that useful time which should have been spent on studying democratic principles was wasted on the conduct of anti-colonial agitation is at variance with the facts of the time. What is more important is that the practice of parliamentary democracy presented difficulties in the post-independence African situation and many leaders felt they had no choice but to brush it aside in favor of more authoritarian forms of government which they saw as more appropriate to the existing circumstances. This meant government by single party, highly centralized and often authoritarian regimes, which had precedents in Africa's traditional chieftaincy system, and parallels in the Soviet system of government.

The third impediment to democracy, according to Rosberg, was the lack of the crucial social requisites such as transportation and communications systems, the

lack of wide-spread literacy and mass media participation. Efficient systems of transportation and communication are essential for the development of personal and group relations within the nation. Such systems serve as nation building agencies and expose ethnic, tribal and regional units to less parochial and divisive influences. In Africa such nation-building agencies were generally absent or poorly developed. Where they existed, they were controlled by the state, the only institution which could afford the cost, hence the great importance of the state sector.

The low level of literacy was another factor which impeded the development of national consciousness in most African countries. A high level of illiteracy hampers political participation and encourages apathy. In Africa large masses of people were uninformed, or poorly informed about the events that were transpiring at the national level.

A fourth factor which encouraged African leaders to reject capitalism was the lack of capital and capital owning classes in their various countries. Just as time and experience in the running of parliamentary democracy were limited in Africa, so also was time for developing acumen for the Western type of economy. Nor had indigenous capital owning classes had a chance to grow in the colonial atmosphere.

Margaret Roberts noted that in the colonial period Africans were, by and large, excluded from participating in private enterprise. Capital, she continues, was in the main foreign-owned and large proportions of profits were repatriated. This state of affairs consequently stunted the growth of any sizable capital-owned class with a vested interest in capitalism. The result was the growth of a truncated bourgeoisie. Seydou Kouyaté, one time Malian Minister of Planning and Rural Economy, alluding to Mali's woeful economic situation at the time of independence, expressed the logic of Africa's situation: "You cannot be a capitalist when you have no capital." Sékou Touré said simply, "Guinea needs capital not capitalism." Mamadou Dia, then Vice-President of Senegal, outlined two conditions which are present in the capitalist states of Western Europe, but which are absent from Africa: "abundant capital" and "a bourgeois class willing to take risks."⁵⁰ The absence of these two conditions in Africa, Dia concluded, went against the development of a capitalist system.

Similar to the effect of the other socio-cultural factors discussed above, the absence of sizable and viable capital-owning classes had a strengthening effect on state power since only the state had the means to accumulate capital and engage in large scale investment. John Kautsky states that in the absence of sufficient wealth in private hands, the government becomes the only major domestic

source of capital. The modernizing élite, if they wanted to industrialize, must first wrest power from the native aristocracy or the traditional élite, and from the colonial administrators, both of whom were averse to industrialization.⁵¹ Since it was only the government which had the means to finance industrialization, the struggle on the part of the intelligentsia to gain control of the political sector inevitably led to the strengthening of the state sector. The strengthening of the state sector is facilitated by the creation of a single-party system. Thus, the two salient features of the Soviet political system, the single party and the state sector, began to appear in Africa soon after independence. Soviet observers did not overlook this parallel.

If certain trends and developments in Africa created optimism among Soviet leaders, so also did certain conditions in the Soviet Union increase the appeal of Communism to some African intellectuals for a time and caused feelings of complacency among Soviet leaders.

John Kautsky points out the developments in Africa and the Soviet Union that made Communism appealing to African intellectuals, and gave the Soviet leaders reason to believe that their model would be followed by the new states. Kautsky notes that as the Communists were anti-traditional and anti-Western so also were Africa's intelligentsia, that the Communists initiated rapid

industrialization and African leaders aspired to do the same. In other words, both the Communists and the underdeveloped countries had certain similar aspirations and certain similar "enemies."⁵²

One of the most striking accomplishments of the Soviet Union had been the program of rapid industrialization which turned a relatively backward country into a world power. While England took over a hundred years to attain the height of industrial power, and Japan approximately fifty years, the Soviet Union took forty to achieve even greater economic power. The success of the Five Year Plans and the detonation of the A-bomb in 1949 impressed the world. Similarly, the successful firing of her Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in 1957, and the orbiting of the Sputnik later the same year made headlines. As Kautsky points out, these outstanding Soviet successes provided a strong propaganda appeal for the intelligentsia of the emerging states.⁵³

Rapid industrialization was a central theme in the African anti-colonial struggle and independence was a prerequisite for rapid industrialization.⁵⁴ Gradualism was unattractive to the African intelligentsia; they wanted quick results. In Kenneth Grundy's words, "African leaders seek a strategy which is rapid and positive and not experimental."⁵⁵

Contrary to more popular opinion, Worsley states that the human cost of the Soviet model did not bother African intellectuals. His opinion is that only certain aspects of the history of the Soviet industrial development were selectively recalled:

. . . what they [the African intellectuals] do know, empirically and not hypothetically is that a country of peasants equipped, in 1917, only with wooden ploughs, was able to challenge the richest country in the world for world leadership within forty years and to put the first man into space.⁵⁶

Zbigniew Brzezinski reiterates the same view when he says,

Neither the huge price paid by the Soviet in human life nor their continued failures, especially in agriculture . . . have been enough to inhibit this admiration of African intellectuals for the Soviet Union's achievements.

Another characteristic of the Soviet Union which appealed to Africans was her successful multinationalism. The Soviet Union has been able to perform the arduous task of unifying different ethnic and regional groups under one strong centralized single-party government. She has succeeded in modernizing, not only the Russian Federated Soviet Republic, but also such Central Asian territories as Uzbekistan, Caucasian republics like Georgia, and even such backward nomadic hunting societies as Siberia. What is more, these republics are (theoretically) autonomous and have some degree of "national" cultural character. In spite of the deficiencies of Soviet attitude towards these minority

republics, the ability to amalgamate them all into one collective republic provided a model for the new African states faced with ethnic, regional and tribal problems. Chinese, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav leaders had also successfully coped with their minorities and untiringly reminded their African visitors of the multi-national character of their states. The message was that the Communist system offered successful models for unifying diverse regional, ethnic and tribal groups under one state system.⁵⁸

Finally, the similarity between the traditional African communal system (communalism) and the Soviet-type socialism (Communism) was another reason why many African intellectuals were drawn toward Communism. The emphasis on the communal aspects of African society derived from the assumption that it was as classless as the Soviet society is supposed to be.

Reality Versus Apparent Similarity

From all appearances, Black Africa was moving East. Since Andrei Zhdanov officially divided the world into antagonistic blocks in 1947, all countries in the world were fitted into either the "imperialist and anti-democratic camp," or the "anti-imperialist democratic camp."

There were to be no grey areas. From their respective ideological positions, both the Soviet Union and the United States scanned the world, observed national political activities and general trends in Black Africa, and set out to outbid and outmaneuver each other in their search for proselytes. To the West it appeared that Africa was falling to the Communists; to the Soviets, signals from most parts of Black Africa indicated that that continent was moving out of the Western orbit and provided the basis for the assumptions from which Soviet calculations derived. There were six major assumptions.

1. that Black African countries would become more radical, anti-imperialist and anti-Western, and therefore pro-Soviet;⁵⁹
2. that many African nations would put restrictions on Western capital in favor of Soviet aid;
3. that economic development, social progress and peace would be the primary concern for the new African states as against Chinese radical militancy.
4. that the Soviet ideological influence on Africa was great and that friendly African countries would value this;
5. that African independence and socialism went together;⁶⁰ and
6. that the Soviet Union would gain political advantages.

By and large these assumptions were wrong. Let us examine the first assumption: that African countries would become more radical, anti-imperialist, anti-Western and therefore pro-Soviet. The misperception involved the fact that the struggle for independence was not solely anti-imperialist or anti-Western; it was also anti-traditional, for the modernizing intellectual élite had to struggle against the traditionalists as well as the colonial power for the control of the state. In other words the struggle for independence as well as being anti-imperialist was also anti-African in certain respects.

Robert Rotberg's picture of the struggle for independence seems to be the clearest: it was anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and had overtones of racism, Africanism, anti-Africanism in some respects, anti-foreignism and xenophobia.⁶¹ The expulsion of the Soviet ambassador, Daniel Solod from Guinea in 1961 was a clear indication to the Soviet leadership that just as African states could be anti-Western, so also could they be anti-Soviet. The main objective of the African states especially after independence was to dissociate themselves from both East and West and remain non-aligned, even if to the Soviet Union "true" non-alignment must be pro-Soviet or anti-Western.⁶²

The second assumption that many African countries would restrict Western capital in favor of Soviet aid was also erroneous. Even though the most radical trio, Ghana,

Guinea and Mali, claimed they disliked capitalism, they did not dislike capital. Sékou Touré made it clear when he said that Guinea needed capital, though not capitalism: "We have never excluded co-operation with capital."⁶³ In fact, capital, in the form of Western investment was so crucial that without it most Black African countries would not be able to fulfill their post independence development plans. In Nkrumah's "Work and Happiness Program," which became the basis of the Seven Year Plan, he made substantial allowance for the private sector.⁶⁴ As Walter H. Dew puts it, "even in the hey day of Guinea's socialism, there was little question about her ties with international capitalism in the industrial and extractive sectors," and this tendency had increased since 1961.⁶⁵

The third assumption, that economic and social development, and peace would be the primary concern for the new African states and that these new states would repudiate Chinese radical militancy was also disproved by subsequent events. The Chinese involvement in Africa, and the challenges it posed to the Soviet position on that continent will be discussed in detail in a separate chapter. At this point, one need only remember that economic and social progress were the paramount concerns of the new African states and this concern did not obviate the applicability of militant methods if they were deemed necessary.

The new leaders used all means possible in the pursuit

of their goals. While Nkrumah showered invectives upon the "Western imperialists," he solicited the same imperialists for loans to finance projects (the Akosombo Dam), and set up camps to train discontented Africans to overthrow neighboring African governments. There was evidence that the Chinese were involved in this design. Sékou Touré threatened, nationalized, and finally decided to denationalize foreign holdings. The new African states were more concerned about achievements than putting conventional labels on methods.

Moreover, there was no question that direct Chinese involvement existed in areas of Africa where factions fought each other for control of political power, or where national liberation movements clashed with metropolitan forces. During the Cameroonian crisis (1955-1962) China openly supported the guerrilla forces against the French and the local authorities. While the nationalist forces were supplied with Czechoslovakian arms, China was mainly concerned with the provision of finances and the award of scholarships for the study of bomb-making and guerrilla tactics in China.⁶⁶ In the Algerian war (1954-1962) China offered aid totalling some \$10 million to the National Liberation Front (FLN).⁶⁷ In the Congo, China readily made \$3 million available to the Lumumbist government upon the request of Vice-Premier Gizenga.⁶⁸

In the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, Chinese military aid was readily granted to guerrilla forces. Guerrillas in Somalia and Zanzibar also benefited from

Chinese military aid. Even in Ghana, Guinea and Mali, areas of Soviet concentration, Chinese influence was quite remarkable. There were many in Black Africa who were responsive to the radical tenor of China's propaganda, contrary to Soviet expectations. Indeed, as the third chapter will show, Soviet manouvering to counteract the influence of China in Black Africa was one of the reasons the Soviet Union found it necessary to change her foreign policy in that part of the continent.

The fourth assumption that Soviet ideological influence was pervasive and appreciable in Africa was only partially true. If this assumption is examined shortly after Black Africa's independence and before the idea of African socialism began to gain momentum, one would be able to say with a greater degree of confidence that the assumption was wrong. However there is substantial evidence to the effect that Communism did hold popular appeal in certain intellectual circles both in Africa and among Africans abroad prior to independence. Fenner Brockway, Waldemar Nielsen, Ivan Potekhin and William Friedland all agreed that the Communist model was the more popular alternative, at one time or another in Africa prior to the attainment of independence.⁶⁹

Although none of these authors is specific about the precise identity of adherents to the Communist model, Roger Murray seems to suggest that Ghana might have been one such country. He refers to the fact that in Ghana, in the early

1960s, a debate which had begun among certain Ghanaian students abroad in the 1940s was revitalized. The purpose of this debate was to seek a socialism "of a more universal and scientific theory."⁷⁰

Even though the appeal of Communism might have influenced trends of thought in the pre-independence period, there were changes after independence when African socialism came into vogue. All four scholars are agreed on this.⁷¹ This means that although ideas were changing in Africa, Soviet thinking was not. In the post-independence period, African leaders and politicians used the term "socialism" rather indiscriminately. At times the term meant African socialism while at other times it meant socialism of the British type or the Soviet type. However, the Soviet leaders were inclined to attach the third meaning to the term whenever they noticed its use.

One thing did become clear: all African states including Ghana, Guinea, and Mali rejected the Communist model. Since Communist ideology is heavy with the Marxist notion of class struggle, the irrelevance of that notion in the African context rendered the whole model ill-suited for Africa. Also, according to Chandler Morse, the lack of trained cadres able to plan and operate an African economy without the private sector (i.e. without the West), the continuing influence of Western values and the resultant unwillingness to incur the human costs of building socialism

were some of the reasons why the Communist model failed to be adopted in Africa.

The inappropriateness of Soviet ideology, evidenced by Africa's rejection of the Communist model, indicates the equally inappropriate fifth assumption that African independence and socialism went together. It certainly did not go with the Soviet-type socialism. Nor did it seem often to go with African socialism.

The five Soviet assumptions discussed underlay the sixth assumption: that political advantages would accrue to the Soviet Union in her interactions with Black African states. This assumption proved wrong both logically and empirically. Any political advantages the Soviet Union might have gained were small and ephemeral. Contrary to Soviet long-term policy, no Communist party government emerged in Africa. By 1962 the Soviets had realized the futility of this long-term objective. As the years went by, they realized further how difficult it was to try to fit Africa into their ideology or to fit their ideology into Africa.

When the Soviets interpreted anti-colonialism in Africa as pro-Communism and saw the rejection of capitalism as a rejection of Western capital, it was because they were accustomed to viewing any move toward independence in "the rear" and "the reserve of imperialism" as Stalin

called the colonies and the semi-colonies,⁷² as part of the universal struggle against capitalism and imperialism.

Summary

In this chapter the writer has investigated the role ideology played in the Soviet misperception of the conditions in Black Africa. Since all national behavior is a product of decision-making, it was necessary to discuss that concept and to show what influence ideology had on the world-view of the decision-makers of the Soviet Union.

The influences of ideology, it seems, were the main reason why certain developments in Africa, both before and after independence, were more readily noticed by the Soviets and seen as anti-Western and pro-Soviet. Lack of information about Africa and the dynamics of African societies made it easy for the Soviets to rely on ideology as a guideline for the interpretation of the events and trends in Black Africa. Soviet misperception of Africa contributed to a number of assumptions, most of which proved to be wrong.

Although she was using the same verbiage and sometimes similar methods as the Soviets, Black Africa was more interested in carving out an identity for herself than following Soviet or any other model. While the notions of neutrality, African personality and African socialism were

much discussed, they did not have the meaning the Soviets attributed to them. It was these broad notions plus the anti-colonial and anti-Western sentiments that deluded the Soviets into thinking that post-independence Black Africa was united against colonialism and imperialism.

Additionally, after about two years of interaction with Black Africa, the Soviets realized that the unity of Black African countries, which they had counted on, was illusionary and that Black Africa was in fact more divided than they had imagined. This was a serious threat to Soviet preconceptions. In the following chapter, an attempt will be made, inter alia, to investigate the causes of the divisiveness in Black Africa and the effects it had on Soviet policy.

CHAPTER 3

PROBLEMS OF THE EARLY 1960s

When Nikita Khrushchev came to power in 1956 the Soviet Union was a full-fledged military power. Her economy was much stronger and her diplomatic and propaganda skills were more highly advanced than ever before. She had successfully completed her Five Year Plans, had developed an atomic bomb (1949), and hydrogen bomb (1953), an ICBM (1957) and the Sputnik (1957). All these achievements coincided with the anti-colonial, and to some extent, anti-Western tendencies in Africa. This made it easy for the Soviets to assume that they would eventually be able to win at least some African countries into their orbit provided they could forestall the USA and China. However it was not long before the Soviets realized the difficulties involved.

The upheaval in Africa and its transformation from a mere object of colonial exploitation to a world-political force, particularly its scope and its speed, took the Communists by surprise. As a result they were unprepared and not able to take advantage of the situation to obtain a firm foothold from the start.¹

By 1962 the Soviet leaders had become disillusioned about Black Africa. This called for a change in Soviet policy orientation. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the main factors which contributed to this change in Soviet attitude toward Black Africa within the short 1957-62 period. Were these factors solely African in origin, or did certain

conditions in the Soviet domestic setting play a role? Berlin and Havana seemed far removed from the African scene, but it was possible that the Soviet Union's involvement in those areas affected her relations with Black Africa. This chapter will deal with these possibilities.

Three sets of variables will be discussed. The first is African: the existence of ideological and political groups and the general disunity among African states, the concept of African socialism, and Guinea's return to the West. The second set of variables is domestic Soviet economic setbacks, the resultant social problems, and the opposition of the satellite countries to Soviet aid to developing countries. The third variable is the International sphere: the change in the Cold War situation and the 1963 Soviet détente with the West.

Change of Strategy

It is necessary to digress here in order to point out that Soviet penetration of Black Africa in itself was inconsistent with the Stalinist "two camp" theory which divided the world into two major camps; "the imperialist anti-democratic" camp, and the "anti-imperialist democratic" camp.² This theory made no allowance for neutrality. However, by the mid 1950s it became necessary for the Soviet Union to adapt her view to the changing

world situation for several reasons. First, the advent of Malenkov, and then Khrushchev, consolidated the position of the new managerial leadership. Although the new leadership continued to preach the proletarian revolution, it seemed to be more interested in peace and modernization.³

Second, the failure of Communist-led insurrections in Iran, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, and India called for a different type of tactic. One factor which influenced the Soviet attitudes to the new states (when they emerged later) was "the almost universal failure of internal rebellion and external aggression to yield gains for the Communists in the less developed countries."⁴

The third reason why the Soviet Union decided to abandon her revolutionary tactics was her very technological and military might. Khrushchev's contention was that since the Soviet Union was now equally as powerful as the US and the West, they all should expend their resources in another type of competition--a "peaceful competition" within the framework of "peaceful co-existence."

The Soviet-Western military parity, whether real or imagined, ushered in the fourth factor, the question of deterrence. The Soviets learned from the Korean situation that the United States was ready to meet force with force. Even as they feared American reactions, so also were they certain that their own possession of the same type of weaponry, nuclear or conventional, could deter American

reactions of force to Soviet activities in the developing countries.

John Kautsky emphasises the view that the Soviet change of attitude was prompted by the exigencies of the Cold War. According to him, since the Soviet Union had lost her last pre-war "popular front" and the war-time "united front" allies to the US, she needed new allies. Once in the Cold War she was determined to summon all forces, no matter what they were, or where they came from, in order to counteract American objectives.⁵ For the Soviets, therefore, the First Bandung Conference was a welcomed event, not only because of its search for disarmament and peace, but also because the Soviets would be able to exploit the neutrality of the participants even if she might not be able to win them wholly to her side.

In a short time the first Black African new state would be independent, to be followed by others in a quick succession. Some of the most influential of them would be taking the course of "positive neutrality." This, the Soviet Union was ready to support and exploit, for what was more important to her was not necessarily the winning of the new states to her side but denying them to the US and the West. The UN votes of the new states in the early 1960s seemed to fulfill Soviet hopes.

Even before the Black African countries became independent, India had given a practical demonstration of her

neutrality when in the Korean War she refused to support the West in the UN resolution condemning Communist China as an aggressor, and when she took some "other independent actions."⁶ The Soviet Union, therefore, became convinced that at least some of the future independent countries could, indeed, make independent decisions with disregard for their former metropole. This demonstration of neutrality, according to Walters, played an important role in the drastic shift in the general Soviet policy orientation before the penetration of Africa.⁷

All these factors collectively encouraged the Soviet leadership to abandon the "two camp" theory and adopt the doctrine of "peaceful co-existence"; a doctrine which would create difficulties for the Soviets in the African setting especially after Chinese penetration. By the time most of the Black African territories attained their statehood, the Soviet Union had adopted a new strategy which seemed to open the possibility of co-opting the emerging African forces in the struggle against "Western imperialism."

Africa Disunited

As the Soviets moved into Africa in the late 1950s they hoped to find a strong unity among the African states who had just freed themselves from "colonial exploitation," and who had every logical reason to unite against the "neo-colonial" tactics of their ex-colonial masters.⁸ However, the Soviets found this African unity seriously fragmented.

The fear of economic hardships after independence and the inability of some of the new states, particularly the French-speaking countries, to define their relationships clearly with their former metropole was one reason for the lack of unity. The lack of consensus over certain major issues was the other reason. The result was the splintering of newly independent Black Africa into ideological and political groups. Some discussion of these groups is necessary.

The Casablanca Group was identified with "radical," or to use Communist parlance, "progressive" orientations. Inspired by the example of the thirteen American colonies which ultimately led to the formation of the United States, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana joined forces with Sékou Touré of Guinea to form the Ghana-Guinea Union on November 23, 1958. This union was to form the "core of the United States of West Africa."⁹ After the collapse of the Mali Federation (Federation of Soudan, which became Mali after independence, and Senegal) and after the failure of Houphouët-Boigny's efforts to woo Mali to his side,¹⁰ the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union was inaugurated in Conakry, Guinea, on December 23, 1960. This union was the embryo of Nkrumah's continental design, the Union of African States.

The Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union became the sub-Saharan core of the Casablanca Group. Aside from these three the Casablanca Group comprised the North African countries of

Algeria, United Arab Republic. Morocco, and Libya. This group was inaugurated at Casablanca in Morocco on July 7, 1961. The Casablanca charter countries repeated their intention to form a Joint African Command (June, 1961), and on July 22 of the same year, the economic experts announced their decision in favor of the formation of an African Common Market to save Africa from "colonial domination."¹¹

In the same year, the Malian government requested that France vacate her military base at Gao in Mali. There was little doubt that the Soviet Union was very pro-Casablanca on account of its "militant anti-colonialism."¹² This was why the Soviets placed "particular emphasis on developing ties with the Black African members, the most prominent among the Casablanca participants."¹³

Counterposed to the Casablanca Group was the Brazzaville Group, founded in December 1960. It was a twelve-member Francophone organization.¹⁴ Several resolutions emerged from the inaugural meeting in Brazzaville, Congo, and subsequent meetings. Among other things, the members expressed their desire to maintain strong ties with France and the West. They were very anti-Communist oriented.¹⁵ The Soviets called the Brazzaville Group "reactionary and anti-democratic."¹⁶

A Nigerian-Liberian initiative to settle the differences between Casablanca and Brazzaville led to the enlargement of the latter into the twenty-member Monrovia Group, which the Soviets said was organized "not without the collaboration of the imperialists."¹⁷ Later the

Afro-Malagasy Union emerged from the Brazzaville Group. The Monrovia Group and the Afro-Malagasy Group had the same orientation as their parent Brazzaville association.¹⁸ It is the members of these two groups that were generally referred to as the moderates.

There was also the Council of the Entente founded in 1959 and composed of the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger and Dahomey. All these countries belonged to the Brazzaville Group. Since the Council of the Entente was founded earlier, and by the same person--Houphouet Boigny of the Ivory Coast--one could describe it as the core of the Brazzaville Group. In East Africa there was the East African Common Services Organization which was incorporated in the larger Pan-African Freedom Movement of East Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECASA) which had been founded in earlier years.

The constant wrangling, accusations and counter accusations which went on particularly between Casablanca and Bazzaville were destructive of the Soviet desired African unity against "imperialism". The confusion in Africa, or the "African Crisis," as Schatten calls it, came to a head over the United Nations' role in the Congo.¹⁹ The radicals resented the lack of firmness on the part of the moderates who in turn resented the over-anxiety of the radicals. The confrontation came into the open at the UN when Guinea moved that the Lumumba delegation be seated in the General Assembly, and when the moderates tabled a counter-motion to

seat the Kasavubu delegation.

The disagreement between the radicals and the moderates over the Congo was understandable given their ideological profiles and their relationships with the two super powers in this Cold War period, but the lack of consensus among the radicals themselves was very disturbing to the Soviets. Furthermore, Khrushchev had disagreements with his closest African "comrades," Nkrumah and Touré. Nkrumah's main aim was to keep the Cold War out of Africa and the Congo in order to prevent a civil war "of the Spanish type" and probably to enhance his, and Ghana's prestige on the international scene.²⁰ This seemingly was the main reason why he did not follow the example of the other Casablanca Powers (Egypt, Morocco, Guinea and Mali) which withdrew their contingents from the Congo in protest. Soviet resentment of this schism in the Casablanca Group is apparent in Potekhin's statement:

Not all the African states who sent contingents to the Congo recalled them when it became clear that the UN Command was employing them against the interests of the Congolese people.²¹

Even though Khrushchev and Touré had identical desires in the Congo--Tshombe's failure and the installation of a Lumumbist government, and the ouster of the Belgian colonists--they had different reasons. While Khrushchev saw the Congo as an opportunity to deny Africa to the West and thereby influence the balance of the bipolar system, and as an opportunity to promote a regime that might lean to the

socialist camp, and even possibly subscribe to the Soviet model of development, Touré wanted the Congo to be left neutral and "African."²²

As with Congo, African states were divided over the question of whether or not to recognize the Algerian National Liberation Front (the FLN). While the Brazzaville Group would not, the Casablanca Group did. African states were again divided over the question of disarmament and the French nuclear testing in the Sahara. While the Casablanca countries condemned the test, the Brazzaville countries were willing to let France go ahead.²³ Of all the instances of divisiveness among the new African states, the split over the Congo was apparently the one which shook the Soviets the most.

The conflict among African states late in 1960 over the Congo destroyed any thought Soviet leaders might have had that Africa could be united against imperialism.²⁴

The unstable relationships among the African states were further compounded by the impact of the European Common Market. Post-independence Africa became divided between the eighteen states which had the opportunity to choose to become associated with the European Economic Community (EEC), and the sixteen states which rejected, or, as in the case of Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, Libya, South Africa, and the Sudan, who never had the chance to become associated.²⁵ This division was the result of the Treaty of Rome (1957) which inaugurated the EEC and its Common Market and which, in

articles 131-8, provided for an "associated status" to enable the colonies and dependencies of the member-countries (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg) to benefit from the new association.

The member-states of the Afro-Malagasy Union showed ardent interest in the Common Market. Their strong attachment to France, the substantial economic assistance they received from the French government plus the above-the-world-price preferential protection France gave their principal exports were the main reasons. In March 1962, at the Addis Ababa conference of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the conflicting interests of the non-associated states and the associated states became evident. The Ethiopian resolution condemning associated membership in the EEC as antagonistic to the aspirations behind the formation of the African Common Market was defeated by the concerted effort of the Francophone states.

It became quite clear at the conference that the Anglophone territories, in general, rejected association with the EEC. Nigeria rejected it because the idea was irreconcilable with her policy of neutrality, and the East Africans rejected it because it would disrupt their own East African Common Market.²⁶ Expressed in Marxist-Leninist verbiage, Kwame Nkrumah's condemnation of the EEC was the most caustic. For him, the request by Senghor, the Senegalese President, that the Anglophone African states accept

the treaty was a "special plea for collective colonialism of a new order."²⁷ In Nkrumah's estimation, association with the EEC, among other things, would betray the policy of non-alignment, would encourage neo-colonialism, compound the divisions among African states, and jeopardize the efforts toward Africa's political and economic unity.²⁸

The Soviets saw the EEC as nothing but another imperialist trap. The EEC and the possibility of associate membership of some Black African countries "aroused special concern among Soviet policy-makers" and promoted a "Sudden anxiety over the Common Market" because of Britain's application for membership. What the Soviets feared was that the terms of Britain's membership would, and in fact it did, open the possibility of association for some of the Anglo-phone countries. The fear was over Nigeria's associate-membership in particular; for by 1962 Nigeria, a key member of the Monrovia Group, began to occupy the attention of the Soviet leaders following their decision to liberalize their attitudes toward the moderate states.²⁹ Nigeria's association with the EEC, they believed, would make Nigerian-Soviet rapport difficult, and certainly pose a threat to Nigerian-Soviet trade (no matter how limited it was).

Second, since Nigeria was a competitive producer of Ghana's principal agricultural products, Nigeria's association with the EEC might have some adverse effect on Ghana's economy and thus encourage Nkrumah to expand Ghana's trade with the EEC, Nigeria's association with the EEC posed

a threat to Ghanaian-Soviet commercial activities which the Soviets wanted to expand. These considerations played a part in the unleashing of Soviet propaganda against the EEC.

Soviet spokesmen continually encouraged Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa's Nigerian government to maintain its often-repeated stand against association with the EEC, and often quoted the president's public statements against such a move.³⁰ The visit of Modibo Keita, President of Mali, to the Soviet Union gave Khrushchev his first opportunity to deliver a public denunciation of the EEC. As a warning to Keita, Khrushchev presented the EEC as the economic weapon of NATO, and as a reincarnation of colonialism seeking to perpetuate the status of Africa as a "raw-material-supplying appendage to Europe."³¹

If the Soviet leadership was disappointed by the inability of the African states to unite against imperialism, so were they disappointed that Africans, who should know about the practical advantages of the Soviet model, should select a "third way," or African Socialism, as the model for development.

African socialists did not originally regard their views as remarkably distinctive. The early socialists, as discussed in the previous chapter, held the orthodox notion of Socialism as representing the interests of the proletariat as against the interests of the exploiting bourgeoisie. This changed late. During the anti-colonial struggle it became

apparent that many African leaders were saying similar things to the same African societies but in different ways.

Leopold Senghor's concept of negritude and Nkrumah's concept of African personality were examples which were indications of a search for a continental identity.³²

This search for a unifying doctrine was felt necessary as a reaction against colonialism and to some extent against Europe. Anti-colonialism was the rallying call during the nationalists struggles. Before independence it helped the African nationalists establish a "we-they" dichotomy and served as a unifying force which drew Africans closer together and helped create a "consciousness" of Africa's problems. After independence the need for a unifying doctrine did not abate. It was in the search for a replacement for the waning influences of nationalism and anti-colonialism that African Socialism began to assert its importance.

In addition to the role African Socialism was intended to play unifying African societies, it was also supposed to stress Africa's identity, distinguish it from both the East and West and thereby reinforce the continent's non-alignment on international issues.³³

According to William Friedland and Carl Rosberg, African Socialism was a continental phenomenon although certain African leaders tended to dissociate themselves from it and talk rather about "state capitalism". By announced

conviction, Nkrumah of Ghana, Touré of Guinea, Keita of Mali, Senghor of Senegal, and Nyerere of Tanzania were socialists. Tubman of Liberia, Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and M'ba of Gabon shunned the concept though their economic development plans were similar to that of Guinea, an avowedly socialist country.³⁴ And although Emperor Haile-Selassie of Ethiopia can hardly be called an active socialist, delegates from his country attended the Dakar Conference which was sponsored by Senghor to examine the character of African Socialism. In short, the idea of African Socialism was quite pervasive.

One of the salient characteristics of African Socialism was its emphasis on human nature as the center of Africa's traditional society--a society which was believed to have been classless, communal, and egalitarian. In Nkrumah's address to the University of Ghana Law School, he declared that "the African social system is communalistic . . . nor is there antagonism of class against class."³⁵ Expressing an identical view, Touré declares, "Africa is essentially 'communaucratic'. Collective life and social solidarity give her habits a humanistic foundation."³⁶ Keita expresses the same view when he declares, "We consider it would be bad policy to break down this traditional pattern of collective life."³⁷

One of the most obvious reasons why almost every single African leader, socialist or non-socialist,

disassociated himself from Communism was the inapplicability of the Marxian notion of class struggle. Though Africans may admire certain other aspects of Marxism, the notion of class struggle was so out of place (especially before, and soon after independence) as to dampen the admiration that African intellectuals may have had for Communism in general. As Senghor asks, "Must we have the proletariat and capitalists at war before we can talk about Marx?" "In our Negro-Berber society," Senghor goes on, "there is no class war, but merely social groups struggling for power or influence."³⁸ To Houphouet-Boigny, "the class struggle, which lies at the base of Communism, has no meaning in a classless society."³⁹

Though some may debate the notion of the classlessness of African societies, the African leaders believed that African societies were, by and large, tradition-bound and classless or only minimally stratified, leaving little room for a Marxist class-struggle. How many Black African territories had any industries and factories to produce the working class? Africa, being predominantly agricultural produced peasants, and peasants had no place in Marx's notion of the class struggle. Since Marxism, or Communism was not applicable in the African situation, a more suitable type of system was required and this was to be "African Socialism."

The emphasis on African Socialism proved to be another another test of Soviet assumption about Africa and its

leaders. For the first time they realized that although African leaders admired the achievements of the Soviet Union and China, they were not willing to apply Marxism-Leninism uncritically. By socialism, African leaders generally meant a hybrid from the best of both the East and the West, synthesized with the best of Africa's own values. Senghor exemplifies the trend:

We have chosen the African path to socialism which will be a synthesis of Negro-African cultural values, of Western methodological and spiritual values, and socialist technical and social values.⁴⁰

African Socialism was therefore a pragmatic amalgamation of different value systems designed to solve certain specific and peculiar problems. To quote Chisiza,

. . . it is both unnecessary and objectionable to narrow the range to the choice of two systems: capitalism and communism. As a matter of fact, the chances of either . . . being adopted in its unadulterated form are very slim. In Africa the tendency is toward a pragmatic approach which discards the irrelevant and incorporates the best from both systems.⁴¹

However ambitious Africa's selection of a "third way" might be, it lacked overall focus and direction. Each advocate seemed to have his own version of African Socialism. Even at the 1962 Dakar Conference the Africans themselves failed, as they had done before, to agree on what African Socialism was all about.

Toure's African Socialism put more attention on the masses, and was more concerned about political organization and leadership than about economic development per se.

Senghor was more interested in the individual than in the group or in the masses. Nkrumah's main concern was the creation of structures particularly on the urban level to facilitate economic development. While Nyerere was also concerned with economic development, the village was his focal point.

Nyerere's version of African Socialism was Ujamaa; Nkrumah's was Nkrumanism, which meant socialism for Ghana's peculiar problems, at one time,⁴² which later was defined as a continental ideology⁴³ and which still later became equated with Pan Africanism.⁴⁴ Nasser's version was called "cooperative socialism."⁴⁵ Ben Bella of Algeria was known to have preached two different types of African Socialism: "specific socialism" and "Arabo-Islamic socialism."⁴⁶

At first the Soviets were uncertain about how to react to Africa's "third way." However, when reaction came, it reflected disdain and disappointment. In November 1961 the party program of the CPSU officially condemned "socialism of the nationalist type," calling it a misleading "petty-bourgeois illusion of socialism."⁴⁷ Later, Brutents, a Soviet commentator, called the concept of African socialism an utopian illusion and a muddled idea.⁴⁸

The concept of African Socialism has still not been clearly defined by its African inventors. It lacks a theoretical basis, does not constitute a precise ideology, nor does it form a guide to action. It remains a set of

ideas having little coherence. African Socialism, Freidland asserts, can only be described as "socialist tendencies" or "trends."⁴⁹ Potekhin therefore seemed right when he wrote:

What is African Socialism? No simple complete theory of this concept exists. Each individual advocate of African Socialism has his own ideas about it and gives a different meaning to the concept.⁵⁰

The Soviets found it hard to understand why African leaders should choose such a loosely structured program for development instead of the Communist model whose efficacy had been universally demonstrated. This disappointment is evident in Potekhin's words:

. . . why are people who sincerely wish to build a Socialist society and abolish the exploitation of man by man unwilling to accept the scientific theory of Socialism, tested in practice, and instead engage in a search for some other kind of Socialist society?⁵¹

The Conakry-Moscow Dispute and its Aftermath

Of the many factors which contributed to the changes in the Black African Soviet relations in the 1957-1962 period, the Conakry-Moscow dispute was the most important. Guinea seemingly represented the most receptive objective for Soviet proselytizing efforts in Black Africa. The loss of this chance, therefore, represented another crucial test of the validity of Soviet assumptions about Black Africa. It consequently dealt a severe blow to Soviet policy, forcing Soviet policy-makers to redefine their priorities.

Guinea demonstrated courage, determination, and defiance toward France which merited the admiration of the Soviet leaders. In 1958 Guinea was the "sole defector" among France's fourteen African territories when she cast a 1,136,000 to 57,000 vote against joining the French Community.⁵² De Gaulle's reprisal was swift and severe. Within hours all French personnel--military, technical, administrative, medical, and educational were withdrawn from Guinea, reducing the country's trained manpower by 75 per cent.⁵³

Before their departure, the French destroyed almost all records, telephones, all portable capital equipment and machinery. Whatever could not be burned was thrown into the sea. As if France's unilateral action was not enough, De Gaulle persuaded the US to collaborate in putting pressure on Guinea.⁵⁴ De Gaulle's behavior was meant to clip Guinea's wings and bring her into submission. The French withdrawal plus the economic and diplomatic blockade which was erected around Guinea left her severely isolated and created a vacuum into which the Soviets moved:

As Guinea was dropped by France and ignored by the West both economically and politically, the Communist bloc was given an opportunity of breaking the international isolation in which Guinea thus found itself.⁵⁵

Sékou Touré was in dire need of assistance, and Nikita Khrushchev was willing and ready to help. The Soviet Union extended diplomatic recognition to Guinea only two days after her declaration of independence. On February 13, 1959,

a trade agreement was signed between the two countries. The Soviets offered credits totalling \$300,000 which was to be augmented to \$600,000 in the next protocol. In August the Soviets offered to raise Guinea's credits to \$35 million.⁵⁶ Marshall Goldman states that the \$35 million was further raised beyond \$61 million in 1960 and military loan of \$3 million also offered. In addition to all this Guinea received such gifts as a seven to eight million dollar radio station and a 500-bed hospital.⁵⁷ Guinea's difficult situation and the opportunities it presented made the Soviets willing and eager to satisfy almost all her needs. The shoe factory in Kindia, the vegetable cannery at Mamou, the 25,000-seat Olympic stadium and swimming pool, the modern Polytechnic Institute, and the expensive Camayenne Hotel were but a fraction of the long list of Soviet commitments.⁵⁸

The healthy Guinean-Soviet relations seemed strongly based and just a matter of time before Guinea became an African Cuba. In fact the Soviets had already started referring to Guinea as the "Peoples' Democracy."⁵⁹ By December 1960, it was reported that the Soviets had obtained the consent of Sékou Touré to establish a submarine base there.⁶⁰ The award of the Lenin Prize to Touré (the first African leader to win it) and the assignment of Daniel Solod, one of the most talented, skillful and most experienced of Soviet diplomats, to the Conakry post are some of the indications of the great importance the Soviet Union attached to Guinea.

Difficulties, however, were soon to arise as Guinea's needs seemed insatiable. The more the Soviets gave, or promised, the more Guinea requested. A Soviet refusal to give often caused disillusionment in Guinea, as in the case of the request to provide aid for a gigantic dam and hydro-electric plant on the Konkouré River.⁶¹ Guineans were irritated by the poor quality of Soviet equipment, the high cost of spare parts, the many breakdowns, delays, and postponements in the delivery of credits, and unfulfilled promises. Erlich and Sonne single out the failure of the seven thousand-hectare state farm at La Fie as the most important Soviet shortcoming which disillusioned the Guineans.⁶² It became apparent that the Soviets delivered better propaganda than goods. To quote Schatten, "After the original priming operations and the grandiloquent promises of economic assistance, the Soviet bloc countries did less and less for Guinea."⁶³

While Touré put the blame on the Soviets and accused them of unreliability, the Soviets accused the Guineans of lack of seriousness. In Solod's angry words, it was the Guineans who "didn't want to work," and it was they who "were ruining good Soviet equipment." According to him it was hard to take Guineans seriously.⁶⁴ The climax of the Conakry-Moscow dispute came in late 1961 when Daniel Solod was expelled from Guinea on December 16, for the part his embassy played in a teachers' strike and Guinean students studying in the Soviet Union were withdrawn instantly.

With the expulsion of Solod and the general deterioration of Conakry-Moscow relations, there remained no question of Guinea's interest in the restoration of relations with the West. Even before the Conkry-Moscow dispute came to a head, William Attwood, President Kennedy's ambassador to Guinea had,

. . . worked very hard to convince Touré that new toleration had been infused into American policy, that the president sympathized with his country's problems, and that the United States would be willing to help in solving them.⁶⁵

It was also reported that Attwood flew back and forth between Conakry and Washington lobbying for a "sizable aid offer" for Guinea and having "extended conversations" with Touré.⁶⁶ Goldman asserts that after Solod's expulsion, "the United States quietly followed up the incident with an offer of American aid and an invitation for Sékou Touré to visit President Kennedy."⁶⁷

In May 1961, \$25 million in American aid was promised Guinea for such items as a small dam and power station, a vocational training center and six small plants to produce consumer goods.⁶⁸ Aside from this promise the US and Guinea actually signed a \$12.5 million aid agreement. West Germany's president, Heinrich Lübke went personally to Conakry and offered a \$12 million loan. Meanwhile, sympathetic to Attwood's recommendation, Touré applied for Guinea's membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.⁶⁹ Continuing his efforts to turn to the

West, Touré announced Guinea's intention of normalizing Guinean-French relations.

We believe that in spite of old misconceptions, it is only through friendship and understanding that the future relations between France and Guinea can be built up.⁷⁰

To this end, a cultural agreement was signed between the two countries on July 29, 1961, enabling Guinea to recruit professors from France.⁷¹

In the same year Guinea took measures to denationalize industry as a gesture of readiness to re-forge relations with France and the US.⁷² It was for this reason that in April, 1962, the Guinean National Assembly voted to relax restrictions on foreign investment. The new investment code set up guaranteed against nationalization and instituted more favorable tax and customs arrangements to lure foreign investors.⁷³ Some time later, discussions started between Guinean officials and representatives of British, French, and American aluminum companies about the development of Guinea's rich bauxite reserves in the Boké region.⁷⁴

Though Guinea did not repudiate her economic relations with the USSR, it was obvious in which direction Touré was now steering his country. In 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis Touré refused to grant permission to Cuban-bound Soviet air craft to land on the very airstrip built by the Soviets a few months earlier, making clear the extent to which Guinean-Soviet relations had deteriorated.

How could Guinea turn her back on the Soviet Union who not too long before went to her rescue? How could she so quickly and easily forget the punitive steps France took to cripple her economically and diplomatically and turn back to her and the same "Western imperialists" from whom she successfully freed herself? What became of Guinea's revolutionary character? These were some of the problems which were likely to bother the Soviet leaders. For the Soviets, the turn of events in Guinea in 1961 was utter disappointment. As Legvold puts it, "a . . . deflation in Soviet spirits set in."⁷⁵

Soviet Domestic Setbacks

Relatively, Soviet aid to Africa was small (see Table I). Nonetheless one may hypothesize that Soviet economic setbacks had an effect on her aid-granting potential. According to Fritz Schatten:

This association of Soviet economic aid to Africa with the rising graph of Soviet economic development, means conversely that any difficulties experienced by the Soviet economic system is bound to have an unfavorable effect on Soviet aid to Africa.⁷⁶

Marshal Goldman also indicated that there was some correlation between the Soviet domestic economy and her ability to grant aid.⁷⁷ Between 1959 and 1961 Soviet aid to the underdeveloped countries in general was impressive and competitive. Soviet aid in this period exceeded a billion dollars per annum in value. This represented 0.5 per cent

Table 1

Total Soviet Economic Credits and Grants Extended to
Developing Countries Between
Jan. 1954 and June 30, 1962^a
(In Millions of US Dollars)

Latin America	Argentina	100	
	Cuba	300	
			40000
Middle East	Iraq	182.5	
	Syria	150.5	
	Turkey	9.6	
	Egypt	508.6	
	Yemen	25.7	
			876.9
Africa	Ghana	95.4	
	Guinea	71.1	
	Mali	55.4	
	Somalia	57.2	
	Sudan	25.0	
	Tunisia	27.8	
			433.7
Asia	Afghanistan	507.0	
	Burma	7.1	
	Cambodia	6.2	
	Ceylon	30.0	
	India	811.1	
	Indonesia	368.5	
	Nepal	10.4	
	Pakistan	33.2	1,773.5
Europe	Iceland	3.1	
	Yugoslavia	72.9	76.0

^aData do not include military aid. Not all the countries received aid in 1954. In fact offers were not extended to some of the African countries until about 1960. These aggregate data, therefore, only show the total amounts of aid extended to the various countries up to 1962.

Source: U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 474.

of the Soviet Union's GNP. But the Soviets "could not stand the pace." Consequently, between the fall of 1961 and 1962 Soviet aid commitments declined⁷⁸ because aid was not paying off (see Table 2).

Generally speaking, the amount of aid, per se, to a developing country may not be that important to the donor country. What is more important are the returns or the advantages--political, economic, or otherwise--which accrue from the aid. That is, aid may represent a high percentage of a donor's GNP, but there may be no feeling of frustration if her interests are being satisfied in one way or the other. On the other hand, even a small amount of aid with incommensurate returns may frustrate and disillusion the donor. Soviet disappointment in Black Africa is better seen from this latter perspective. Note should also be taken of the fact that it was not necessarily the increasing size of aid to Black Africa which put pressure on the Soviet economy which in turn effected the decline of Soviet aid commitments to Black Africa. There is no doubt that the sum total of aid commitments to the Third World as a whole could possibly have had a devastating effect on the Soviet economy. However, that is not the argument which this section of the chapter intends to raise. The crux of the argument here is that it was the economic problems in the Soviet Union and the satellite

Table 2

Trends in Soviet Economic Aid Commitments to Developing Counties
(In Millions of US Dollars)

Year	Africa		Asia		Latin America		Middle East		Total
	Amount	% of Total	Amount	% of Total	Amount	% of Total	Amount	% of Total	
1955-1957	0	0	496	73	0	0	183	27	679
1958	0	0	37	10	45	13	278	77	360
1959	137	16	577	67	0	0	141	16	855
1960	69	12	255	43	0	0	270	45	594
1961	193	35	354	67	0	0	0	0	547
1962	24	45	27	50	0	0	2	5	53
1963	100	42	53	22	0	0	83	35	236
1964	206	21	262	26	0	0	530	53	998
1965	0	0	64	10	15	2	574	88	653
1966	75	8	660	69	58	9	139	14	959
1967	9	3	5	2	55	20	200	74	269
1968	140	31	127	28	2	0	178	40	447
Cumulative									
1954-1968	998	16	2,929	46	187	3	2,322	36	6,436

Source: Robert S. Walters, American and Soviet Aid: A Comparative Analysis (Pittsburg: Pittsburgh University Press, 1970), p. 87.

countries which made the Soviet leaders decide that if they gave less to the developing countries, they would have more left at home.

In addition to the disappointing experiences in Africa, domestic economic difficulties and their social ramifications in the Soviet Union contributed to the decrease in Soviet interest in Black Africa in the 1957-1962 period. The Soviet aim in this period was to deny the new Black African states to the West. One way of doing this was to help abrogate their economic (and political) dependence on the West. Soviet aid was therefore needed to sustain these countries until they were able to stand on their own feet.

The main Soviet economic factors involved in the following discussion are the inability of Soviet industries to absorb all the raw materials imported from the developing countries, industrial problems, agricultural setbacks, the relative emphasis on heavy industry, and socio-economic problems.

The general pattern of Afro-Soviet trade was that of imbalance, with the Soviets buying more from Africa than they were selling to the Africans. There were two main reasons for this. The Soviets were willing to tolerate a trade imbalance for the sake of acquiring political and diplomatic advantage over the West. Second, many developing countries, Ghana in particular, found it difficult to find enough suitable goods to purchase from the USSR.

Consequently, by 1963 the Soviet Union had accumulated a trade deficit of more than \$700 million with Ghana alone.⁷⁹ Promising to buy all of Cuba's sugar in addition to all of Ghana's cocoa was probably an overcommitment on the part of the Soviet Union. Her industries could not absorb all these products, and her solution to the problem was to underpurchase and re-sell some of these imports. Between 1961 and 1962 she bought nine thousand tons less of Ghana's cocoa than the stipulated tonnage she had originally agreed to buy,⁸⁰ and between 1960 and 1961, the import of Guinean coffee dropped from 1,604 tons to only 520 tons.⁸¹ Legvold states that in the 1960-1962 period, trade between Guinea and the Soviet Union fell from the 1961 high of \$31.1 million to \$22.4 million in 1962, and then 16.3 million in 1963.⁸²

Aside from under-importing raw materials, there is evidence that the Soviet Union was also re-exporting products imported from Africa. The re-export of Ghanaian cocoa is a notorious example. Guinea's coffee is also known to have been re-sold. The re-export of Egyptian cotton, Burmese and Cambodian rice, Greek tobacco, cotton, sultanas, and currants, and Indian cashew nuts, iron ore, raw hides, and yarn has also been reported. So also has been the re-export of Cuban sugar. These re-exports were undertaken to alleviate the burden on the Soviet Union's industries and also to help her settle her balance of payments.⁸³

Such practices were discouraging to the developing countries and detrimental to their economic development. The reason for this is that the Soviet Union obtained these raw materials under the barter system and therefore did not have to expend foreign exchange. This meant the loss of as much foreign exchange to the developing countries concerned as the Soviet Union was gaining. Second, since the Soviets re-sold these bartered merchandise at less than world-market prices, Ghanaian cocoa at home (to use only one example) found itself in stiff competition in the world market against Ghanaian cocoa in Soviet hands.

Consequently, the original producer had to cut her prices in order to compete against the Soviet Union, or rather against herself. To quote Goldman:

. . . it is bad enough when Russian-made goods compete for markets with products of underdeveloped countries, but when the Russians re-sell products they obtain from underdeveloped countries, and force these countries to compete with themselves, bad feelings are bound to arise.⁸⁴

Accusations from developing countries are reported to have been made against the Soviets.⁸⁵

The original impression the Soviets projected regarding their market system was that it would be beneficial for the developing countries to have economic relations with the Soviet Union because of her "just methods" of sustaining economic relationships "on the basis of equality"⁸⁶ and thereby avoid the Western "non-equivalent

exchange." Also, according to the Soviets, the drawing up of long-term trade agreements was easier because of the highly developed and well-planned socialist economic system where conditions of delivery (stipulated volume, time, period, prices, and so on) were fixed.⁸⁷ Third, according to the Soviets, the Soviet market was large and stable enough to be able to absorb large imports of raw materials.⁸⁸

Despite these guarantees, the underfulfilling of agreements, the re-export of bartered products and the general decline of trade constituted a breach of contract and a breach of faith, and the Africans became disillusioned about the Soviet (or the socialist) market system.

The Soviet economy, because of its centralized nature, can be controlled to permit sacrifices. Foreign trade can be controlled for economic or non-economic reasons. The Soviet economy can therefore be made to take a heavy strain. Nonetheless, circumstances beyond her control might have made it impossible for the Soviet economy to cope with the strain in the 1961-62 period. There is some evidence that by mid-1960 the Soviet industrial economy had suffered production setbacks, causing the rate of production to decrease (see Table 3) and disrupting the Seven Year Plan. Nor did the reduction of the standard work week from 48 hours to 41 hours help.⁸⁹

Agricultural problems which arose from the Seven Year Plan

Table 3

Annual Soviet Industrial Production

Growth Rates: 1960 - 1964

(Annual Percentage Increases)

Year	All Industry	Heavy Industry	Consumer Goods
1960	10	11	7
1961	9	10	7
1962	9.5	11	7
1963	8.5	10	5
1964	7.5	10	2

Source: Harry Schwartz, The Soviet Economy Since Stalin
 (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1965),
 p. 124.

also contributed to the Soviet economic difficulties in this period. Launched in early 1959, the Seven Year Plan was generally a failure. By the end of 1961 it had become clear to the Soviet leaders that production targets could not be met.

In the mid-60s the Soviet Union had to spend about one billion in foreign exchange on grain imports from Canada and the United States.⁹⁰ In 1962 the overall farm output was a negligible 2 per cent more than the 1961 mark, and only 7 per cent above the 1958 mark, as against the 70 per cent increase anticipated by 1965⁹¹ (see Table 4). In 1962, in urban areas, the price index for food went up 16 per cent over 1958.⁹² The same year saw the cancellation of the plan to abrogate income taxes in conformity with the Seven Year Plan. This plus the rising of retail prices for meat and butter by 30 per cent and 25 per cent respectively, in June, provoked "violent discontent in some areas" of the Soviet Union.⁹³

It is reported that in Odessa, longshoremen went on strike against loading butter for Cuba while there was no butter in their local markets. It is also reported that Soviet officials were angry over the shipping of private cars to Guinea when they had to stay on waiting lists for years before they could buy cars for themselves.⁹⁴ Inside the Kremlin, particularly among the conservative

Table 4

Indices of Soviet Agricultural Output

1958 - 1963 and the 1965 Goal

1958=100

Year	Total Gross Farm Output	Crop Output	Livestock Output
1958	100	100	100
1959	100	95	108
1960	102	100	107
1961	105	101	111
1962	107	101	114
1963	96	86	110
1965 goal	170	*	*

*Not available.

Source: Harry Schwartz, The Soviet Economy Since Stalin
 (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1965),
 p. 130.

elements, there was bitter criticism of Khrushchev's aid program because of its limited payoffs. Though Soviet economic assistance to Africa originally purported to alleviate, and finally break, her economic dependence on the capitalist West, (a condition preliminary to the socialist construction) it contained a major contradiction. The more Communist aid the Africans got, the more stable their economies became, the fewer grievances they had against the capitalists, and the less the chances for the anti-capitalist revolution.

Apart from the criticism Khrushchev's economic policies toward the developing countries received inside the USSR, there was also criticism from the satellite states. After the Second World War, the Soviet Union depended heavily on reparations and the economic resources of the Eastern European countries to rebuild her own economy. It would have been appropriate, therefore, for the Soviet Union to assist her satellites, yet it was only after the Polish and the Hungarian uprisings (1956-1957) that the Soviets extended anything resembling meaningful credits to her satellites.

In 1959, only Albania received any credits and grants; in 1960 only Bulgaria, in 1961 only East Germany, and in 1962 none of the satellite countries received credits or grants. The \$310 million reported by the USSR to have been extended to East Germany in that year is

believed to have been an installment of the \$475 million extended the previous year (see Table 5). Rumania was particularly disappointed because between 1956 and 1962 she received nothing from the Soviet Union. Rumania complained bitterly that while the Soviet Union did everything she could so that India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Iraq, and Turkey might have steel mills, she was prevented from building one for herself at Galati.⁹⁵

The logic of the Eastern European criticism against aid to the developing countries was that a steel mill, a hospital, or a cannery to a developing country meant one less for Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, or Albania. These developing countries were neither Communist nor socialist, hence Albania's "bitter" complaint that it was "harmful to aid non-socialist developing countries until the socialist states [themselves] became show-cases of prosperity."⁹⁶

In addition to the general setbacks in Soviet agriculture and industry and the complaints voiced both within the USSR and among her bloc countries, the relative emphasis that Khrushchev put on heavy industry also contributed to the economic difficulties of the USSR. While agriculture suffered and there was a decline in the production growth rates of "all industry" between 1961 and 1962, heavy industry managed to sustain a fairly even rate of development and there was a rise in defence and

Table 5

Soviet Economic Credits and Grants Extended to
The European Satellites, 1945 - 62
(Millions of US Dollars)

	1945- 1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	Total
Albania	106	--	48	--	93	--	--	--	247
Bulgaria	198	92	72	44	--	162	--	--	568
Czechoslovakia	48	--	14	--	--	--	--	--	62
East Germany	363	20	260	235	--	--	475	(310)	1,353
Hungary	43	41	262	35	--	--	--	--	381
Poland	614	300	--	--	--	--	--	--	914
Rumania	94	95	--	--	--	--	--	--	189
Total	1,466	548	656	314	93	162	475	(310)	3,714

Source: US, Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, (Washington: US Government Printing Office), 1962, p. 427.

science expenditures in the same period (see Tables 3 and 6).

Although Khrushchev may have wished heavy industry and light industry to develop at equal rates, the exigencies of the international situation demanded that primacy be given heavy industry, and that military and space capabilities be developed as quickly as possible. Thus, Khrushchev called for "the development and the strengthening of the country's defence" in this period.⁹⁷ This inevitably exerted further pressure on the country's resources.

Relative to the West, the centralized nature of the Soviet economy and the ability of the government to manipulate trade in almost any fashion does enable the Soviet Union to suffer a considerable amount of imbalance and even sacrifice profits. In other words, because of its nature, the Soviet economy can take greater pressure. Nevertheless it is by no means shock-proof, for the room to manoeuvre is not unlimited.

It is reported that the Soviet Union's trade with the West left her a deficit of \$131.6 million in 1961 alone.⁹⁸ By 1962 it was speculated that repayments of Western credits, which were three to five years overdue, had already exceeded new drawings and that in a matter of one or two years the difference might grow "so large as to constitute a substantial net out-flow of funds

Table 6

Soviet Defense and Science Expenditures
1960 - 1964 (In Billions of Dollars)

Year	Defense	Science
1960	10.323	3.663
1961	12.876	4.218
1962	14.097	4.773
1963	15.429	5.439
1964	14.765	5.772

Source: Harry Schwartz, The Soviet Economy Since Stalin (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1965), p. 46.

The 1 rouble = \$1.11 rate of exchange was used in the conversion from roubles into American dollars. For information about the relationship between the American dollar and other national currencies and exchange rates see:

United Nations, Statistical Office, United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1969 (New York: 1970), p. 566.

from the USSR."⁹⁹ Mark Farrison and Morris Crawford assert that the balance of payments to her trading partners and the repayment of her loans put such a heavy strain on the Soviet economy that by 1961 abnormally large quantities of gold had to be exported.

The Soviet Union is at the present time [1961] apparently faced with a number of foreign exchange problems which may make necessary a variety of adjustments in Soviet trade and credit arrangements if abnormal gold sales are to be avoided.¹⁰⁰

In addition, Soviet credits extended to the developing countries, which had not yet been drawn, totalled some \$2.7 billion.¹⁰¹ This constituted an enormous potential drain on Soviet resources. The sudden and drastic decline in the Sino-Soviet trade (from a total value of \$1,665.2 million to \$918.8 million between 1960 and 1961) also put some pressure on the Soviet economy. This decline meant that the large quantities of machinery and equipment previously destined for China had to be sold elsewhere. Unfortunately, ready markets were not available.¹⁰²

The conclusion from the above discussion seriously undermines such possible arguments that because the Soviet economy is centrally controlled and can make sacrifices, aid and trade with the developing countries could not have disrupted Soviet economic planning. To advance such an argument is to assume that the variables influencing the Soviet economy are constant and will ever remain

constant. Such an argument ignores the importance of such non-constant variables as over-ambitious planning, climatic changes, lack of adequate supporting activities such as the production of fertilizers, the production and maintenance of equipment, the building of roads and the development of distribution facilities, and the lowering of incentives on the part of workers which can disrupt even the most perfect economic principle. In fact, all these variables were very prominent in the causes of the Soviet economic setbacks in this period.¹⁰³

At any rate, the economic difficulties which plagued the Soviet economy, the re-export of Third World products, and the underfulfillment of trade agreements plus the decline in aid commitments to the Third World testify to the limited extent to which the Soviet economy could be made to fulfill several competing ends at the same time.

Berlin, Cuba, and Soviet Détente with the West

The two main crises which took the Cold War into Africa were the Congo and Algeria. By 1962, under the auspices of the UN Security Council, the Congo crisis had been considerably deflated. In March of the same year, the Evian Agreements ended the 132 years of French colonization in Algeria, and the Cold War seemed to have been removed from Black Africa.

In Cuba, the Bay of Pigs incident (April, 1961) legitimized Castro's quest for Soviet military and economic assistance and led to his decision to "volunteer" Cuba's membership in the Socialist bloc. By 1962 the Soviets had invested quite heavily in Cuba. In the military area, Cuba had received at least 42 IL-28 bombers and a similar number of strategic missiles with launchers for MRBMs and IRBMs.¹⁰⁵

Between 1960 and 1962 there was a remarkable expansion of the Cuban-Soviet trade. In 1961 the total value of trade rose from its 1960 figure of \$175 million to \$588 million. In 1962 the total value was \$600 million. The Soviet loan to Cuba in February 1960 totalled \$100 million and was meant to finance various projects.¹⁰⁶ Between 1960 and 1963, a matter of three years, aid commitments to Cuba had amounted to \$811 million in military aid, \$471 million in economic aid, \$300 million in currency support, and \$300 million in sugar subsidies. In total, \$1.9 billion was delivered.¹⁰⁷ These figures do not include the cost of Soviet missiles, bombers, and troops sent to Cuba. Not only did Cuba distract Soviet concentration on Africa, but she also became economically so expensive to maintain that it probably became necessary for the Soviets to cut down elsewhere in order to be able to retain Cuba and her seven million people in the Soviet orbit.

The Soviet détente with the West was another factor which influenced the Soviet Union's attitude to the developing countries including Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. In 1963 a tripartite nuclear test-ban treaty was signed by the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States and a hotline opened between Moscow and Washington. Accordingly, the tone of Soviet pronouncements about readiness to intervene directly in the developing areas changed. The Soviets now pledged only "broad moral, political, and material support" for "the diplomatic struggle" for the "unmasking of the colonists" and for "the mobilization of public opinion in defense of oppressed people."¹⁰⁸

Summary

This chapter has outlined the factors which contributed to the changes in Afro-Soviet relations in the 1957-1962 period. Even before the Soviets moved into Black Africa they had made a major policy shift in 1956, repudiating the Stalinist "two-camp" theory. The confidence with which the Soviets entered Black Africa soon gave way to disappointment when they discovered that Africa was neither ready nor willing to be united against "neo-colonialism." The disunity among African states, particularly over the Congo, was very discouraging.

Africa's selection of a "third way," or "African

Socialism," as a model of development was another factor which contributed to the disillusionment of the Soviets. They were disappointed that Black Africa did not select the Communist model which had been tested through time, and whose efficiency had been demonstrated. For the Soviets, African Socialism was a deliberate perversion of the concept of scientific socialism. The Conakry-Moscow dispute and its consequences were a major factor in Soviet withdrawal from Africa in this period particularly as Guinea re-established relations with France and the West in general.

In addition to setbacks experienced in Africa, Soviet domestic economic problems had a significant effect on Black African-Soviet relations. Agricultural and industrial problems, plus the increase in outlays for defence and the space program exerted pressure on Soviet resources. Nor did the balance of payments problems and the repayment of external debts help the situation. Rising food prices led to violent disturbances in certain parts of the Soviet Union. Complaints from ordinary Soviet citizens as well as from Kremlin officials, plus complaints from the satellites called for a re-examination of the Soviet Union's economic relations with the developing countries.

By 1962 Cuba and Berlin had eclipsed the Congo and

Algeria as the venues for the Cold War. The Cold War was considerably reduced in Africa; so also was Soviet pre-occupation. After the Bay of Pigs, Cuba became a Communist block country and the opportunities which this opened to the Soviets helped divert their attention from Black Africa.

Finally, in 1963, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States signed a nuclear test-ban treaty. Soviet détente with the West considerably reduced Soviet sympathy for revolutionary methods in Black Africa. This had grave consequences for, as we shall see in the next chapter, the relative popularity which the Chinese enjoyed among Africa's radical leaders and the national liberation movement was due to China's advocacy of violent methods. In other words, as the Soviets and the Africans drew apart, Sino-African relations improved and expanded. This increase in the Sino-Black African friendship was a major factor which influenced the Soviets to make another drastic shift in their policy in Africa.

CHAPTER 4

THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY AND ITS EFFECTS ON SOVIET POLICY

The Conakry-Moscow dispute had serious consequences for Soviet foreign policy in Black Africa. Firstly, the Soviets decided to broaden their relationship with a larger number of African countries including the "moderates."¹ Secondly, the locus of Soviet attention shifted to Ghana and Mali;² thirdly, as the Soviets abandoned their "revolutionary calling" in Africa, Afro-Chinese relations began to improve in the same period. Finally, the Soviets cut down on their trade and aid commitments.³ However, in the 1963-65 period the Soviets changed their policy again, from passivity and moderation to an accelerated involvement in Black Africa. This chapter will examine the Chinese presence, policy and propaganda drive which helped change Soviet policy once more. It will examine Chinese motives and the extent of involvement in Guinea, Ghana and Mali; the Chinese advantages and the Soviet reaction to China's popularity in Africa.

The Cold War, generally speaking, was a bipolar phenomenon. As the United States tried to consolidate her "spheres of influence" and ward off Communist influence, Russia tried to consolidate her post-war "socialist gains" and to make inroads into what one could consider traditional domains of the West. It was, and still is, axiomatic to

consider Black Africa "Western" (even though Kwame Nkrumah, Sékou Touré and other Africanists tried to give that continent a different and a more indigenous "personality") by reason of history, language (official), culture, economic system and political and social institutions. However, Black Africa's declaration of "neutrality" and the desire to make political, economic and social experiments, left her open and vulnerable to a "new scramble." This post-war competition for Africa, hitherto a Russian-American (Western) phenomenon, became three-sided with the appearance of the Chinese. While the Americans preached capitalism cum democracy and the Soviets preached "peaceful" competitive Communism, the Chinese preached violent revolutionary Communism.

Communist China's involvement in Africa began later than that of the Soviet Union. With a modest base of previous interest in Africa, China made her first political contact with Africans during the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states in 1955. At this conference, Premier Chou En-lai and President Nasser met; about a year later, full diplomatic relations were established between China and Egypt. In December 1957 when the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference met in Cairo, China established a permanent international secretariat in that capital. Though China signed a cultural agreement with Egypt in 1955, it was not until the establishment of this secretariat that China had a

firm base from which to undertake any organized political activity. To quote Richard Lowenthal, "the Cairo Embassy thus became the first base for Chinese activity in Africa." ⁴

China's Motives

John Cooley outlines three elements--history, nationalism and ideology--which were emphasized in China's approach to Africa. To impress Africans with her past glory, China often invoked the memory of her traditional Sino-centrism which has existed since pre-Confucian times. The rulers of China take inspiration from the memory of the sage-kings of the Golden Age when China was the epicenter of civilization.

The idea of China's "superior civilization" is still evident in Chinese pronouncements today concerning a "new superior Afro-Asian civilization" about to germinate from the old shoot destroyed by "Western imperialists."⁵ This helps explain why the Chinese attached great importance to such organizations as the "Chinese-African Peoples' Friendship Society," the "Committee for Cultural Relations with African People," the "Asian and African Journalists' Association," the "Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau" and the "Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization."

Nationalism is the second element influencing Chinese interest in Africa. In 1911 when a wave of nationalism erupted against the Manchu dynasty and since the 1948-58 period in particular, China has sought to remain

an independent power, unattached to either East or West. Africa and China, the Chinese argued, had been plagued by one common chronic problem, "white European colonialism." Africa, they assumed, would therefore welcome Chinese assistance in ousting Western domination.

Ideological proselytism is the third and the most important element in China's foreign policy toward Africa. In Africa, the Sino-Soviet dispute was in three areas. In the first place, the two powers differed on the question of strategy and tactics to be adopted by the national liberation movement in the colonial areas. Secondly, there was a rivalry between the two Powers for the control of the local Communist movements where they could be found in Afro-Asia. Thirdly, and most relevant, a strong competition developed between the two Powers for favor and influence from the newly independent Afro-Asian states;

Red China in Black Africa

Of the Black African countries receptive to Chinese influence, Tanzania and Zambia were the ones most affected, and the Tanzanian-Zambian (Tan-Zam) railway is the most practical, the most conspicuous and the most indelible of all Chinese aid projects undertaken in Africa. It eclipses all other Communist aid projects in Black Africa.

Although Tanzania and Zambia fall outside the scope of this thesis, the Chinese impact on this part of Africa is so important that it cannot be completely ignored. The

Chinese loan offer for the Tan-Zam railway was made in 1965. Signed in July 1970, the loan was to be a generous \$336 million. It was interest-free, and repayable over a thirty-year period. China had agreed in 1967 to bear the total cost alone.⁶ The main reason why the two African leaders, President Nyerere of Tanzania and President Kaunda of Zambia accepted the aid from China is indicated by the Tanzanian president's statement, "it was not as if we had alternative proposals to choose from. We should, indeed, have welcomed Western offers, but the only firm offer we had was from China."⁷ It was reported that as late as 1967, two years after the Chinese offer, Kaunda still hoped for a competitive bidder but none appeared.⁸ As in Guinea and in Egypt (the Aswandam), Tanzania-Zambia was an example of how a Western absence created a vacuum for Communist influence to move into.

In the initial stages of her advance into Africa, Guinea was the focal point of China's interest. Guinea and China established diplomatic relations and signed a technical aid agreement on October 4, 1959. On December 23, a Chinese embassy was opened in Conakry, the Guinean capital; and on March 4, 1960, Ko Hua, the first Chinese ambassador, took office. In May of the same year, Sékou Touré accepted an invitation to visit China four months later.

After private discussions between Mao's representatives and Guinean officials following the Second Afro-Asian

Solidarity Conference (Conakry, April 1960), it was reported that Chinese agricultural experts were to be employed in the implementation of the Guinean Three-Year Plan.⁹

During Sékou Touré's visit, a number of agreements were signed: a treaty of friendship; a trade agreement; and economic and technical co-operation agreements. This visit was the zenith of the Sino-Guinean relations. It was marked by pomp and revelries which "overwhelmed" the first neutral Head of State to visit China. To charm the Guinean president even more, Mao made an offer of credits totalling \$25 million at interest rates as low as 1 to 1.5 per cent per annum¹⁰ which were more favorable than those of the Soviets.

China strengthened her relations with Guinea by arranging good-will visitations. The Chinese ambassador to Morocco was the first Chinese official to visit Guinea. He went with a relief grant of 5,000 tons of rice in June 1958, Guinea's difficult year.¹¹ Other Chinese visitors or groups of visitors included two groups of acrobats and a group of Moslem pilgrims in 1960, a foreign trade delegation in 1961, the Secretary-General of the Chinese All African Peoples' Solidarity Organization Committee and Vice-President of the Afro-Asian Solidarity fund. A delegation attended the Second Afro-Asian Lawyers' Conference in 1962. In 1963, Chinese groups visiting Guinea included

a trade delegation and another delegation of Lawyers.¹² Premier Chou En-lai was in Guinea as part of his African tour in December, 1963. Similar Guinean delegations visited China in the same period.

Ghana and China established diplomatic relations on July 5, 1960. In September, the Chinese ambassador Huang Hau presented his credentials and conveyed an invitation to Kwame Nkrumah to visit China. On August 8, 1961, the two countries signed a treaty of friendship in Peking. An agreement for economic and technical co-operation was also signed and an interest-free loan of about \$21 million was granted Ghana. The loan was to be drawn between 1962 and 1967, and was to be repayable between 1971 and 1981, either in Ghanaian goods or in foreign currency.¹³ The trade agreement specified Chinese road building equipment, agricultural tools, and some industrial machinery to be exchanged for Ghanaian cocoa, ground nuts, copra, industrial diamonds, tobacco, and coffee. Of the visits made by Chinese official delegations to Ghana, the 1963 Chou En-lai visit was the most symbolic just as Nkrumah's visit to China in 1960 was.

Chinese relations with Mali followed a similar pattern. The Chinese ambassador to Guinea, Ko Hua, and the Malian president, Modibo Keita, signed an agreement establishing diplomatic relations on October 25, 1960. On March 17, 1961, the Chinese ambassador to Mali, Lai Ya-li,

presented his credentials. In September 1961 the two countries signed an economic and technical co-operation agreement in Peking. This agreement included an interest-free credit of about \$21 million to Mali. This was to be drawn between July 1962 and June 1967, and was repayable in ten equal installments commencing in 1971.¹⁴

Sino-Soviet Rivalry Over Africa

The ideological dispute between the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and that of China (CCP) derived from their different interpretations of the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. Whereas the leadership of the CPSU was supposedly applying the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism creatively to the changing international environment, the leadership of the CCP believed that the pristine sanctity of the doctrine should be upheld. Consequently, China believed that her armed revolutionary type of socialism based on Mao's doctrine of the block of four classes stood a better chance of success in the "intermediate" zone" or in the "storm centers" of Afro-Asia and Latin America. China also regarded herself in Zagoria's words, as

. . . the appointed leader of the revolutionary movement throughout the under-developed world and considered its own revolutionary experience and pattern of 'socialist construction' a more suitable model for these areas.¹⁵

By Chinese standards the Soviet and the Yugoslav models were inadequate and would prove unsuitable in the African

context. In summary, the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute vis-a-vis Black Africa was one of dogmatism versus flexibility, obstinacy versus modern revisionism.

The ideological disagreements regarding Africa date from the controversial doctrine of peaceful co-existence enunciated by Khrushchev in 1956 during the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU. This was, in fact, an invocation of Lenin's "alliance" theory propounded at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 in Moscow during discussions over the colonial question. The essence of the "alliance" theory was that, for the successful launching of the "class struggle" in the colonial areas, revolutionary movements in Africa and elsewhere should form temporary alliances with the bourgeois-democratic forces, adopt their slogans and work from within the status quo.¹⁶ The implication was that open and direct confrontation could be avoided.

In the Cold War, the Soviets had specific and concrete reasons for adopting the doctrine of peaceful co-existence. As Denis Healy points out, in the Cold War era, the economic cost of an unlimited arms race was heavy for the Soviets (and even the US) to bear. Also, the continuation of an interminable arms race increased the prospects of a greater war which the Soviets would rather avoid.¹⁷ In Khrushchev's own words, "war in the rocket and H-bomb age is fraught with the most dire consequences for all nations."¹⁸ Khrushchev made it clear at the Congress that

the doctrine of "peaceful co-existence," "non-inevitability of war" and "peaceful transition" not only symbolized a "tactical move," but also formed a "fundamental principle for Soviet foreign policy."¹⁹

The Soviet rationale behind the doctrine of peaceful co-existence vis-a-vis Africa was that revolutionary wars had a better chance of success under the conditions of peaceful co-existence.²⁰ Intertwined with this is a second explanation: involvement in the anti-colonial wars risked Western intervention which dimmed the hopes for a successful revolutionary struggle.²¹ "Peaceful co-existence" was, therefore, an alternative strategy for taking over state power from the bourgeoisie. It was in the name of the same doctrine that Khrushchev expressed the desire to sign a treaty of friendship with the US.²²

Chinese reaction to the doctrine of "peaceful co-existence," "non-inevitability of war" and "peaceful transition" was perhaps predictable. In the first place the cost of the Cold War arms race did not bother the Chinese for they were not seriously involved. Being true to traditional Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese believed in the inevitability of war, hence the impracticability of peaceful co-existence. How could colonial peoples live side by side with the colonists or the "agents of imperialism" was a common question. How can one co-exist with one's "enemy?" History demonstrated to the Chinese that

co-existence would not work. When the Chinese Communists aligned with Kuomintang following the dictates of Stalin, the consequence was the massacre of hundreds of Communists in 1927. The Chinese never failed to cite this example, and the examples of Algeria and the Congo (the execution of Lumumba) as proof of the failure of peaceful co-existence.

Peace, the Chinese believed, should be won by fighting and not by begging for it. They therefore called on all revolutionary Marxist-Leninists to support colonial revolutions "without the slightest reservations."²³ This is one reason for their keen interest and deep involvement in the events in the Cameroons. Algeria and the Congo, and the liberation struggles in Portugese Africa.²⁴ Revolutionary wars, the Chinese stressed, must be continued without fear of Western intervention for although the imperialist powers are strong and aggressive, collectively, they are only a "paper tiger."²⁵

The contradictory Chinese and the Soviet views on the issue of war and peace made the question of national liberation struggles the most important point in their differences over Africa. The Chinese constantly exerted pressure on the Soviets by referring to traditional Marxism-Leninism. The Soviets were often accused of betraying the oppressed colonial peoples of Africa by co-existing or lining up with the "haves," that is, the

West, against the "have-nots."²⁶ The Chinese saw themselves as comrades of the oppressed nations who should follow her admonitions and lead.

Mounting Chinese pressure often baffled the Soviets and influenced their change of policy regarding Africa in the 1963-65 period. The main factor in this regard, as Nielsen points out, is that the Soviets conduct their foreign policy on two planes: through normal interstate diplomacy, and through revolutionary action via party machinery or radical organizations.²⁷ Which of the two channels the Soviets might decide to use would depend on the situation and the conditions of the external environment.

The normal channels through which the Soviets tried to conduct their foreign policy in Black Africa was through interstate diplomacy following the principle of peaceful co-existence. However, as Kautsky asserts, the USSR would (and in fact did) find it very difficult to compete for the allegiance of the Communist parties or even the non-communist nationalist movements with China "whose strident anti-Westernism" is more appealing to Black Africa.²⁸ The only alternative left to the Soviet Union in the face of the Chinese appeal was to change her tactics and try to conduct her policy through revolutionary propaganda and action in order to be able to counteract

Chinese influence. That is, the Soviets had to adopt the same method as the Chinese. In Kautsky's view, the more the Chinese used their revolutionary slogans, the more the Soviets had to use theirs in order to show the African revolutionary movements that their cause was not forgotten.²⁹

The Soviet de facto recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government in 1960 was one example of how the Chinese impact influenced Soviet policy. As Zagoria asserts, in spite of Russia's diplomatic relations with France, "increasing Chinese rivalry in the colonial areas"³⁰ caused the Soviets, apparently "bending before Chinese pressure,"³¹ to extend a de facto recognition to the National Liberation Front.

The Soviets and the Chinese differed also in their attitudes and view-points concerning the national bourgeoisie and the nationalist movements in Black Africa. In the name of "peaceful co-existence," the Soviet leaders had wanted the Communist parties or the revolutionary nationalist movements to co-operate with the nationalist governments which were identified with the national bourgeoisie. The Chinese on the other hand had wanted the Communist parties or the revolutionary nationalist movements to co-operate with the bourgeoisie against the nationalist governments and even overthrow these governments by force.³²

Chinese propaganda here again influenced the Soviets to make doctrinal modifications. The co-operation of the nationalist movements with the ruling bourgeoisie which the Soviets desired was, in the light of their co-existence doctrine, regarded as a permanent state of affairs. However, "as a reaction to Chinese pressure," the Soviet leadership decided that the alliance of the revolutionary forces and the bourgeoisie was meant only for "the present stage." It was only "at the beginning" that it was necessary.³³

It was in order to give this change of policy a theoretical justification that Soviet theorists came up with the doctrine of National Democracy. Thus in December, 1961, the doctrine of National Democracy was introduced and given formal definition in the Statement of Eighty-One Communist Parties. Under this doctrine it did not matter if the leader of a national democratic state was bourgeois or "progressive"; so long as he was anti-imperialist or anti-traditional he had made a head start toward socialism. Nkrumah, Touré, and Keita of Black Africa, and Ben Bella and Nasser of North Africa fell into this category of national democrats.³⁴ Even though the Chinese rejected the particular doctrine,³⁵ they had influenced the Soviets to make a doctrinal change in relations to their African policy.

Closely related to the doctrine of National

Democracy was the doctrine of Revolutionary Democracy which stipulated that if a leader of a national democratic state, be he bourgeois or socialist, could make anti-bourgeois reforms (as Castro did), then he was being a revolutionary democrat. The Chinese rejection of the doctrine of national democracy presupposes their rejection of this doctrine of revolutionary democracy because of their close relationship. Specifically, the Chinese could not foresee the national bourgeoisie relinquishing power voluntarily. Nor could they see the possibility of the new nations freeing themselves from the control of "imperialism" any way short of revolutionary means. The Chinese did not trust the anti-imperialist slogans of these African governments.³⁶

Since the doctrines of "national democracy" and "revolutionary democracy" made it possible for an African state to embark on socialist development outside the Marxian formula,³⁷ the implication was that the capitalist and the revolutionary stages would be by-passed. How would the Soviet theoreticians account for this?

To cope with this new problem, Khrushchev came up with another doctrine, the Non-Capitalist Path. This then became another facet of the Sino-Soviet dispute over Africa. This doctrine made it possible for a revolutionary democrat to lead his country from the "transitional stage" straight to the "socialist stage" without having to go

through the "capitalist stage." This would obviate the necessity of the "class struggle" and the "revolution." The way to do this was simply to turn the anti-colonial struggle into an anti-capitalist struggle.³⁸

The logical basis for the Soviet optimism was that the weakness of Africa's bourgeoisie both in numerical and economic terms, the importance of the state sector in African economic development and the survival of communalism in large parts of Africa, should make the short-cut to socialism easy. Devoid of the revolutionary struggle, the doctrine of the Non-Capitalist Path was directly opposite to Chinese thinking.

China's Advantages

In the Sino-Soviet competition for the sympathy of Africans, the Chinese had certain advantages. These were questions regarding the Soviet scientific and technological achievements, the similarity between the Chinese and the African colonial backgrounds, the Moslem element in Chinese society, the terms of Chinese aid, and China's non-membership in the UN and the fact that she had no diplomatic relations with France.

In the Soviet-Western competition for Africa in the Cold War, one thing which impressed the African leaders about the Soviet Union was her rapid achievements in science and technology since 1917. To most of Black

Africa's leaders prior to independence, the Russian Luniks, Sputniks, rockets, and bombs were viewed as an eloquent testimony of what socialism could accomplish in just a matter of thirty to forty years. However, reflection revealed the contradiction: these outstanding achievements put the Soviets in the same category of powerful industrial nations as the West. Thus, the Soviet Union and the West, by virtue of their industrial and military capacity, fell into the category of the super powers so highly advanced and so removed from Black Africa's level of development. An African visiting the Soviet Union, to use Worsley's apt description,

. . . feels as alien in the face of Soviet industrial strength and ever increasing affluence, as he does when he visits the cities, factories, and pleasure domes of Western capitals.³⁹

There was, therefore, some basis for the Chinese argument that the Soviet Union had gravitated into the category of the "haves" as against the "have-nots."

While the Soviets tried to impress Africans by displaying their achievements, the Chinese capitalized on their "backwardness" in order to create and maintain a parallel between their country and the continent of Africa. Black African visitors to Mao's empire were shown the unfinished and the rudimentary. The unspoken message was: we are just as "backward" as you are; our problems are similar and we can surmount our common problems only in

concert. As Lowenthal said, "their [the Chinese] position as an ancient but poor and struggling nation becomes a positive asset."⁴⁰

The similarity between China's and Africa's colonial history was another advantage which the Chinese had over the Soviets in their competition for Africa. Communist China's independence was the result of a bitter and long "revolutionary war" (which was presented to Africa as a colonial war). National liberation and anti-imperialist movements in many parts of Africa constantly referred to the "rich experience" of China. In 1960, Nicanor, the permanent representative of the Cameroonian Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) in Rabat, Morocco, stated that the Chinese example was worthy of emulation.⁴¹ In the previous year, Sékou Touré during his visit to China, declared at a banquet, "we can assure you that we Africans know where the truth is to be found, for Africans know that you had to fight against the same foes they are now fighting."⁴² The Chinese on many occasions drew parallels between Afro-Chinese problems, and often emphasized the non-existence of any historical links between Africans and Soviets.

The large Moslem population in the Chinese Society was yet another advantage the Chinese had over the Soviets.⁴³ Pan-Islamism, in Lenin's doctrine, strengthened landlordism and traditionalism being the initial stage of socio-economic

development (traditional, transitional, capitalist, and socialist stages) is detrimental to socialist development. At the Second Comintern Congress (Moscow 1920) Lenin remonstrated against feudalism and Pan-Islamism but incorporated the peasantry in the anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist forces.⁴⁴ One important question one might ask is what if, in a particular country, the peasantry is all, or predominantly, Moslem? Although Lenin and the subsequent leaders decided to make anti-feudalism a less stringent condition for socialist development, such a step was not necessary in Communist China.

For China the idea of aligning with feudalistic Moslems came easily because of her Moslem population. Nor does Mao's "'classical' four-class alliance" make any discrimination as to what elements the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist forces should comprise. Since a large percentage of Africans are Moslem, it was expedient for China to contact Africa through Moslem delegations. Friendly gestures were made to such predominantly Moslem countries as Guinea, Tanzania, Somalia, and Mali.⁴⁵

Launched in May 1953, (probably for domestic purposes initially) the "China Muslim Association" had the explicit purpose of convincing Moslems outside China that "the interests of their co-religionists in China are carefully guarded."⁴⁶ Between 1956 and 1961 Moslem delegations from African countries including Guinea and

Mali attended Moslem and May Day celebrations in China.⁴⁷

In 1962 special messages were broadcast in Swahili to African Moslems attending Moslem festivals in China.⁴⁸

Since 1960 Chinese Moslems on pilgrimage to Mecca had used Guinea, Mali, and Samalia as stop-over points for propaganda purposes.⁴⁹ By using religion as a vehicle of propaganda, the Communist Chinese succeeded in large measure in distracting the attention of Afro-Asians by presenting themselves as Moslems.

In the area of foreign aid, China's advantage over the Soviet Union lay in the fact that the Chinese terms of repayment were more favorable. Whereas the USSR granted credits at interest rates as low as 2.5 per cent per annum, the Chinese rates were even lower. Occasionally they were 1 to 1.5 per cent per annum; but in most cases credits were granted interest-free, and the date for the commencement of repayment was usually ten years after the loan was ratified. There was no hard rule as to whether the repayment should be in goods or in cash. China was also more selective in her commercial operations than the Soviets. The Chinese normally would rather engage in a small number of commercial ventures (as opposed to heavy industry and major projects such as dams) and make sure they did a good job. However, there may also be reasons of parsimony resulting from the lack of resources.⁵⁰

In China's campaign in Africa, the fact that she did

not belong to the United Nations and that she had no diplomatic relations with France gave her another advantage over the Soviet Union especially concerning the national liberation movements. China seemed to be able to behave in any manner in any part of Africa so long as the particular country or faction involved was willing to let her. In Lowenthal's words, "China enjoyed greater freedom of maneuver than the Soviet Union and its European satellites because of her lack of diplomatic relations with France."⁵¹ The Soviet Union, on the other hand, did not have that much freedom of action. Membership in the UN and the diplomatic relationship with another country presupposed some measure of disciplined behavior. This, to a great extent, constrained Soviet options especially in French-speaking African countries.

In the Franco-Algerian war the Soviet Union was uncertain what her level of involvement should be. While she temporized, China went ahead not only to recognize the FLN, but also to establish a consulate at Quida on the Algerian-Moroccan frontier.⁵² Similarly, in the Cameroonian disturbances, the Sino-Soviet discrepancies were obvious. Whereas Khrushchev would ask the well-travelled Dr. Felix Moumie (the anti-French guerilla leader) to "go back to Cameroon to suffer with your fellow-countrymen, and win power legally by elections,"⁵³ Mao would give him money and his blessing, a French translation of his works

on guerilla warfare and ask him to go back home and continue the fight.⁵⁴ As Alexander Dallin concluded, "in almost every instance, Soviet failure to support 'direct action' . . . led the 'armed struggle' movement in Africa to seek, and gain, closer ties with Peking."⁵⁵

It is also important to note that in her propaganda broadcasts to Afro-Asia, China, unrestrained by any diplomatic niceties, flouted international regulations governing the use of radio frequencies; she used frequencies very close to those of the BBC, Voice of America, Moscow or radio Brazzaville, even using chimes similar to those of the BBC.⁵⁶

China's ability to confuse Soviet policy did not stem from Chinese pressure per se. It also came from the combination of the advantages she had over the Soviet Union, and above all, from Black Africa's response to the Chinese programs and the Soviet Union's assessment of this response. When the Soviets decided to recognize Algeria's FLN, it was mainly because they had realized that China's policies were having a positive effect on Africa's most outstanding leaders.

Black Africa's sympathy for China's revolutionary methods became more apparent in late 1961 at two important international conferences: the Fifth Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Moscow (December 4-15) and the conference of the World Peace Council (WPC)

in Stockholm (December 16-19) where the peace struggle versus the revolutionary national liberation struggle became the most important issue. "China found several of its most important allies among the African delegates."⁵⁷ At the conference of the World Peace Council, Seydou Diallo, the Guinean delegate, speaking for the other disaffected African representatives, maintained that "the main content of our epoch is anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and anti-racial discrimination" and not "disarmament."⁵⁸ This statement constituted a direct attack on Soviet priorities. The same attack was continued at the Moshi conference of the All African Peoples' Solidarity Organization (February 4-11, 1963) by the Guinean delegate Mamadou Camara. Reiterating the Chinese line, he insisted that the national liberation struggle was an integral aspect of the struggle for peace.⁵⁹ Nor did the Organization of African Unity (OAU) differ from China in advocacy of the continuation and intensification of the national liberation struggle until the last vestiges of colonialism and neo-colonialism were erased from the continent of Africa. Since its inception, the OAU had made generous donations, both in material and moral terms, to the cause of the liberation movements in parts of Southern Africa still held in colonial or "semi-colonial" tutelage. In short, China's views were quite popular among the militant anti-colonialist groups in Black Africa.

Of their advantages over the Soviets, their skin color was one the Chinese employed very adeptly. When Seydou Diallo stated that anti-racial discrimination was a more important issue than disarmament he was expressing the sentiment of most of Africa's proud and Africanist leaders. When the Chinese picked up the race question, they capitalized on it and made it the most important and persistent issue in their anti-Soviet propaganda. The race question and the way the Chinese manipulated it dealt a devastating blow to the post 1961 Soviet policy in Africa.

By the end of 1961 and early 1962, the Chinese had begun a deliberate campaign, based primarily on the appeal to race, to exclude the Soviets from all conferences of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (A-APSO).⁶⁰ In an executive committee meeting of the A-APSO (Gaza, UAR, December 1961), the Chinese representatives opposed Soviet participation in the organization, and insisted that relations between the A-APSO and the WPC be curtailed. In February 1962, at the conference of the Afro-Asian Writers' held in Cairo, the Chinese alluding to the Soviets, told the Africans that "these Europeans are all the same . . . we non-whites must hold together."⁶¹ As time passed, China's racial propaganda began to impress most Africans. By 1963, the race question had become the resounding note in the Afro-Asian organization; and the Moshi Conference of the A-APSO in February of that year was no exception.

At both the third conference of the A-APSO in Moshi (February 1963) and the preparatory conference in Cairo, which were attended by Soviet and East European representatives, the Chinese declared that "the whites have nothing to do here." The Chinese succeeded in relegating the Soviets to an observer status at the preparatory meeting of the Afro-Asian journalists. In Djakarta, at the conference itself, Outer Mongolia's proposal to promote the Soviet representatives to full delegate status was voted down overwhelmingly.⁶²

Before and since the 1963 Moshi Conference the Chinese made every attempt to present the Soviets as "white outsiders" who should have nothing to do with Afro-Asian problems and aspirations. On the other hand they made every attempt to spread the idea that Chinese and Africans were "brother races" and different from white Russians. According to the Chinese it would therefore be wise for African and Asian countries to emphasise their Afro-Asian distinction and solidarity.⁶³ To give this argument practical expression, the Chinese leaders obliged their technicians to live unsegregated from their African counterparts, work side-by-side with them, and receive equal pay for equal work.⁶⁴ In this way the Chinese were able to convince Guineans, Malians, and East Africans of Afro-Chinese racial equality.

One might ask how Black Africans responded to China's

anti-Soviet racial propaganda. In the first place, as Legvold points out, Africans involved with Afro-Asian organizations believed that the Soviet Union, in spite of its "pretensions to be an Afro-Asian nation" is essentially European.⁶⁵ Therefore, logically the Soviet Union was not qualified for membership in Afro-Asian organizations. Second, the Chinese were, in fact, accurate when they argued that the Russians were basically white. Even Ghana and Guinea accepted the Chinese argument that the Soviet Union had no place in the Afro-Asian movement.⁶⁶

When the Soviet technicians insulted Guinean workers as "lazy and stupid,"⁶⁷ Africans were more likely, in the light of the colonial experience, to agree with Chinese propagandists who asserted that such a statement could only come out of the mouths of "upholders of white supremacy."⁶⁸ With the whole colonial experience and with white-supremacist minorities still controlling parts of Africa, African leaders tend to be sensitive to race issues in international relations. Although they may be divided over African issues (for example, the Congo), to quote Vernon McKay, "Africans are unanimous in their undying antagonism toward a system of white domination which discriminates against Africans because of their race."⁶⁹

In large measure, it would seem, the Chinese were able to effect a sort of optical illusion: among Black Africans they were viewed more as colored people than as Communists.

It may be necessary to make it clear, at this juncture, that not all of China's policy preferences were heeded or satisfied by Black African leaders; and not all aspects of Soviet policy were rejected. Which side Africans took depended in large part on the issue at hand. In Lowenthal's view, whenever it was a question of asserting their neutrality in the event of Western intervention in African affairs, African leaders were willing to side with the Soviets. However, when it was a question of militant anti-colonialism, or the question of race became involved in an international issue, African leaders were willing and ready to listen to the Chinese.⁷⁰

Soviet Reaction

One might ask how Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda and, above all, its positive effect on Black Africans, affected Soviet policy after 1961 and how the Soviet Union reacted.

Briefly, the Soviets were very much disturbed by the state of affairs in Black Africa. They realized that in their competition against China for the ideological leadership, they were losing as a result of China's advantages and the manner in which these advantages were exploited. To the Soviets, Chinese propaganda was disturbing enough, but the fact that Africans should echo China's call for her ouster

from the Afro-Asian movement was even more disappointing. Legvold speculated that,

The Soviet Union must have been rankled by the apparent willingness of Guinea and Ghana to accept the Chinese argument that it had no business being part of Afro-Asian solidarity organizations.⁷¹

The Soviet mood is explicit in the words of Vladimir Kudrayavtsev. A delegate at the 1963 Moshi conference, he later lamented the fact that "the more 'chauvinistically-inclined' Afro-Asian leaders were steering the 'solidarity movement' not against imperialism, colonialism and its agents, but against all white people."⁷²

Between 1963 and 1965, in anticipation of the Second Bandung Conference scheduled for the spring of 1965 in Algeria, the Sino-Soviet competition for Africa intensified. Without the USSR at the proposed conference the Chinese would be free to push their interests and policy preferences among the neutralist countries. To this end, they were determined to use the racial issue in every possible way to deny Soviet participation. The Soviets were equally determined to attend the conference so they could promote their policy aims and oppose the vociferous Chinese.

The Soviets decided to use their economic power to outbid the Chinese. Although by 1962 the Soviet Union had adopted a new policy line which necessitated her cutting down on aid commitments to Africa, she abandoned this position and decided to extend a total of \$100 million in purchasing credits to Algeria (September 1963).⁷³ Hitherto,

because of a commitment to peaceful co-existence and her diplomatic relations with France, the Soviet Union's dealings with Algeria had been circumspect. The Soviets had not taken any direct official action in Algeria's favor since extending recognition to the Provisional Government in exile. These credits then constituted a new Soviet overture to Algeria. Since Algeria was the designated venue for the proposed Second Bandung Conference, there was a high probability that the Soviet Union was trying to buy her way into the conference.

In April 1964 the foreign ministers of twenty-six Afro-Asian countries had a preparatory meeting in Jakarta (Indonesia) where the date and venue of the Second Bandung Conference were officially announced. When some of the delegates proposed that the Soviet Union, which did not attend the first Bandung conference in 1955, be invited to participate in the forthcoming Algerian conference, China vehemently opposed the proposal and destroyed any hope of reaching any agreement favorable to the Soviet Union.

Thereafter

Moscow and Peking undertook intensive campaigns to win the African and Asian governments over to their respective positions. Algeria was especially courted, particularly after it was chosen to host the conference.⁷⁴

After opening a month-long industrial exhibition in Algeria (September 1963), China continued her challenge to the Soviets by signing a cultural agreement with Algeria and

offering her interest-free credits totalling \$50 million in early October.⁷⁵ In December, Premier Chou En-Lai visited Algeria on an African tour.

The credits granted Algeria by the Soviet Union and China in 1963 were the beginning of an economic aid competition between the two (see Table 7).⁷⁶ The Sino-Soviet economic competition was one of great interest. China, like the Soviet Union, had been troubled by internal economic problems. After the first two years the Great Leap Forward launched in 1958 was a failure. After 1960 there was a drastic decline in the total domestic output. The average of the 1952-65 growth-rate was not remarkable, taking into account the 2 per cent increase in population. Although per capita industrial production rose by 75 per cent from 1952 through 1965, the average annual growth rate of 4.4 per cent was unimpressive.⁷⁷

The years 1958-65 for China and 1959-65 for the Soviet Union were bad years. Their three-year competition must therefore have come from great conviction, and the Bandung Conference must have meant a lot to both countries for "The outpouring of economic loans came to a rapid halt after the second and ultimate postponement of the Algerian Conference in September 1965."⁷⁸ After the overthrow of Prime Minister Ben Bella of Algeria the idea of resuming the conference was completely abandoned; for the Soviet Union and China there was no need for further competitive bidding.

Table 7

Soviet and Chinese Loans Immediately Prior to the
Algerian Conference (1965)
(In Millions of Dollars)

Recipient	China		Soviet Union	
	Loan	Date	Loan	Date
Afghanistan	28	Mar. 1965	39	June 1964
Algeria	50	Oct. 1963	100	Sept. 1963
			128	May 1964
Cambodia	5-10	Nov. 1964	12	Nov. 1964
Ceylon	4	Feb. 1964		
Congo (B)	25	1965	9	Dec. 1964
Ghana	22	Feb. 1964		
Indonesia	50	1965		
Iran			39	July 1963
Iraq			140	Mar. 1965
Kenya	28	1964-1965	3	1964
Pakistan	90	July 1964- Jan. 1965	11-70	July 1964
Senegal			7	Nov. 1964
Somalia	21	Aug. 1963		
	3	Jan 1965		
Tanzania	29	June 1963	42	Aug. 1964
	14	June 1965		
Turkey			168	Apr. 1964
U.A.R.	80	Jan. 1965	277	May 1964
Uganda	15	1965	15	Dec. 1964
Yemen	28	May 1964	72	Mar. 1964
Zambia	.5	Feb. 1964		

Source: Marshall I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), p. 190.

As far as Soviet interest in Africa was concerned it was time for another downward trend.

Summary

This chapter has shown how Chinese influence in Black Africa contributed to the increase in Soviet interest in 1963-65. The Chinese were able to capitalize on their historical experiences to woo some of Black Africa's leaders and factions. One of China's main arguments was that colonialism and imperialism were the chronic problems which plagued Africa and China, and which they both had to work together to overcome. For this reason, whether in Ghana, Guinea, Mali or elsewhere, the Chinese tried with considerable success to impress on Africa's militant anti-colonialists that China's revolutionary type of socialism was the most appropriate in Black Africa's existing circumstances.

The Chinese propaganda ran counter to the Soviet doctrine of "peaceful co-existence." This was the root cause of the contradictory views which the Soviets and the Chinese held on the question of the national liberation struggle. On the whole, Chinese propaganda seemed more credible because most Africans were more concerned about the total decolonization of Africa than about disarmament and peaceful co-existence.

China had certain advantages over the Soviet Union.

China's relative "backwardness," the similarity between her and Africa's colonial experiences, her Moslem population, the terms of her aid and her lack of membership in the United Nations plus her lack of diplomatic relations with France were some of the most important. The most important of all China's assets and the one exploited to the fullest advantage was the question of skin-color. This was the weapon used by the Chinese to preclude Soviet membership and participation in the Afro-Asian organizations especially prior to the proposed Algerian Conference.

Chinese rivalry had a great effect on Soviet policy toward Africa. The Soviet de facto recognition of the Algerian National Liberation Front was apparently the result of this rivalry. The many doctrinal changes the Soviets made were also consequences of the Chinese influence. The Soviets were disappointed by Africa's response to Chinese propaganda and accused the Chinese for exploiting the color issue and steering the revolutionary movement against all white people.

The main result of the Sino-Soviet rivalry in Black Africa and in Afro-Asia in general was the aid-granting competition the two Communist Powers indulged in. The Soviet Union tried to buy her way into the Algerian Conference. China did everything possible to prevent Soviet participation. The Soviet Union's renewed interest in

Africa in the 1963-65 period was the main consequence of the Sino-Soviet rivalry.

However, this revival of Soviet interest in Black Africa was only temporary, for starting from 1966 there appeared to be another general decline of interest. Even so, interest in Nigeria increased. These two trends form the theme of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

THE MID AND THE LATE 1960s

Between 1966 and 1969 there was a considerable slackening of Soviet interest in Black Africa. The immediate cause of this was the failure of the Algerian conference. There were other important factors which promoted this new trend in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy and influenced the Soviet decision (in 1965) to abstain from deep involvement in Afro-Asian affairs. However, to this new policy, there were two exceptions, the Middle East and Nigeria. Various factors--African, Soviet and systemic in origin--were responsible for the new pattern of Soviet foreign policy in Black Africa. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse these variables in order to investigate how they contributed collectively to the changes in Soviet foreign policy in Black Africa.

In the African context, the most important variables to be discussed are the lack of viable domestic markets, the poor quality of Soviet goods, adverse climatic conditions, long delays in Soviet deliveries, repayment difficulties, the Ivory Coast's economic success, and lastly but probably most importantly, the ouster of some of Black Africa's militant and pro-Soviet leaders. All these affected both

the Soviet Union and Black Africa and contributed to the mutual loss of interest.

In the USSR, social problems resulting from the economic situation and the anti-aid reaction of the conservative groups continued to affect policy. So also did the complaints of the satellite countries spark a concern and promote a rethinking by the Soviet leadership.

The main systemic variables accounting for the decline of Soviet interest in Black Africa in the 1966-1969 period were the developments in Vietnam and the Mideast.

Problems of Economic Development

In Black African countries, the lack of viable domestic markets for manufactures produced by the Soviet-built factories was a source of discouragement to the Soviets as well as to the pro-Soviet African leaders. It seemed a wasteful effort to sign the economic agreements, send Africans to the Soviet Union and her satellites to be trained, send Soviet technicians to Africa to supervise the construction of factories and not be able to sell the goods turned out by these factories.

In the colonial era, Black African industries were predominantly extractive, the raw materials produced mainly for export. Since the colonial economy was an integral part of the metropolitan economy, the former had no chance to become viable. The raw material exports went to the

metropolises for consumption and for re-export in the form of manufactures in the world market. Benveniste and Moran summarized the common thinking on this in noting that

. . . colonies in Africa were not developed in terms of African or regional possibilities or requirements but in terms of their place in the colonial scheme.¹

After independence the arduous task which faced the new African leaders was the changing of their countries' relationships with foreign investors whose influence was overwhelming in the market economies. This meant industrialization and the processing of at least some of the internally produced raw materials either for export or for local consumption.

Industrialization presupposes the availability of certain factors of production, namely, land, labour and capital.² In Africa, land, to yield the raw materials, and labour to extract these raw materials, were abundant; but capital to finance labour, was lacking. Also lacking was the technological know-how. Capital and technology therefore had to be imported. Because these could not be obtained from the West on favourable terms and the Africans hoped to get a better deal from the Soviet Union, they turned East.

Another factor essential for industrialization and economic development, in addition to land, labour, capital and technology, is markets. The crucial importance of markets to industrial products is the ultimate goal of all industrial planning. The lack of markets to absorb

industrial goods. therefore, renders all the other factors and efforts ineffectual and wasteful. In simple economic logic, if there are no markets for goods, there is no need for labour and capital investments. The lack of viable markets was one of the reasons the Soviet-sponsored industries in Black Africa were unprofitable and could not expand.

A market for industrial goods means a consumer population, internal or external. A large population, therefore, in principle connotes a healthy market and in Schumpeter's terms, becomes "one of the dominating factors in the economic situation."³ Ghana's 8.74 million population, Guinea's 3.83 and Mali's 4.88⁴ were too small to support the countries' industrial efforts. The dismal picture becomes clearer when these figures are superimposed on the fact that inter-African trade was limited and that African industrial goods literally had no chance in the highly competitive world market.

Another important point to remember is that the majority of these populations were rural-dwellers who lead subsistence or close-to-subsistence lives, and who had little, or only the occasional need for industrial goods (see Table 8). Furthermore, it is very likely that the urban poor, or even the average Ghanaian, Guinean, or Malian would rather go to the outdoor market to buy a fresh pineapple than to the supermarket to buy the more expensive

Table 8

Estimates of Urban and Rural Populations

by Countries: 1960, 1965 and 1970

(In Thousands)

Countries	Urban Population			Rural Population		
	1960	1965	1970	1960	1965	1970
Ghana	1,578	2,096	2,820	5,199	5,644	6,206
Guinea	240	322	437	2,943	3,188	3,484
Mali	400	490	609	3,689	4,040	4,479
The Ivory Coast ^a	511	684	915	2,992	3,151	3,395
Nigeria	7,668	9,830	12,535	35,279	38,346	42,539

^aThough the Ivory Coast and Nigeria had no Soviet-built factories to speak of, their population figures have nevertheless been included for comparative purposes. Estimates for the year 1970 have been used here in spite of the fact that the period under discussion in this thesis terminates at 1969. The reason is because the 1969 figures cannot be located. However, the use of these 1970 figures will not affect the general question under discussion. In spite of the accelerated rate of urbanization in post-independence Black Africa, rural population was still disproportionately high.

Source: United Nations, Statistical Office, United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1972 (New York: 1973), p. 80

locally produced canned pineapples.

However, population size per se is not necessarily an index of a healthy market. The purchasing power of the population is as important, if not more so. In this respect, also, the Black African countries were unfortunate. With a national disposable income of \$1,849 million in 1968, and \$2,083 million in 1969, Ghana's per capita national income was \$221, and \$238, respectively. These per capita income figures run second only to those of the Ivory Coast. The Ivory Coast's national disposable income was \$1,193 million for 1968, and \$1,274 million for 1969, and her corresponding per capita national income was \$290 and \$303 respectively (see Table 9). In Black Africa, generally speaking, because of the low per capita income and the tastes of the people, goods from the Soviet-built fruit and vegetable canneries, leather tanneries and shoe factories, fish-processing plants and metal works did not have ready domestic markets.

Although loans were obtained from the Communists, the modes of development and growth of the African economies were oriented toward capitalistic markets. The need for markets was crucial and the profit motive was strong. The Soviet authorities and the African leaders did not undertake sufficiently careful planning before the industrial projects were launched. In his analysis of the trend of industrial development, Kenneth Galbraith argues that unlike the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when capital was hard to

Table 9

Estimates of Total National Disposable Income
and Per Capita National Income
1968 and 1969

Countries	(In Millions of Dollars)		(In Dollars)	
	Total		Per Capita	
	1968	1969	1968	1969
Ghana	1,849	2,083	221	238
Guniea	282	296	75	77
Mali ^a	---	---	---	---
The Ivory Coast	1,193	1,274	290	303
Nigeria	4,024	4,475	77	83

^aData for Mali is not available.

Source: United Nations, Statistical Office, United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1972 (New York: 1973), p. 621

accumulate and crucial for economic take off, currently capital is not all that crucial because it is relatively easy to obtain. According to him, the demands of technology and planning call for "specialized talent" and just as there was a power shift from land to capital, so also has there been a shift from capital to talented planning.⁵

Economic planning was largely ignored by the Soviet authorities and the African leaders during the construction of the industrial projects in Black Africa. It does not appear that the small national populations in Black Africa and the limitations which these numbers put on industrial development were given due consideration. In an attempt to be impressive, the Soviets constructed over-sized factories. In Guinea a shoe factory at Kindia was estimated to be able to produce 500,000 pairs of shoes a year. At Mamou, in the same country, the vegetable and fruit cannery had an output of 5 million cans a year; and a cold-storage in Conakry had a capacity of 3,000 tons.⁶ In Tema (Ghana) the output of a metal foundry was estimated at 2,500 tons of pig iron a year.⁷ In Mali, the cement factory had a 50,000-ton capacity. It was originally going to have a 100,000-ton capacity. Marshall Goldman, discussing Guinea, states

The Russian-built factories were generally too large in both size and productive capacity for a small country with a population of about 3 million. The Russians are accustomed to building for a population of over 200 million.⁸

If the Soviets anticipated that the excess capacity

of the over-sized factories could be employed for export sales, it was a miscalculation for inter-African trade was limited. That the Soviets constructed the same type of factories in the different West African countries to produce the same type of goods (canned foods, leather and textile products) makes the Soviet calculation even more unrealistic. It would have been wiser to see how the locally produced goods sold in the domestic markets before increasing output for export purposes.

Closely related to the lack of viable domestic markets in Black Africa was the non-acceptability of imported Soviet goods as well as of goods turned out from Soviet-built factories. Though Black Africa may be poor and unindustrialized she has a high sense of quality. The fact that Black Africans cannot produce the goods by themselves does not mean that they ignore the quality and efficiency of whatever they import.

In Ghana the general attitude was that Soviet goods were inferior to Western goods. Similarly, Ghanaian goods derisively referred to as "made in here" were considered inferior to Western imports. Yet these locally-produced products had to compete in the domestic market against American, West German, Dutch, Japanese and British products. Even at the peak of Ghana's "socialist" experiment (1962-1965) when her trade with the Soviet Union was most bouyant, her trade, both in import and export value, with Western

countries was far greater than her trade with the USSR.⁹

In Mali the pattern was the same. Even in 1965 when the value of Malian imports from the Soviet Union reached their highest level (\$8 million) her imports from China and France were greater (\$9.8, and \$10.3 million respectively).¹⁰

It is apparent, therefore, that in Black Africa domestically produced goods had, from the start, a tough competition from goods from the advanced industrialized countries--a competition with a foregone outcome. The fact that Black Africans had a prejudice against their own locally manufactured goods further dimmed the hopes of any successful economic development and undermined the hope of any meaningful economic independence from the West.

Many of the Soviet exports to Black Africa were known to have been of poor quality. If Africans complained, it was because they had a basis of comparison with Western goods which they admired and were accustomed to versus the new locally-produced and Soviet goods which had just appeared in the African markets.

Among the long list of Guinean complaints against Soviet goods were electrical equipment that wore out too fast, movie projectors that burnt out in no time, and typewriters that broke down very frequently.¹¹ The Soviets built a 100 kilowatt radio transmitter on top of a hill near Conakry which turned out to contain one of Guinea's large iron ore deposits but was very poor for radio transmission.

This was hardly a sign of efficiency and good planning. It was reported that Soviet grain destined for Guinea fermented by the time it arrived, and water and power supply systems malfunctioned repeatedly.¹² While the Guineans complained about the quality of Soviet goods, Soviet inefficiency and poor planning, they complimented highly West German equipment and technical services.¹³

So strong was the prejudice against Soviet standards in Black Africa that in Ghana, in particular, the credentials of Soviet and Eastern trained scholars were questioned. The dispute which started in 1967 was not settled until 1972 when the Ghanaian government decided to establish equivalencies between the qualifications of the Eastern trained graduates and those of their peers trained in Ghana or in Western Europe and to recognize their qualifications. According to the government,

These steps have been taken to remove the prejudices held against Ghanaian professional men trained in Eastern European countries since the return of the first batch of Soviet trained doctors in 1967.¹⁴

An important factor which contributed to the deterioration of Soviet goods in Black Africa was the tropical climate. It is reported that Soviet shipments of cement destined for Ghana and Guinea hardened upon their arrival because of the use of improper wrapping material or generally poor packaging. Even though the condition of a particular piece of Soviet merchandise may be unquestionably good to start with (and the Soviets "usually select their

best goods for oversea delivery,")¹⁵ this piece of merchandise would not take long to succumb to the ravages of tropical heat and humidity.

The jeeps and automobiles sent to Guinea, and the tractors and the farm machines sent to Ghana were reportedly unable to withstand "the rot and dampness of the tropics."¹⁶ Nor did the long delays which Soviet equipment had to suffer on the docks before installation help the situation. In the tropics, equipment that is not run constantly rusts or deteriorates. Re-ordering pieces of degenerated equipment, trying to fix them, or installing them and then realizing that they could not function contributed to further delays in the construction of projects. In Guinea in particular this resulted in "violent disputes between the Guinean and Soviet officials."¹⁷

The tropical heat did not affect Soviet equipment alone; it also affected the Soviet technicians. The excitement of travel and life in exotic Africa turned into boredom and discomfort; and "the sweltering Russian technicians longed for the more moderate climate of Moscow."¹⁸ It is doubtful if the tropical climate improved their efficiency.

The accusations and counter accusations that went on between Black African government officials and the Soviet planners about efficiency and delays were intensified by the inability of the recipients of the Soviet aid to repay

Soviet loans punctually, if they could at all. Western creditors, due to their long relationship with Black Africa and understanding of Black Africa's economic problems, seemed to take rescheduling of debts and belated payments as normal concomitants of Western-African economic activities. The Soviets, unaccustomed to such situations, took offence and complained as in 1965 and 1966 when Guinea defaulted on her payments.¹⁹

It should be borne in mind that the fisheries, foundries, tanneries and canneries, because of the limited markets in Black Africa plus the other related factors, generated no, or only negligible profits making it difficult for the African debtors to repay the Soviet loans. Nor should it be forgotten that in countries undertaking a "socialist" experiment, hospitals, stadia, radio stations and Polytechnic institutes were almost non-profit by definition.

One main reason why the operating costs of the Soviet-sponsored projects were so high was the lack of sufficient technical and managerial personnel in the recipient countries. This necessitated the employment of large numbers of expensive personnel from the Soviet Union or other Eastern Communist countries. The highly narrow specialization of Soviet technicians made it necessary that even larger numbers be assigned to each project.²⁰ In short, since the Soviet-built projects were unnecessarily

large,²¹ markets scarce, and operating costs very high (because of poor planning from the beginning) the Black African countries could not possibly repay their Soviet creditors on schedule.

In 1965-66, when the Soviets complained to Guinea about unpaid debts, the Guinean answer was that it was the fault of the Soviets for allowing Guinea to undertake the construction of projects which did nothing "to increase the country's export or productive potential."²² The Soviet response, as Goldman was told by the Soviet ambassador, was that Guinea was in such a woeful condition after the French withdrawal that her requests could not be refused. The Guinean officials retorted, "But the Russians were more experienced than we and should have known better."²³ In general, this type of sentiment, explicit or implicit, was what became of the once sympathetic, cordial and mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and Black Africa.

The Ivory Coast's Economic Success

A final factor which further disrupted the Soviet Union's relations with the "radical" Black African countries was the Ivory Coast's "economic miracle." When the Soviet Union penetrated Black Africa, her main purpose was to neutralize American or Western influence. The goal was to curtail or abrogate the economic dependence of the new Black African states on the "Western imperialists." Soviet aid, therefore, flowed into Black African countries and Soviet

trade with these countries, whether profitable to the Soviet Union or not, boomed soon after the independence of these countries. Guinea's complete break from France, politically and economically made her independence, in Soviet eyes, very meaningful.

On the other hand, the Ivory Coast was held in low esteem because of her decision to remain close to France, her open commitment to capitalism and her efforts to attract foreign investment. In brief, the Ivory Coast as the Soviets viewed her, "epitomized the most reactionary kind of state."²⁴ However, by 1968 the spectacular economic progress achieved by the Ivory Coast could not be overlooked, not even by Soviet commentators.

As V. Katin aptly describes it, the Ivory Coast's economic activities--the arrival or departure of "loads of freight, commercial delegations, financiers [and] businessmen" were like an "endless commercial merry-go-round." What he admittedly calls the Ivory Coast's "economic miracle,"²⁵ was due to two main factors; a well-planned agricultural diversification program and heavy foreign investment. Pushing ahead at the average rate of 8 per cent during the 1960s, the Ivory Coast's GDP in 1968 reached the high level of \$1,193 million and rose to \$1,274 million the following year compared with Guinea's \$282 million and \$296 million for the same years respectively. Her per capita income of \$290 for 1968 and \$303 for 1969 exceeded Ghana's

\$221 and \$283 or Guinea's \$75 and \$77 (see Table 9).

The Ivory Coast was moving ahead by leaps and bounds, outstripping formerly "socialist" Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, destroying the myth of the "rapid" socialist economic development. In general terms, this was what J. Kesse was alluding to when he said that the Ivory Coast, over the years, increased her food production enabling her to cut down on her rice imports thereby reducing her total imports from 11 per cent in 1960 to 6.8 per cent in 1970. According to him, in contrast to Guinea with similar climatic conditions, (which imported four times as much rice in 1970 as she did in 1962), the Ivory Coast had done very well.²⁶ Efrem Sigel thinks that since the former French West African Colony had no oil or other mineral resources of great commercial importance, she had done very well.²⁷

If Ghana, Guinea, Mali and other Black African countries were once inspired by the Soviet Union's historic "rapid economic development" and assumed that socialism, per se brought economic success, in the late 1960s they did not have to look far beyond their frontiers to realize that other approaches could be equally or more successful. If the Soviets once took Black Africa's anti-Western polemics literally and hoped to help Black Africa develop economically, the post Khrushchevian leadership, and in fact Khrushchev himself, realized that their assumptions about Black Africa

had been poorly based on fact. The Soviet model was shaped in accordance with certain specific historical developments and conditions indigenous to the Soviet Union. Following the Soviet example, or prescribing Soviet cures can be misleading and even dangerous to another country with different historical background and conditions.

The economic hardships which faced Ghana, Guinea and Mali in the late 1960's plus the example of the Ivory Coast, contributed to one conclusion: the ineffectiveness of Soviet methods and efforts in Black Africa, and its converse, the success of Western foreign investment and planning. In addition to her economic success, the Ivory Coast experienced remarkable political stability. In contrast to her "radical" neighbours, the Ivory Coast, aside from some minor tribal tension, suffered no political executions, assassinations, military interference in government and no coups d'état.

The Ouster of the Revolutionary Democrats

This takes us to another very important factor which contributed to a Soviet decline in involvement and interest in Black Africa: The coups d'état which ousted some of Africa's "revolutionary democrats," Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Modibo Keita of Mali, and Ben Bella of Algeria. When the Soviet Union moved into Africa, it was because the leaders of the countries concerned let them in. The assumptions which promoted the mutual interest and cordial relations between the Soviets and the Africans had already been dealt

with. It may be recalled that in 1962 many of the assumptions had proven ill-founded and that both the Africans and the Soviets had realized that their hopes and aspirations had been euphoric. Thereafter, the main channel through which the Soviets conducted their Black African policy was "personal diplomacy," i.e., Khrushchev's personal "friendship" with the Black African leaders.²⁸ "Personal diplomacy" as a political method was a very important characteristic of the Khrushchev era. Even though the Soviet leadership had begun to rethink Afro-Soviet relations during Khrushchev's reign, the "personal diplomacy" of the flamboyant Soviet Prime Minister was able to sustain the relationships. However, if difficulties arose in the personal relationships between Khrushchev and Nkrumah, Khrushchev and Modibo Keita, or Khrushchev and Ben Bella, and their governments, such as the removal of any of them from office, the Afro-Soviet relations were endangered.

The period between 1964 and 1968 witnessed a systematic disintegration of this "personal diplomacy." The first leader to go was Khrushchev, who was removed from office on October 15, 1964.²⁹ The main criticism centered on his direction of the Soviet economy, though it is not difficult to link the Soviet domestic economic problems with certain ramifications of Khrushchev's African or Third World policy. On June 19, 1965 Ben Bella of Algeria was overthrown in a military coup led by Colonel Boumedien,³⁰ on

February 24, 1966 the Ghanaian army seized power while Nkrumah was on his way from Vietnam to China.

The importance and the popularity that Nkrumah enjoyed in Africa, many parts of the Third World and in the Soviet Union as the leading force against "imperialism" and what he called "neo-colonialism" cannot be over-emphasized. When Deputy Premier Mikoyan awarded Nkrumah the Lenin Prize in April 1962, it was not only an indication of the Soviet Union's shift of preference (from Guinea) to, and her special interest in, Ghana;³¹ it was also because of Ghana's contribution to the struggle against colonialism in Africa, and because "Kwame Nkrumah enjoys a great and deserved authority in the countries of the African continent" and is "known to the world public as a courageous and staunch fighter for peace."³²

Metaphorically, since her independence Ghana had become the Mecca and Nkrumah the great prophet of the "African revolution." All Africa watched Ghana and listened to the "Osagyefo." If the success of Ghana's efforts would have a great impact on Africa, so also would her failure be important. Nkrumah himself was aware that failure in Ghana would be far reaching since the hopes of "millions of Africans living in our great continent are pinned upon the success of our experiment here."³³

However, Nkrumah was ousted in spite of Soviet efforts to help him see some of his shortcomings. Led by

Rodionov, the Soviet ambassador to Ghana, a team of Soviet experts had advised Nkrumah to overhaul his economic policies and direct more resources and energy into productive enterprises and less into social and prestige projects. In the political area, the same Soviet team admonished the Ghanaian president to democratize the top branches of the party structure. This also had been ignored and the military coup, through its public justifications of its action, underscored the Soviet recommendations for reform. Within weeks, some 1,200 Soviet technical assistants, economic experts, medical doctors, teachers and intelligence experts had to leave Ghana following the orders of the National Liberation Council.³⁴ This was a tragic blow to Ghanaian-Soviet friendship.

After Ghana, the Soviets directed their attention to Mali and tried to prevent the occurrence of a similar catastrophe. As Robert Legvold points out, "no country in Black Africa reacted more swiftly or (eventually) more thoroughly to the lessons of Nkrumah's fall than Mali."³⁵ The Soviets had noticed and warned that like Ghana's CPP, the Malian ruling party, the Union Soundanaise (US) was suffering from an internal struggle and that if remedial measures were not undertaken immediately, Modibo Keita ran the same risks as Nkrumah.

Soviet recommendations plus the efforts undertaken by Mali to avert an internal upheaval included the creation

of the Comité National de Défense de la Révolution (CNRD) endowed "with full power to defend and consolidate the gains of the people," the introduction of a new economic policy to reduce government spending, to rationalize management and state enterprises and eliminate unprofitable state enterprises. Nine days before the Ghanaian coup Mali had signed an agreement in France to re-enter the franc zone to save and strengthen her economy.³⁶

The Malian government's efforts also included an overhauling of the party structure, improvement of ideological work within the party, the strengthening of the alliance with the youth, workers, women, and the army, that is, bridging the gap between the party and the masses and between the urban and the rural.³⁷ The years 1966, 1967, and part of 1968 were the period that, one could say, the Malian policy-makers dedicated to the overhauling and strengthening of economic, political, and social structures of their country. In Legvold's words, "no Black African country had matched Mali's efforts to give firm footing to its revolution,"³⁸ and it was Mali's efforts which momentarily convinced the Soviets that Black Africa's revolutionary democrats had the capability to avert the fate which befell Nkrumah.³⁹

In spite of concerted Soviet and Malian efforts to save it, Modibo Keita's regime was toppled in a military coup on November 19, 1968. In October, 1970, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt died of a heart attack. Patrice Lumumba of

the Congo had been killed in 1960. In short, in the period between 1960 and 1970, excepting Sékou Touré of Guinea, all the "progressive" leaders of Africa were out of power.⁴⁰ If the Soviets had not already drawn any conclusions about their difficulties and failures in Black Africa, the rapid and systematic displacement of friendly Black African governments and the tendency of the new governments to look West came as clear and final indicators.

Charity Begins at Home

There were also certain Soviet domestic developments which contributed to the decline of Soviet interest in Black Africa in the mid and late 1960's. These were the continuing economic problems in the Soviet Union and among the satellite states, and the anti-aid reactions of the conservative groups. These variables, as they pertained to the early 1960 period, were discussed in chapter three. Since in the mid and late 1960's the problems were similar, it will not be necessary to spend much time over the problems per se, but to examine the general reactions which accompanied or followed these problems in the latter period.

In the late 1950's and early 1960's a common Soviet theme was that for the developing countries to be able to liquidate their colonial dependence on, and secure economic independence from, the Western capitalist nations, co-operation with the socialist countries was the only alternative. For this reason, they concluded trade and aid

agreements with almost any Black African country that was willing to negotiate. The terms of these agreements, as noted, were always favourable and attractive. However, difficulties in the Soviet Union--economic, political and social--pressured Brezhnev and Kosygin to re-consider their country's economic commitments to the developing countries.

In the light of this, it was natural for the Soviets to lose much of their interest in Black Africa. There were no longer any exciting developments there to attract their attention. But that is a one-sided view of the matter, for in fact, Black Africa's interest in the Soviet Union had also dwindled. In Ghana, in particular, the new military leaders harboured a "deep resentment" against the Soviet Union because of the role she had played in Nkrumah's government.⁴¹

By 1965 the Soviet Union had drawn up a definite policy for easing her involvement in the economic and political affairs of the Afro-Asian states. As early as May 1964, Khrushchev had stated (in a television address to his nation on his return from the UAR) that:

. . . when the Soviet Union helps the young developing countries and gives them a part of the resources accumulated by its own labour, it restricts for a certain time, its own potentialities.⁴²

On October 26, 1965, a Pravda editorial spelt out the new Soviet policy. In essence the Soviet Union was to disavow full involvement in the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles in Afro-Asia. The Soviets had decided

that putting an end to colonialism and imperialism was, after all, the responsibility of "the peoples of these countries themselves," for the socialist countries "cannot replace the peoples of the young nation states in the solution of the tasks of the national liberation movement."⁴³

The fact that the Soviet Union made such a declaration at a time when the Rhodesian crisis was at its height shows the seriousness of the Soviet Union's intent to disengage herself from African-Western disputes or confrontations. The Soviet rationale was that such non-involvement would mitigate the risks of a "thermonuclear war, with all its grave consequences for all peoples."⁴⁴

The Soviet Union was not concerned with Afro-Asian political issues only. She was also concerned with the revision of her economic relations with the Third World. In short, the Soviets decided that charity should begin at home. As the argument went on, the Soviet Union must increase "the economic strength of its homeland" and her "military might"; then she would be able to fulfill her "supreme international duty"⁴⁵ of assisting other peoples of the world and being a "reliable ally of all revolutionary anti-imperialist forces."⁴⁶

Pravda was not speaking for the Soviet Union alone but also for the rest of the Socialist Commonwealth. On October 27 (1965), a day after the first declaration, a Pravda editorial carried another declaration on behalf of

all the socialist countries which said that they could best fulfill their "supreme international duty to the workers of the whole world" by rebuilding their economies. By successfully building Socialism and Communism in their own countries, the argument continued, the socialist countries would be creating the "decisive condition for increasing aid to other detachments of the liberation struggle."⁴⁷ This has been the general (and probably popular) sentiment in the Soviet Union since Brezhnev and Kosygin took over from Khrushchev.

In 1969, D. Degtyar argued that since the credits, technical equipment and materials granted by the Soviet Union did not come from a surplus reserve, "they could be fully and successfully used for the development of the economy of the Soviet Union."⁴⁸ In the same year, Yu M. Osipov, repeating a common formula, pointed out that capital accumulation was the starting point and sine qua non of economic development; where and how to accumulate capital, he went on, was the problem and responsibility that faced the developing countries and the brunt of that responsibility devolved on the developing countries themselves.⁴⁹

N. P. Shmelev took a more dismal view of the prospects of a successful solution of the economic problems in Afro-Asia. "Facing logic and realism rather than Marxism-Leninism" as David Morison says of Shmelev, the Soviet writer, basing his conclusions on UN estimates, states that even if the GNP of the developing countries grew

at the rate of 5 or 6 per cent, and the population increased at only 1 to 2 per cent, it would take up to the year 2,000 to reach half of the present average of the Western European GNP, and only 20 per cent of North America's.⁵⁰

Economist V. Kollantay's picture was that even if the developing countries, by the rate of growth of their GNP, were gaining on the advanced capitalist nations at the rate of 2 per cent per annum, it would take some ten decades to close the present gap.⁵¹

In the late 1950s and early 1960s the Soviet response to such a gloomy picture would have been that the Soviet Union should help save the underdeveloped countries from overdependence on the West. In the late 1960s the attitude was that the Soviet Union should not try to solve other nations' economic problems when she had enough of her own.

If Soviet citizens at home had to suffer long waits before making purchases, if the quality of consumer goods was poor, and above all, if citizens were demonstrating their disapproval of the existing state of affairs and insisting that charity began at home,⁵² then it was incumbent on the Soviet planners to do something about the domestic situation. If a consumer revolt could convulse Poland and force the Communist regime into reforms to satisfy the demands of the people; if Hungarians like the other Eastern European countries were plagued with chronic housing shortages,⁵³ if

Czechoslovakia had to make sweeping and even anti-socialist reforms to ameliorate her poor economic situation, then there was definitely something wrong not just in the Soviet domestic setting but in the whole satellite system.

It was necessary for the Soviet Union, in the face of these problems, to prune her material outlay on the developing countries. Thus, after years of courting Afro-Asia,⁵⁴ the Soviets finally decided to resort to prudence. The political, economic and social problems in the Soviet domestic setting as well as in the satellite system influenced the new Soviet leadership to look inward and away from Black Africa.

The new attitude of the Soviet Union was reflected in her trade-aid program vis-a-vis Black Africa. Among Black African states, the reduction of economic relations with Ghana was the most drastic. The reason was the recent change of government in Ghana which necessitated the departure of over a thousand Soviet citizens. In 1966, the total value of Soviet imports from Ghana dropped to \$24.198 million from the 1965 high of \$30.636 million and then to a mere \$15.429 million in 1969. The value of Soviet exports followed a similar pattern, dropping from the 1965 high of \$34.521 million to \$13.98 million in 1966 and to \$9.324 million in 1969. Soviet trade with Guinea and Mali also showed a decline by 1969 (see Table 10). It was only Nigeria's trade with the Soviet Union which increased in the

Table 10

Soviet Trade with Selected African Countries

1965 - 1969 (In Millions of US Dollars)

Countries	General Imports					General Exports				
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Ghana	30.636	24.198	25.641	20.424	15.429	34.521	13.980	7.326	9.213	9.324
Guinea	3.552	3.552	2.886	3.219	3.441	9.657	10.767	7.215	13.764	8.769
Mali	2.553	1.554	1.665	1.776	1.998	9.768	8.547	9.546	9.435	5.106
The Ivory Coast	0.600	0.174	0.113	0.053	0.113	2.700	0.466	0.458	3.760	1.880
Nigeria	5.772	0.777	9.102	21.300	24.420	3.219	4.551	10.767	11.877	16.650

^aContrary to the general pattern, Nigeria's figures are in the ascending order reflecting the Soviet Union's increasing interest in that country during the civilwar.

Source: United Nations, Statistical Office, United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1969. New York, 1970, p. 858, and P. 441 for the Ivory Coast.

In the conversion from roubles into dollars the 1968 rate (1 rouble = \$1.11 = 95.4d) was used. For the Ivory Coast, the 1968 rate (246.85 francs = \$1) was used. These rates were stable over a period of time. For information about the relationship between the American dollar and other national currencies and the exchange rates, see the same Yearbook, p. 566.

same period. We will analyse this later.

In her extension of aid, the Soviet Union became more stringent: Ghana, Mali, Kenya, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, the Congo and Zambia received no credits in 1966 or in 1967. Only Guinea (\$3 million) and Tanzania (\$20 million) received offers. In 1967 only Zambia and Nigeria received aid overtures (\$6 million and \$60 million respectively), (See Table 11). The \$20 million for Tanzania in 1966 and the \$6 million for Zambia in 1967 were probably designed to counter the growing Chinese influence in that area. In 1968, Nigeria was offered \$140 million.

Vietnam

In conjunction with the conditions in Africa and the pressure of Soviet domestic imperatives, the Vietnamese conflict was an important international development which distracted Soviet attention from Black Africa.

Soviet policy in Indochina from 1960 was determined by two conflicting considerations. The first consideration was to try for a general détente with the United States who supported the South Vietnamese government against the Vietcong and North Vietnam. The second consideration was the desire to maintain Soviet influence in the Asian sector of the international Communist movement "in the face of increasing rivalry with China."⁵⁵ The first consideration dictated a Soviet non-involvement in Vietnam, and required that the Soviet Union ease North Vietnam's increasing

Table 11

Soviet Offers of Economic Credits and Grants
to Selected African Countries
1966, 1967 and 1968
(In Millions of Dollars)

	1966	1967	1968
Cameroon			
Congo			
Ghana			
Guinea	3		
Kenya			
Mali			
Nigeria		60 ^a	140 ^b
Senegal			
Sierra Leone			
Tanzania	20		
Uganda			
Zambia		6	

^aArthur Jay Klinghoffer. "Why the Soviets Chose Sides," Africa Report, Feb. 1968, p. 48. Also see Robert Legvold. Soviet Policy in West Africa, 1970, p. 222.

^bRobert Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Changing View of Sub-Saharan Africa," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, ed. Raymond Duncan (Toronto: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), p. 82.

Source: Research Memoranda R-SB-80 July 21, 1967, and RSE-120, August 14, 1968, U.S. Department of State, Washington, adopted by Waldemer Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 207.

hostility toward South Vietnam. The second consideration required that the Soviet Union support North Vietnam.

It was this dilemma which motivated the Soviet Union to take two calculated actions. In the first place the Soviet Union sought to prevent a Chinese "victory" which might give credence to Mao's "liberation war" theory and enhance China's influence in North Vietnam and in the Third World in general. Secondly, the Soviet Union sought to prevent American victory, which might undermine Soviet prestige. In Vietnam, therefore just as in Black Africa, Soviet policy seemed to be better defined in terms of "what it seeks to avoid rather than what it seeks to gain."⁵⁶

In August 1960, Khrushchev granted North Vietnam "large credits to finance [an] ambitious industrial expansion."⁵⁷ This and the air-lift to Laos four months later were meant to convince the Vietcong and their Pathet Lao allies that the Soviet Union was behind them in the struggle against the "imperialists". These friendly gestures were also intended to woo the North away from China. In spite of this, by 1964 Hanoi had gravitated even closer to Peking and it became apparent that Moscow was losing out to Peking in the struggle for leadership in South East Asia. However, the Soviet eclipse did not last long for as a result of the US military escalation following the Tonkin Gulf episodes (Aug. 2 and 4), Hanoi sought stronger ties with, and support from the Soviet Union. Her more

sophisticated weapons (relative to China's) were needed to buttress North Vietnam against the US.

After Khrushchev, there were three main reasons why the new Kremlin leadership wanted to pursue a middle-of-the-road policy and seek a peaceful negotiated settlement to the Vietnam crisis. In the first place Kosygin and Brezhnev did not want to endanger the Soviet-American détente reached in 1963. Second, Kosygin and Brezhnev were new in office and were anxious to consolidate their position rather involve themselves in a crisis. Third, after Khrushchev's ouster there were pressing domestic problems which required immediate attention. In the light of these considerations it did not seem very likely that the Soviet Union would be interested in devoting further resources and attention to external developments.

However, in 1965, the Vietnam war took a new turn with the American bombing of North Vietnam and with the assignment of over 100,000 US ground troops to the combat, increasing Hanoi's need for Soviet assistance. At the same time, Moscow became increasingly sensitive to China's incessant propaganda which accused the Soviets of making a "deal" with the US to end the war on terms detrimental to Hanoi's aspirations. The fear of Hanoi's possible defection to Peking and the subsequent Peking-Hanoi anti-Soviet coalition left the Soviets the easier alternative of endorsing the National Liberation Front's proposals and

lending full support to its course. Thus, the Soviets, under circumstances that were difficult to control, became deeply involved in Vietnam.

On April 24, 1965, the Soviet leaders allowed the NFL to establish a permanent mission with full diplomatic status in Moscow. They also reiterated their intention to supply Hanoi with "all necessary aid" and "demanded American withdrawal as a prerequisite for settlement."⁵⁸ In July, a new Moscow-Hanoi agreement "provided for economic and military aid beyond that already granted to North Vietnam . . . under previously concluded agreements."⁵⁹ By the end of 1965 Soviet military aid to the North had amounted to half a billion dollars; meager, relative to American aid to the South,⁶⁰ yet handsome and a sign of concern for a friend in need.

In 1966, Soviet aid to Hanoi, mainly military, was increased. In the main, it comprised "ground-to-air missiles, 'complex' anti-aircraft guns with radar guidance systems and anti-aircraft automatic guns of 'large caliber'." By March the Soviet Union was reported to have delivered twelve Soviet MIG fighters. By April forty more were reported to have been delivered. It was also reported that a considerable number of North Vietnamese were being trained in the Soviet Union as fighter pilots. Soviet officers were said to have been in the North serving as advisers on surface-to-air missile sites.⁶¹ When large-scale American

bombing of Communist North Vietnam started in 1965, the Soviet Union found it impossible to abandon a fellow "'socialist state' under attack by 'imperialism'." ⁶²

The Middle East

The Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 was an important international development which promoted a deeper Soviet involvement in the Mideast, and further distracted their attention from Black Africa. The Soviet leadership had already clearly defined the limits of involvement in Afro-Asian affairs. Any political or economic involvement in Afro-Asia which, in Soviet estimation, threatened world peace was to be avoided. The Soviet involvement in the Mideast therefore constituted a departure from the newly defined direction of foreign policy, for the consequences of the June war created the very dangerous confrontation which the Soviet decision-makers had tried to avoid. There were good reasons for this involvement: the strategic importance of the Mideast and the desire to increase their influence in that area seem to have encouraged the Soviets to treat the Mideast as a "special case" in the East-West "game of power politics." ⁶³

The foundations of involvement in the Mideast were laid by Khrushchev. By 1963, Iraq had been granted \$218 million in Soviet economic aid, Syria had been granted \$193 million, Tunisia \$46 million, Yemen \$44 million, and Egypt \$715 million. ⁶⁴ By the end of 1964, President Nasser had

released local Egyptian Communists from prison, and the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) and the Algerian FLN (a favourite of the Soviets) had decided to pursue a unified policy. Iraq and Syria were becoming increasingly radical and Nasser's dependence on Soviet economic and military aid was becoming greater.⁶⁵ Thus an opening, alluring and accessible to the Soviet Union had appeared in the Mideast by 1965.

This largely explains why within six months after the Soviet decision to avoid deep involvement in Afro-Asian problems, they began to assume full patronage of Syria after a six-year lull. Syria's revolutionary character and her geographical position viv-a-vis Israel in the "heart of the Arab World," merited much Soviet attention and interest.

In April 1966, during the visit of the Syrian Premier to the USSR, the Soviet Union agreed to finance three-fifths of the \$250 million dam on the Euphrates. The two countries also reiterated their solidarity with the Palestinian Arabs and support for the Arab cause in the struggle against Israel. In the month of May the powerful Soviet mass media, Pravda, Izvestiya, and Tass, carried a continuous stream of accusations and invectives against Israel. The Egyptian-Syrian reconciliation and defense agreement, and the improvement in the Syrian-Iraqi relations were favourably commented on in the Soviet Union,⁶⁶ for these developments in the Mideast indicated a gathering of "progressive forces" against Israel and her Western

supporters.

As their passions rose against Israel, during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Arabs turned against the West thus creating a vacuum for the Soviet Union to fill. As Time put it.

From Morocco on the Atlantic to South Yemen on the Arabian Sea they [the Russians] are supplying weapons, training troops, running aid programs and generally making themselves useful in areas that until recently were Western preserves.⁶⁷

Russia's strong military influence in the Mediterranean was one of the most remarkable results of the Six-Day War (June 1967).⁶⁸ Since the ignominious defeat of the Arabs the Soviets had increased the number of their Mediterranean fleet to fifty ships by 1968, thus bringing it to par with the US sixth fleet. The defeat of the Arabs meant increased dependence on the Soviet Union and, consequently, the Soviet Union's deeper entanglement in the Mideast.⁶⁹ By the end of 1968 the Soviets has replaced some 80 per cent of all the military equipment the Arabs had lost in the Six-Day War. These replacements included 80 new MIG-21 fighters, SU-9 fighter-bombers and 200 tanks for Egypt. 40 planes and 100 tanks for Syria, and 20 planes for Iraq.⁷⁰

In addition, Egypt, Syria, and Algeria had acquired some 40 Komar patrol boats, which carry styx missiles. The number of the Soviet military advisers had increased to at least 2,000. This represented approximately twice the pre-war total. Large Soviet training missions had also

been reportedly active in Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

The Soviet Union, in the absence of Western competition had extended her influence into Mideast areas hitherto regarded as Western spheres of influence. Iran, once a customer of Britain, had signed an agreement for the purchase of \$110 million worth of military trucks and other gear. The Sudanese army, which once used British equipment was now being rearmed by the Soviets. In Yemen Soviet advisers together with Republican forces had flown combat missions against Royalists.

Though the bulk of Soviet aid to the Mideast was military, some of it was economic and cultural. The Aswan dam is the single most expensive (\$325 million), monumental, inspiring and the most conspicuous symbol of Soviet penetration of the Mideast. In addition to the Aswan, by 1968 the Soviets had been engaged in about a hundred major projects in the Mideast. These included the Euphrates dam in Syria, oil prospecting in Egypt, a steel plant in Algeria, a railroad in Iraq, a machine-tool plant in Iran, and a fish-meal plant in Yemen.

In the cultural sphere, a Russian ballet school in Alexandra was repeatedly attracting large attendances, and Soviet folk-dance groups and circus troupes were touring the major Mideast cities. Soviet films could be seen in many movie theatres and on the state-owned television. Soviet books and magazines, printed in Arabic, were widely

available in bookstores and news-stands and Russian language courses were being emphasized in Arab universities.

The Mideast was, and to a large extent still is, the most viable Soviet stronghold in the whole of Afro-Asia although the United States in recent months has begun to re-establish some Western influence. The Arabs needed the Soviets and the Soviets needed the strategic Mideast. The interest and the irresistible attention which that geographical area commanded in the late 1960s contributed to the decline of Soviet interest in Black Africa.

Nigeria

Soviet foreign policy in the Mideast in the mid and late 1960s was a deviation from the new line of policy defined in October 1965. So also was Soviet policy in Nigeria. In the current state of Black African-Soviet relations, Nigeria was an exception. While Soviet trade with Ghana, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, and Mali declined, the Nigerian-Soviet trade increased in the same 1966-69 period. (See Table 10).

Nigeria had not originally been attractive to the Soviet Union because of her membership in the moderate "reactionary" Monrovia Group and her strong affiliation with the Western capitalist countries. The fact that Nigeria was controlled from the north by Moslem feudal "reactionary"

overlords (Soviet Communism is antagonistic to feudalism) was a further reason why the Soviets saw Nigeria as "unprogressive." The Soviet Union was therefore cautious and hesitant about interacting with Nigeria.

By 1967 it had become obvious that the Soviet Union had revised her attitude to Nigeria for two main reasons. The Soviet Union had become less doctrinaire and had liberalized her attitude toward the moderate African states in general and the Nigerian civil war removed some of the "reactionary" overtones of Nigerian politics and provided a point of access to the USSR.

The first variable: the reasons for the pragmatism of Soviet policy toward the moderate African states, had already been dealt with. One should remember that the conclusion of a trade agreement in July 1963 with emphasis on Soviet purchases of Nigerian columbite initiated the move toward Nigerian-Soviet ~~rapport~~. Without reservation, Nigeria throughout 1964 openly invited Soviet aid for her Six Year Plan. The "radical" Trade Union Federation urged the Soviet Union to "give Nigeria the same kind of assistance already extended to other African countries." The Soviet ambassador, A. I. Romanov was pointedly asked if his country would be willing to aid Nigeria in her efforts to build the \$216 million Kainji Dam. In the later part of that year, the minister responsible for the Navy indicated Nigeria's willingness to welcome Soviet technical aid.⁷¹

The Soviet Union however, was not too receptive to these friendly gestures from the regime of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and his northern "feudal" colleagues. Nigeria continued to be viewed as economically "backward", subservient to Anglo-American interests and vulnerable to capitalist "divide and rule" tactics. The Nigerian president was looked upon as the middleman in these relationships.⁷² This helps explain why, in spite of the Soviet Union's agreement to aid Nigeria, she tried to avoid making any specific commitments.⁷³

Soviet doubts about Nigeria were dispelled in January 1966 when a military coup d'état dislodged the Nigerian federal government. For the Soviets, gone with the Balewa regime were the preponderant reactionary feudal elements, nepotism, corruption, tribalism and above all, Western financial influence. The Soviets, as Legvold points out, "have every reason to be pleased"⁷⁴ with the turn of events in Nigeria. This explains the Soviet Union's support of the first coup and the subsequent development of amicable relations between the Communists and the government of Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. Though Ironsi preferred capitalism to socialism, the Soviets did not necessarily regard him as a neo-colonialist puppet. His pursuit of non-alignment, his willingness to bring Nigeria closer to the Communist countries, and particularly his efforts to destroy regionalism encouraged the Soviets. The Soviets believed

that under Ironsi, Anglo-American preponderance in Nigeria would wane.⁷⁵

Soviet disappointment was therefore natural when in a second coup, the Northern (Hausa-Fulani) officers toppled the Ibo-controlled Ironsi government in July, 1966. This "step backwards", as the Soviets called the coup, meant a return of the former status quo. However, Lieutenant Colonel Yakuba Gowon's new government did not turn out to be as "reactionary" as the Soviets had feared. The scepticism surrounding the Gowon regime disappeared as it became clear that national unity and the reduction of British economic influence were his paramount objectives.⁷⁶

The Soviet Union and Nigeria soon negotiated agreements concerning air services, student exchanges and cultural affairs. The two countries also discussed trade and aid. Loan offers to Nigeria publicized on January 16, 1967 showed how interested the Soviet Union and her Eastern European satellites were. Yugoslavia offered \$9.1 million, Czechoslovakia \$15 million, Poland \$32 million, and the Soviet Union offered \$45 million. These offers were for the development of chemical and metallurgical works.⁷⁷ For this purpose, a team of Soviet scientists and economists visited Nigeria (between the end of January and March) to investigate the prospects for such developments.⁷⁸ All this happened before the Biafran secession when the Soviet Union was neutral (at least, publicly) during the Federal-Biafran debates.

After Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwa Ojukwu announced Biafra's secession (May 30, 1967), Soviet commentary, though lamenting the state of affairs in Nigeria, avoided apportioning blame to either side.⁷⁹

When the Civil War broke out officially in July of 1967 the Soviet Union relinquished her neutrality and sided with the Federal government. There were specific reasons, mainly pragmatic, why the Soviet Union supported the Federal Military Government. The existence of a partial vacuum in Nigeria, the lack of big-power support for secessionist Biafra, the desire to maintain good relations with most African states, and ideological considerations were the main reasons. The possibility that expectations of preferential treatment in the Nigerian oil industry influenced the Soviet calculus is a real one. Closely related to this was the Soviet assumption that the Federal Military Government, given enough help, would win the war in a short time.⁸⁰

In the initial stages of the Civil War, the Soviet Union along with Britain, France, and the United States, adopted a wait-and-see attitude and the three Western powers curtailed arms shipments to both Biafra and Federal Nigeria. When the Federal Military Government increased pressure on Biafra, the United States remained neutral while Britain allowed licenses only for the sale of small defensive arms to the Federal Military Government. Then France began to aid Biafra while Britain and the US tried to avoid a firm commitment to either side. The lack of serious

Western commitment to the Federal Military Government thus created a partial vacuum and the Soviet Union moved to fill it.⁸¹ This was reminiscent of the situation with Guinea eight years earlier.

The lack of formal Western commitment to Biafra, by the same token, meant that the Soviet Union's stand on the Nigerian issue was unopposed. The absence of Western opposition to the Soviet position removed the risk of any Soviet-Western confrontation. When, therefore, the Soviets started supplying the Federal Military Government with arms, there was no danger involved.

Similarly, the non-committal position of the large majority of African states, and in fact the general pro-Federal Military Government sentiment among the African states removed the danger of Soviet confrontation with the collective Organization of African Unity (OAU).⁸² Under the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership the new Soviet policy was to pursue short-term goals and to try to be on good terms with as many African states as possible. The Nigerian crisis did not pose a threat to this new policy.

The Soviet Union supported the Federal Military Government against Biafra from ideological as well as empirical considerations. Marxism-Leninism is antagonistic to traditionalism and all its ramifications. This is evident in Lenin's pronouncements in the Second Comintern Conference (Moscow, 1920).⁸³ The Soviets were not happy

about ethnic or tribal divisiveness in Black Africa since it was believed to militate against the development of the "progressive forces" badly needed in the fight against "neo-colonialism". It was therefore not in their interest to see Black African states splinter apart under the weight of regionalism, tribalism or border disputes.⁸⁴

A final reason was the assumption that the Federal Military Government, timely and adequately aided, would gain victory in a relatively short time. Victory for Federal Nigeria could mean a possible Soviet displacement of Anglo-American influences especially in the Nigerian oil industry. Thus, the Soviet Union had no hesitation in aiding the Nigerian Federal Government once the civil war began. The most important Soviet military aid to Federal Nigeria included seven Czech Dolphin trainers and six MIG-17 fighter jets, Illyushin bombers, three patrol boats, heavy artillery, vehicles and other arms. This equipment was accompanied by 150-200 technicians.⁸⁵ Later, (November) Soviet Ambassador Romanov reaffirmed the Soviet Union's willingness to extend economic aid to Federal Nigeria⁸⁶ and reminded the Nigerian Commissioner for Industry of the \$60 million which the Soviet Union had pledged to Nigeria three years before.⁸⁷ Then in 1968, only days after Modibo Keita's ouster, the Soviet Union signed another aid agreement offering Nigeria \$140 million.⁸⁸ Thus Nigeria, which was once ignored, became the focal point of Soviet attention.

Summary

In this chapter, the factors which contributed to the decrease of Soviet interest in Black Africa in the 1966-1969 period have been analysed. Some of these factors were African in origin, and others were Soviet and systemic.

It has been observed that the lack of viable domestic markets to absorb the goods produced by the Soviet-built factories created economic and repayment difficulties for the Black African countries concerned. An interesting observation was that the modes of economic development in the Black African countries were capitalistic though the credits were "communist". Even so the economies of the pro-Soviet Black African countries continued to falter while the economy of the avowedly pro-Western Ivory Coast continued to expand. Africans were likely to draw specific conclusions from this, and the disaffected, (e.g., Ghanaians) could not help but look for alternative solutions to their country's economic and related problems.

The coup d'état which rocked Ghana and Mali were not merely indicative of the need for economic reforms, but were also signals for a decrease in Soviet influence. The ouster of Mali's Modibo Keita in 1968 dealt a final blow to the lingering Soviet interest in Black Africa and left an indelible mark on Afro-Soviet relations. Adverse climatic conditions affected Soviet equipment and technicians and contributed to long delays in the construction of projects.

These delays helped generate accusations and counter-accusations between African and Soviet officials and contributed to a mutual loss of respect.

With all the problems and disappointments which the Soviets were suffering in Black Africa, it was not surprising that the conservative groups in the Soviet Union should demand an overhaul of Soviet aid programs. In the face of domestic economic and social problems and complaints from her satellites, the Soviet Union felt it incumbent on her to look inward and pay more attention to her own problems. This involved less attention to Black Africa.

Other important developments which contributed to the decline of Soviet interest in Black Africa in this period were Vietnam and the Middle East. Vietnam and the Mideast became the two most important "storm centers" from 1965 and 1967 respectively. They made demands on Soviet resources, which called for a decline of interest in less important areas including Black Africa.

Although Soviet interest declined in most parts of Black Africa there was a remarkable increase in the interest in Nigeria in this same period. This was a deviation from the Soviet Union's general direction of policy in the 1966-1969 period. The main reason for the interest in Nigeria was the opportunities which the Nigerian civil war opened for Soviet penetration. The desire to undermine Anglo-American interests and probably an interest in Nigerian oil

were important considerations which contributed to Soviet involvement in Nigeria.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

Trade and aid data were found to be the most suitable indicators of the fluctuations which marked Soviet policy in Black Africa. Such indicators as the total number of Soviet residents in Ghana or the total number of Ghanaians in the Soviet Union failed to vary in accordance with the changes in the Black African-Soviet relations. They were more suitable as tests for the decline of interest in the Afro-Soviet relations. UN votes also proved inadequate for, although the Soviets and the Africans cast similar votes on the same international issues, their motives were different and in fact, selfish. Nations may have the similar goals or a common "enemy" and yet may not necessarily be friends.

Africa's geographical distance from the Soviet Union, the low level of her political consciousness, the colonial presence on that continent, the threat of war, and the weakness of the Soviet Union made it impossible for her to make any contact with, or influence events in, Africa. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet Union was weak militarily, she was isolated diplomatically, had no allies and was not even a member of the League of Nations. She was

weak economically and could not influence any country with foreign aid. The only weapon she had was an ideology upon which she relied for the interpretation of events and trends in the international system and for potential influence in that system.

In the Soviet policy toward Black Africa, ideology was pre-eminent. Africa's colonial history, developments and trends--political, economic, military and social--were viewed through Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Accordingly, the definition of her foreign policy objectives and interests as well as the assignment of priorities to these objectives and interests were influenced by ideology. This made it difficult for her to view developments in Black Africa and the relationships between the new Black African countries and their former metropolises objectively.

Before their actual contact with Black Africa, the Soviets had interpreted anti-colonialism as hatred for the West and its economic and political systems. Consequently, they anticipated a firm unity among the newly independent Black African states against the "neo-colonialist West." However, as it turned out, most of these and related assumptions were inaccurate. Of all the disappointments experienced by the Soviets, the lack of unity among the African states over the Congo was one of the most severe. The divisiveness among the African states dealt a severe blow to Soviet assumptions about, and aspirations in,

Black Africa.

In their efforts to establish and maintain friendly relations with Black African countries, the political, economic and social conditions in Africa were not the only variables the Soviets surveyed and analysed. The domestic conditions in the Soviet Union, especially the rapid and outstanding scientific and technological achievements and how they might influence Black Africa were also carefully calculated. Soviet analysts assumed that these achievements, demonstrative of the efficiency of socialist development, would have a positive influence on Black Africa.

Admittedly, the attraction of Soviet achievements and methods did exist both prior to, and shortly after independence. Facing reality after the short post-independence euphoria it became apparent to the Africans that the Soviet Union was too far advanced to make her examples worthy of emulation. The same complacent views about their rapid scientific and technological advancement were behind the Soviets' assumption that Black Africa would prefer the Soviet Union to China in the Sino-Soviet rivalry over Africa. As it turned out, the Soviet Union's achievements put her in the category of the advanced industrialized nations while China's relative "backwardness" became an asset.

Competing against the United States and China was a difficult undertaking for the Soviet Union. To win this competition, or to prevent the others from winning, the

Soviet Union had to take quick and drastic competitive measures especially after the realization that the conditions in Africa, the Soviet Union and the international sphere had been misperceived. Soviet decision-makers faced the task of winning favors and privileges from African governments against American and Chinese interests, and reviewing the conclusions made about Africa.

All this necessitated such actions as the conclusion of favorable trade and aid agreements at one time, and the reduction and even the termination of trade and aid at another time; the hardening of attitudes toward the moderate African states at one time, and the softening of attitudes toward the same group of states at another time. Also, at one time, it was expedient for the Soviets to apply the principles of orthodox Marxism-Leninism to Black Africa. and to make doctrinal changes to facilitate Black Africa's transition to socialism at another time. The making of these doctrinal changes presupposed the Soviet acceptance of the idea of "socialism of the national type." Yet at times the Soviets looked down on efforts by Black African countries to develop types of socialism considered suitable for their needs. All this collectively formed the basis of the variations which marked Soviet policy for Black Africa.

Contributing to the shifts in Soviet priorities and interests were such international developments as Cuba, Berlin, the Middle East, and Vietnam which distracted Soviet

attention from Black Africa. After the settlements of the Congo and Algeria crises, and especially after Guinea's return to the West, there was less in Africa to retain a high level of Soviet interest. Developments in Cuba, Berlin, the Middle East and Vietnam were more challenging. By the time tension heightened over these international issues, the Soviet Union had almost "left" Black Africa. However, the one important African development which the Soviets could not avoid exploiting was the Nigerian Civil War. The opportunity which Nigeria presented initiated a Soviet "return" to Black Africa.

Because of the problems of perception it is hard, if not impossible, for decision-makers of all nations to view an object, situation or behavior in exactly the same way. This is because of the different images which the values, doctrines and ideologies of national societies present. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sékou Touré of Guinea and Modibo Keita of Mali, because of the way they were perceived, came to be called "radicals" in the West. These same leaders were called "agents of imperialism" at one time, and described as "progressive" at another time by the Soviets. To most Africans these leaders, among others, were in reality "Africanists" who struggled for the freedom to select ideas from the East and West, weave them together with Africa's own traditions to develop a system distinctively African in character. These were the leaders that

most Africans called the "true" African socialists. Perception, therefore seems to depend largely on who we are, and where we are at a given point in time. The popularity of Chinese ideas among militant Africanists, and particularly the success which attended the Chinese exploitation of the color issue depended on how they were perceived in Black Africa in relation to the Soviets and Westerners.

Two observations can be made about Soviet behavior during the period discussed in this thesis. These concern the question of tactics. First, in the Soviet Union's policy toward Black Africa, the underlying ambition was not to win in Africa, but to see the United States fail. She was not so much interested in winning Africa over as denying her to the United States and the West, hence the Soviet Union's interest in, and support for, the neutrality of African states in international affairs. Soviet policy in Black Africa (and in fact in almost all of the Third World) could therefore be called a "negative" policy, for it was less concerned with what she could accomplish for herself than with preventing her opponents from accomplishing their goals.

Second, Soviet penetration tended to be in areas neglected by the United States and the West. Soviet influence in Guinea was made possible, or easier, by the French withdrawal just as the increase in Soviet interest in Nigeria was facilitated by the refusal of the West to

support the Federal Military Government. One might ask if Soviet penetration would have been impossible with Western presence or concern in these areas. The answer seems to be in the affirmative, for (taking the example of Guinea) it was reported that after the 1958 Guinean-French dispute Sékou Touré made conciliatory gestures to De Gaulle, but the latter would not respond. Stranded and broke, Guinea had no choice but to accept whatever she could wherever it came from.

The Chinese penetration of East Africa followed a similar pattern. With no apparent interest from any Western country in the much needed Tan-Zam railway, the Chinese moved in and finally offered to loan the total amount required for the project. Kwame Nkrumah is known to have intimated that if economic aid did not come from the West, the only alternative was that it would have to come from the East. American and Western absence or indifference, therefore, seems to have provided the major opportunities for Soviet and Chinese (Communist) access to Black Africa.

A trend which is foreseeable in the Black African Soviet relations is a continued deflation of Soviet interest. The Soviet-American détente of 1963, as we say, had repercussions on Black African-Soviet relations. Soviet-American co-operation though gradual, is continuous; this will affect at least the anti-American aspect of Soviet foreign policy. Anti-American polemics will be, and in fact

are, reduced considerably, for they seem to have lost much of their relevance with the reduction in the tensions between the two powers.

Chinese influence and interest is also likely to wane as the colonial question eases. As new Portuguese government seeks settlement with Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau the entire Southern African situation takes on new and as yet undetermined dimensions. This will reduce the number of the national liberation movements in Africa, which could diminish Chinese influence if sustained African support is concentrated on the remaining situation in Rhodesia, Namibia, and the Republic of South Africa itself.

The changes in Soviet foreign policy in Black Africa were conditioned by a large number of variables which fit into three main categories: African, Soviet, and systemic. It is possible that further research into each of the sets of variables would reveal further details undiscovered in my broader approach and help establish the strength of the sets of the variables in their fuller dimensions. They have helped to structure an otherwise diverse and sometimes disorderly set of events into patterns that have explanatory value and allow some future projections.

F O O T N O T E S

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 1

¹See Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970). Also see his "The Soviet Union's Changing View of Sub-Saharan Africa", Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, ed. Raymond Duncan (Toronto: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), pp. 62-82 and Marshall Goldman's "How Effective is Soviet Foreign Aid?" Challenge, Vol. II, January 1963, pp. 7-11.

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FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 2

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²⁴Kenneth W. Grundy, "Mali: The Prospects of Planned Socialism," African Socialism, p. 178.

²⁵J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. V (1952), p. 57.

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⁶⁵Walter H. Dew, "How Socialist are African Economies?" African Report (May, 1963), p. 12.

⁶⁶John K. Cooley, East Wind Over Africa (New York: Walker and Co., 1965), p. 101.

⁶⁷Bruce D. Larkin, China and Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 39.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 58.

⁶⁹See Fenner Brockway, op. cit., pp. 19-20, Waldemar Nielsen, op. cit., p. 200, Ivan Potekhin, "On African Socialism: A Soviet View," African Socialism, ed. Friedland and Rosberg Jr., p. 4.

⁷⁰Roger Murray, "Second Thoughts on Ghana," New Left Review, XLII (March-April, 1967), p. 34.

⁷¹See footnote 69.

⁷²Stalin, op. cit., p. 57.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 3

¹Fritz Schatten, Communism in Africa (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), p. 166.

²Norman Graebner, The Cold War (USA: Heath and Co., 1963), p. x. Also see Robert S. Walters, American and Soviet Aid (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1970), p. 27.

³John H. Kautsky, Communism and the Politics of Development (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), pp. 163-171.

⁴All information from this and the next three paragraphs is taken from Walters, op. cit., pp. 26-29.

⁵This new strategy which changed the proletarian revolution into a nationalist movement was originally developed by Mao Tse-tung in his battle against the Japanese in World War II, and was later adopted by the Soviet Union following her foreign policy needs in the Cold War. See Kautsky, op. cit., pp. 86 and 178.

⁶See Walters, op. cit., pp. 26-29.

⁷Loc. cit.

⁸Soviet ideologues since Lenin view unity as a crucial factor in the Communist strategy and unceasingly emphasize the need for unity among all enemies of "imperialism". In the Second Comintern Congress (1920, Moscow), Lenin paid particular attention to the idea of forming temporary alliances with the enemies--the bourgeois democratic forces--until time was appropriate to turn the tables. In the Fifth Congress (1924) Stalin reiterated the need for "direct alliance" between the proletariat in Europe and the liberation movements in the colonies in the "anti-imperialist struggle". The pre-war "Popular Front" and the war-time "United Front" movements are indicative of the concern Stalin had for unity against the enemy. See Schatten, op. cit., p. 61 and Stalin, Works, VI, p. 146.

⁹Radia Ghana Broadcast, Accra, (November 24, 1958), quoted by Schatten, op. cit., p. 155.

¹⁰See W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 147.

¹¹Africa Diary, Vol. 1, No. 7 (August 12-18, 1961), p. 83

¹²Richard Lowenthal, "China," Africa and the Communist World, ed. Zbigniew Brzezinski (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 182.

¹³Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 110.

¹⁴The Brazzaville Group comprised the Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville) Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, the Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta and Rwanda. Burundi and Congo (Leopoldville) were observers.

¹⁵See Arthur Cook, Africa Past and Present (New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1965), p. 144. Also see Gray Cowan, The Dilemmas of the African Independence (New York: Walker and Co., 1964), p. 155.

¹⁶For further information about Soviet attitude to French-speaking Africa, see David L. Morison, "Moscow's First Steps," Problems of Communism, Vol. X, No. 5 (September-October, 1961), p. 13. Also see "The Monrovia Group of African States," International Affairs, No. 10 (1962), p. 144.

¹⁷Mizan, Vol. IV (February, 1962), p. 19.

¹⁸See Gray Cowan, Dilemmas of African Independence (1964), p. 155.

¹⁹See Schatten, op. cit., chapter three. Also see W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy (1969), pp. 145-157.

²⁰Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, p. 153.

²¹Ivan Potekhin, "The African Peoples Forge Unity," International Affairs, No. 6 (1961), p. 81.

²²Legvold, op. cit., p. 121.

²³Ibid., p. 100.

²⁴Ibid., p. 3.

²⁵All information regarding the EEC and the Common Market, unless otherwise indicated is taken from Aaron Segal, "Africa Newly Divided?" Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1964), pp. 73-90. Also see T. Balogh, The Economic Impact of Monetary and Commercial Institutions of an European Origin in Africa (Cairo: 1964), pp. 37-70.

²⁶For further information about Nigeria's unwillingness to become associated with the EEC and the Common Market, see Ali Mazrui, "African Attitudes to the European Common Market," International Affairs Vol. XLI (London, January, 1963), p. 253.

²⁷Also see his Africa Must Unite, pp. 160-161.

²⁸Also see excerpt from his speech at the Accra Conference of African Freedom Fighters as reported by Neues Deutschland (June 17, 1961). Schatten, op. cit., p. 163, William E. Griffith, "Yugoslavia," Africa and the Communist World, p. 140, and Legvold, op. cit., p. 182.

²⁹This was mainly due to the consequences of the Conakry-Moscow dispute and the virtual disintegration of the Casablanca Group. See Legvold, op. cit., p. 163.

³⁰Ibid., p. 169.

³¹See Pravda (May 31, 1962), p. 2, and (June 1, 1962), p. 2, adopted by Legvold, op. cit., p. 168.

³²William Friedland and Carl Rosberg Jr., African Socialism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

³³Ibid., p. 4.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 2-4.

³⁵Kwame Nkrumah, The Old and the New: Law in Africa: Address to the Ghana Law School (Accra: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, January 4, 1962), quoted by Colin Legum, African Socialism, ed. Friedland and Rosberg Jr., op. cit., pp. 154-155.

³⁶Africa Report, VIII (May, 1963), p. 26.

³⁷Modibo Keita, "The Foreign Policy of Mali," International Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 4 (London, October, 1961), pp. 436-437.

³⁸Fenner Brockway, African Socialism (London: Bodley Head Ltd., 1963), p. 32.

³⁹L'Afrique Noire (December, 1951), quoted by Alan Rake, "Mr. Ivory Coast," African Report, VII (April, 1962), p. 4.

⁴⁰Leopold Senghor, "Some thoughts on Africa: A Continent in Development," International Affairs, Vol XXXVIII (April, 1962), p. 191.

⁴¹D. K. Chisiza, Africa: What Lies Ahead (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 163.

⁴²Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 119.

⁴³Spark (Accra, April 3, 1964), adopted by Colin Legum, op. cit., p. 141.

⁴⁴Loc. cit.

⁴⁵Alexander Darlin, "The Soviet Union: Political Activities," Africa and the Communist World, p. 36.

⁴⁶Revolution Africaine, No. 143 (October 23, 1965), quoted by David and Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 81, n33.

⁴⁷"Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," New Times, No. 48 (November 29, 1961), p. 24.

⁴⁸K. Brutents, "The October Revolution and Africa," New Times, No. 45 (November 7, 1962), p. 10.

⁴⁹Friedland and Rosberg, op. cit., p. 15.

⁵⁰Ivan Potekhin, "On African Socialism," International Affairs (Moscow, January, 1963), p. 76.

⁵¹Loc. cit. Also in Mizan, Vol. 3, No. 4 (April, 1961), p. 2.

⁵²John Marcum, "Sékou Touré and Guinea," Africa Today (January-February, 1959), p. 6.

⁵³Legvold, op. cit., p. 75.

⁵⁴Marshall Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 168. Also see Walters, op. cit., p. 34. According to Toure an attempt was made through the Liberian president Tubman, to obtain military assistance from the US but there was never any answer to the request. See Legvold, op. cit., p. 60, n.60 (1970), p. 60, n.60.

⁵⁵Schatten, op. cit., p. 125.

⁵⁶P. F. Weiss, "Communist Activities in Africa," Africa Institute International Bulletin, Vol. (1963), p. 214. Also see Goldman, Soviet Aid, p. 169, and Legvold, op. cit., p. 64. For more information on Guinea's "unique . . . conditions," see Mizan, Vol. 2, No. 9 (October, 1960), p. 19.

⁵⁷Goldman, Soviet Aid, p. 169.

⁵⁸Loc. cit. For further information about Soviet aid commitments to Guinea, see Nekrasov, A., "Cooperation and Disinterest Aid: Soviet Aid, Past and Present," International Affairs (Moscow, March, 1963), p. 82. Also see David L. Morison, "Moscow's First Steps," Problems of Communism, Vol. 10, No. 5 (September-October, 1961), p. 12.

⁵⁹Pravda (December 17, 1960), adopted by Schatten, op. cit., p. 138.

⁶⁰Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, p. 168.

⁶¹Marshall Goldman, "How Effective is Soviet Aid?" Challenge (January, 1963), p. 73.

⁶²Alexander Erlich and Christian Sonne, "The Soviet Union: Economic Activity," Africa and the Communist World, ed. Z. Brzezinski, p. 73.

⁶³Schatten, op. cit., p. 70.

⁶⁴Le Soir (Paris, October 26, 1961), quoted by Schatten, op. cit., p. 142.

⁶⁵Legvold, op. cit., p. 122. Also see Churney Sheldon, Christian Science Monitor (May 26, 1961), p. 3.

⁶⁶Legvold, loc. cit.

⁶⁷Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, p. 171.

⁶⁸See William Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 37-41.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 41.

⁷⁰Le Monde (Paris), quoted in Africa Diary, Vol. 1, No. 7 (August 12-18, 1961), p. 86.

⁷¹Africa Diary, Vol. 1, No. 7 (August 26-September 7, 1961), p. 99.

⁷²Charles F. Adrain, "Guinea and Senegal: Contrasting Types of African Socialism," African Socialism, ed. Friedland and Rosberg, p. 171.

⁷³West Africa (April 14, 1962), p. 403.

⁷⁴Legvold, op. cit., p. 156.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 148.

⁷⁶Schatten, op. cit., p. 182.

⁷⁷See Goldman, Challenge (January, 1963), p. 8. Also see Goldman, "Soviet Foreign Aid Since the Death of Stalin: Progress and Problems," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, ed. W. Raymond Duncan (Toronto: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), pp. 34-35.

⁷⁸"Russian 'Foreign Aid': Big Headache for Khrushchev," US News and World Report, Vol. 54 (May 27, 1963), p. 50.

⁷⁹Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, (1969), p. 175.

⁸⁰Erlich and Sonne, op. cit., p. 60.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 76.

⁸²Legvold, op. cit., p. 156.

⁸³See Carol A. Sawyer, Communist Trade With Developing Countries, 1955-65 (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 66. Also see Scott Thompson, "Parameters On Soviet Policy in Africa: Personal Diplomacy and Economic Interests in Ghana," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, 1970, p. 103. Goldman, "Soviet Foreign Aid Since the Death of Stalin," op. cit., p. 34, and Pieter Lessing, Africa's Red Harvest (1962), p. 69.

⁸⁴Goldman, Challenge (January, 1963), p. 10.

⁸⁵Walters, op. cit., p. 205.

⁸⁶Sawyer, op. cit., p. 2.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 4.

⁸⁸Ibid., pp. 7 and 63.

⁸⁹Gregory Grossman, "The Soviet Economy in the Post Stalin Decade," The Realities of World Communism, ed. William Petersen (Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963), p. 63.

⁹⁰Goldman, "Soviet Foreign Aid Since the Death of Stalin: Progress and Problems," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, p. 34.

⁹¹Harry Schwartz, The Soviet Economy Since Stalin (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1965), p. 168.

⁹²Loc. cit.

⁹³Ibid., p. 124.

⁹⁴US News and World Report (May 27, 1963), p. 53. Also see Goldman, Challenge (January, 1963), p. 10.

⁹⁵Goldman, "Soviet Foreign Aid Since the Death of Stalin: Progress and Problems," op. cit., p. 36.

⁹⁶Goldman, Challenge (January, 1963), p. 11.

⁹⁷Pravda (March 24, 1962), quoted by Schwartz, "The Soviet Economy Since Stalin" (1965), p. 106. Also see J. G. Godaire, "The Claim of the Soviet Military Establishment," Congress Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power: Hearing, Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States, Dec. 10 and 11, 1962 (Washington: US Government Printing, 1962), pp. 35-46. (Hereafter referred to as Dimensions.)

⁹⁸See Dimensions, pp. 744 and then 453.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 454.

¹⁰⁰Loc. cit.

¹⁰¹Loc. cit.

¹⁰²Loc. cit.

¹⁰³Gregory Grossman, op. cit., p. 74.

¹⁰⁴Schwartz, op. cit., p. 126. (See Table 6.)

¹⁰⁵Arnold L. Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, p. 145.

¹⁰⁶See Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, pp. 157 and 161.

¹⁰⁷US News and World Report (May 27, 1963), p. 53.

¹⁰⁸See V. Matveyev, "Wars of Liberation and Diplomacy," International Affairs, No. 3 (1963), pp. 69-72.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 4

¹See Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 161-166.

²Ibid., pp. 110-129.

³The decline of Soviet trade and aid commitments in this period was not the result of disappointment over setbacks in Black Africa alone; it was also due to the economic problems which the Soviet Union was experiencing back home.

⁴Richard Lowenthal, "China," Africa and the Communist World, ed. Zbigniew Brzezinski (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 152.

⁵John K Cooley, East Wind Over Africa (New York: Walker and Co., 1965), p. 211. All information from the next two chapters are taken from pp. 210-211 of the same source.

⁶Bruce D. Larkin, China and Africa 1949-1970 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 99.

⁷Quoted in Larkin, loc. cit.

⁸Op. cit., p. 100.

⁹Fritz Schatten, Communism in Africa (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), p. 195.

¹⁰Mizan, Vol. VI, No. 5 (May, 1964), p. 15. Also see Schatten, loc. cit.

¹¹Larkin, op. cit., p. 40.

¹²Mizan, Vol VI, No. 5 (May, 1964), p. 16.

¹³Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 21-22.

¹⁵The Chinese believed that their agricultural-based "great leap forward" and the commune program (initiated in 1958) and the development of small industries were more relevant to the development of socialism than the Soviet model with its emphasis on science and technology and large scale industrial expansion. Donald Zagoria, "Sino-Soviet Friction in Under-developed Areas," Problems of Communism, Vol. X, No. 2 (March-April, 1961), p. 2.

¹⁶Schatten, op. cit., p. 61.

¹⁷Denis Healy, "Strategy and Foreign Policy," Survey, No. 50 (January, 1964), p. 18.

¹⁸Nikita Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1959), p. 1.

¹⁹Vimla Saran, Sino-Soviet Schism (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1970), p. viii.

²⁰Mizan, Vol. V, No. 8 (September, 1963), p. 1.

²¹Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 255

²²Saran, op. cit., p. viii.

²³Lu Ting-ye, "Unite Under Lenin's Revolutionary Banner," Long Live Leninism (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), pp. 103-104. Also see Mizan, Vol. V, No. 3 (March, 1963), p. 3.

²⁴For further information about the Chinese involvement with National Liberation movements in Black Africa, see John K. Cooley, op. cit., chapters 12, 13 and 14. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), chapter 10, and Larkin, op. cit., chapter 9

²⁵Mizan, Vol. V, No. 3 (March, 1963), p. 3.

²⁶Denis Healey, Survey, No. 50 (January, 1964), p. 26.

²⁷Waldemar A Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 158.

²⁸John Kautsky, Communism and the Politics of Development (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 157.

²⁹Ibid., p. 158.

³⁰Zagoria, op. cit., p. 271.

³¹Ibid., p. 254.

³²Kautsky, op. cit., pp. 113-114. The Soviets adhere to the Leninist-Stalinist theory of identifying the national bourgeoisie with the nationalist government. Though the Chinese also accept this theory, they believe that enemies of the nationalist government could be made from all classes of people including the bourgeoisie itself. The implication in the Chinese argument is that the bourgeoisie as a class and the nationalist government may not always be the same. In fact the bourgeoisie or the capital-owning class is one of the "classes" enlisted in the Maoist block of four classes against the "imperialists" and their middlemen--the nationalist governments.

³³Ibid., p. 112

³⁴Lowenthal, "China," Africa and the Communist World, p. 189. For detailed and comprehensive information on the doctrine of National Democracy see W. Z. Laquer, "Towards National Democracy: Soviet Doctrine and the New Countries," Survey, No. 37 (July-September, 1961), pp. 3-11.

³⁵Thomas P. Thornton, ed. The Third World in Soviet Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 27.

³⁶Kautsky, op. cit., p. 114.

³⁷The well-known Marxian stages of development are: the traditional stage, the transitional stage, the capitalist stage and the socialist stage.

³⁸For further information about Khrushchev's doctrinal changes, see Ishwer C. Ojah, "The Kremlin and the Third World Leadership: Closing the Circle." Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, ed. Raymond Duncan (Toronto: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), pp. 13-22. Also see Alexander Dallin, "The Soviet Union: Political Activity," Africa and the Communist World, pp. 14-20.

³⁹Peter Worsley, The Third World (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), p. 245.

⁴⁰Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 157.

⁴¹New China News Agency (NCNC, September 11, 1960), quoted in Schatten, op. cit., p. 207.

⁴²NCNC. quoted in Schatten, op. cit., p. 196.

⁴³China's population is 2-5% Moslem. Figures for the Soviet Union's Moslem population have not been located. However, there is evidence that relative to the Soviet Union, China used her Moslem population more effectively in Africa for propaganda purposes. For more information about China's multi-nationalism, see John Paxton (ed.), The Stateman's Yearbook (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1972), p. 816.

⁴⁴Lenin, Selected Works, Vol II (London, 1947), p. 657.

⁴⁵See Schatten, op. cit., pp. 192-194.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 192.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 192.

⁴⁸Loc. cit.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 194.

⁵⁰See Cooley, op. cit., pp. 187-192.

⁵¹Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 163.

⁵²Ibid., p. 165.

⁵³Radio Yaounde broadcast, December 9, 1969, quoted by Schatten, op. cit., p. 205. Also see Alexander Dallin, "The Soviet Union: Political Activity," Africa and the Communist World, p. 39.

⁵⁴Though the Cameroonian nationalists were supplied with Czechoslovakian arms, China provided most of the finances and awarded scholarships for the study of bomb-making and guerilla tactics in China. See Cooley, op. cit., pp. 210-211. Also see Dallin, op. cit., p. 39.

⁵⁵Loc. cit.

⁵⁶Cooley, op. cit., p. 196.

⁵⁷Legvold, op. cit., p. 149.

⁵⁸Loc. cit.

⁵⁹Loc. cit.

⁶⁰The Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (A-APSO) comprised political parties and movements in Africa and Asia. It also included the Soviet Union and China. Headquartered in Cairo, its first conference was held in that city in December 1957-January 1958. The second conference was held in Conakry, Guinea in April 1960. Then followed subsequent conferences in Moshi, Tanganyika (February, 1963), and at Winneba, Ghana (May, 1965). See W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. xxii.

⁶¹W.C. Adie, "China, Russia and the Third World," China Quarterly, No. 11 (July-September, 1962), p. 208.

⁶²William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964), pp. 125-126.

⁶³Legvold, op. cit., p. 153. Also Lowenthal, op. cit. p. 196.

⁶⁴Schatten, op. cit., p. 195.

⁶⁵Legvold, op. cit., p. 153.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 154.

⁶⁷On account of the break-down of Soviet equipment, uncompleted or poorly completed projects, Guineans accused the Soviets of inefficiency. The Soviets in turn blamed it all on the "laziness and Stupidity" of the Guineans.

⁶⁸Legvold, op. cit., p. 151.

⁶⁹Vernon McKay (ed.), African Diplomacy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 2.

⁷⁰Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 179.

⁷¹Legvold, op. cit., p. 154.

⁷²Vladimir Kudryavtsey, "Problems of Afro-Asian Solidarity," International Affairs, No. 5 (1952), p. 52.

⁷³This happened after the US and France had refused to extend any aid to Algeria. See David and Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 158.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 159.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 159.

⁷⁶In order to illustrate the scope and extent of this competition fully, aid to non-Black African countries has been included in the table.

⁷⁷See Table 4-1 in Clair Wilcox, et al. Economies of the World (New York: Brace and World Inc., 1966), p. 86.

⁷⁸Marshall I Goldman, "Soviet Foreign Aid Since the Death of Stalin: Progress and Problems," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, p. 39.

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CHAPTER 5

¹The Benveniste and W. E. Moran, Jr., "African Economic Problems," The Study of Africa, ed. Peter J. M. McEwan and Robert B Sutcliffe (London: The Camelot Press Ltd., 1967), p. 266. For some idea about Soviet views on the colonial-metropolitan economic relations, see L. Stepanov, "The Problem of Economic Independence," The Third World in Soviet Perspective, ed. Thomas Perry Thornton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 103-116. Also see Pierre Jalée, The Pillage of the Third World (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968).

²John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 46.

³Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (3rd ed., New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1962), p. 108.

⁴These were the 1969 population estimates. They represent the highest estimates in the period under discussion in this thesis. The highest figures have been deliberately selected for the sake of the argument that even at their highest, these population sizes were inadequate to help form viable domestic markets for the Black African countries concerned. See United Nations, Demographic Yearbook (1970), p. 127.

⁵Kenneth Galbraith, op. cit., p. 27.

⁶Marshall I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 169.

⁷Ibid., p. 174.

⁸Ibid., p. 169.

⁹See United Nations, United Nations Statistical Yearbook (1965), p. 301.

¹⁰Converted from United Nations Statistical Yearbook (1969), p. 546.

¹¹Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 124.

¹²Fritz Schatten, Communism in Africa (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), p. 140.

¹³Ibid., p. 123.

¹⁴High Commissioner for Ghana, Ghana News (Ottawa, October, 1972), p. 14.

¹⁵Marshall I Goldman, "How Effective is Soviet Foreign Aid?" Challenge, Vol. 2 (January, 1963), p. 10.

¹⁶Loc. cit.

¹⁷Schatten, op. cit., p. 140.

¹⁸Marshall Goldman, "Soviet Foreign Aid Since the Death of Stalin: Progress and Problems," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, ed. W. Raymond Duncan (Toronto: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), p. 30. Also see Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, p. 170.

¹⁹Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, p. 171.

²⁰Leo Tansky, "Soviet Military Aid, Technical Assistance, and Academic Training," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, p. 48.

²¹Apart from the fact that the Soviet-built industries were too large, the post-elementary educational institutions were not able to produce enough graduates to feed the industries. The Soviet-built Polytechnic Institute designed to accommodate 1,400 students had only 100 students as of the middle of 1964. See Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, p. 170.

²²Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid, p. 171.

²³Quoted by Goldman, loc. cit.

²⁴Legvold, op. cit., p. 303.

²⁵See V. Katin, "Travel Notes from the Ivory Coast," New Times, No. 11 (March 2, 1968), p. 27.

²⁶Adopted by Legvold, op. cit., p. 305.

²⁷See Efrem Sigel, "Ivory Coast: Booming Economy, Political Calm," African Report (April, 1970), p. 18.

²⁸For Khrushchev's "personal Diplomacy" with Nkrumah, see Scott Thompson, "Parameters on Soviet Policy in Africa: Personal Diplomacy and Economic Interests in Ghana," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, pp. 90 and 94. The term also connotes the dispatch of high-rated officials for negotiations, economic talks, and as government representatives at national celebrations. See Alexander Dallin, "The Soviet Union: Political Activity," Africa and the Communist World, ed. Zbigniew Brzezinski (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 21.

²⁹Nikita Khrushchev was dismissed from his offices as First Secretary of the Communist Party, as a member of the party's ruling Presidium and as Premier of the Soviet Union. See Harry Schwartz, "Economic Factors in Khrushchev's Downfall," The Soviet Economy Since Stalin (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1965), p. 121

³⁰Colonel Boumediene was also Vice-President and Minister of Defense in the Ben Bella government. See David and Maria Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 179. For complete information about the "June 19 Coup d'etate, see ibid., pp. 174-195.

³¹Legvold, op. cit., p. 142.

³²Quoted in Africa Diary, Vol. II, No. 20 (May 12-18, 1962), p. 547. For further information about the high esteem and popularity of Nkrumah see Ali A. Mazrui, Toward a Pax Africana (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), chapters three and four.

³³Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom (London: Heinemann, 1961), p. 60.

³⁴W. Scott Thompson, "Parameters on Soviet Policy in Africa," Personal Diplomacy and Economic Interests in Ghana," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, pp. 103-104.

³⁵Legvold, op. cit., p. 290.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 290-294.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 291-292.

³⁸Ibid., p. 297.

³⁹Ibid., p. 290.

⁴⁰At this juncture some attention should be given President Nyerere of Tanzania, one of Africa's leading socialists. Soviet commentary was favourable toward his Arusha Program since its declaration in February, 1967. However relative to Ghana (before 1966), Guinea, Mali, United Arab Republic and Algeria, Tanzania was regarded only as one of Africa's "hopefuls". Basing thier conclusions on Nyerere's "Memorandum Principles and Development" (June, 1966), the Soviets viewed him as a fence-sitter who placed himself in "an intermediate position, a middle of the way between capitalism and socialism".

Nyerere was often criticized for his rejection of the Marxist theory of class struggle and for his emphasis on his Africanist "distributive socialism" which the Soviets thought was abstract and ineffectual.

However the Soviet Union extended credit facilities to Tanzania. Though no specific figures were published the \$60 million committed to Tanzania by Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union included the Soviet Union's original promise. In 1966, according to the Tanzanian Embassy in Moscow the Soviet Union granted Tanzania a 12 year credit worth \$21 million to undertake various projects. Mineral prospecting, the construction of hospitals, schools, veterinary stations and hydro-electric schemes were some of the projects to be financed with the loans. All information is from Mizan, Vol. 9, No. 5 (September-October, 1967), pp. 197-201.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 311.

⁴²Pravda (May 5, 1964), quoted in Mizan, Vol. XII, No. 3 (1970), p. 135.

⁴³Quoted in Mizan, No. 4 (1967), p. 165.

⁴⁴Loc. cit.

⁴⁵Mizan, Vol. 7, No. 10 (November, 1965), p. 1.

⁴⁶Mizan, No. 4 (1967), p. 165

⁴⁷Pravda (October 27, 1965). Quoted by Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Changing View of Sub-Saharan Africa," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, p. 74. A passing reference should be made at this juncture to the fact that though the Soviet Union was in the forefront, her Eastern European communist satellites also undertook a certain level of involvement in Black Africa. See Robert and Elizabeth Bass, "Eastern Europe," Africa and the Communist World, pp. 84-115. Also see William E. Griffith, "Yugoslavia" from the same volume, pp. 116-141.

⁴⁸Mizan, Vol. XII, No. 3 (December, 1970), p. 135.

⁴⁹Yu M. Osipov, Financial Methods of Mobilizing Capital Accumulation in Developing Countries (Moscow: 1969), p. 7, adopted in Mizan, Vol. XII, No. 3 (1970), p. 125.

⁵⁰N. P. Shmelev, Problems of Economic Growth of Developing Countries (Moscow, 1970), adopted by David Morrison, "USSR and the Third World: Questions of Economic Development," Mizan, Vol. XII, No. 3 (December, 1970), p. 124.

⁵¹Mizan, Vol. XII, No. 3 (1970), p. 125.

⁵²In 1970 Soviet citizens would rather put their money into the bank than spend it on poor-quality television sets. The main complaint was that the television screens were too small. Statistically, private savings were up by 20 percent and one million television sets remained unsold. See Time (Canada ed., March 29, 1971), p. 28

⁵³Loc. cit.

⁵⁴Exclusive figures for Black Africa have not been located; but by 1961 Soviet aid to the underdeveloped countries had exceeded a billion dollars per annum in value, which represented 0.5 percent of the Soviet Union's Gross National Product.

⁵⁵Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi (New York: Western Publishing Co. Inc., 1967), p. 55.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 34.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 43.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 49.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 50.

⁶⁰Loc. cit.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 51.

⁶²Allan W. Cameron, "The Soviet Union and Vietnam: The Origins of Involvement," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, pp. 166-205.

⁶³David Morrison, "The USSR and the Middle East War," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, p. 209.

⁶⁴See US News and World Report, Vol. 54 (May 27, 1963), p. 51.

⁶⁵David Morrison, "The USSR and the Middle East War," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, p. 211

⁶⁶David Morrison, op. cit., pp. 214-215.

⁶⁷"Middle East: Arms for Embracing," Time (Canada ed., January 19, 1968), p. 24.

⁶⁸See Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 216-217.

⁶⁹Soviet Military aid to Black African countries was deliberately ignored in this thesis because it did not occupy a place of great importance in the Soviet aid marked for economic purposes. However the exigencies of the protracted Mideast situation emphasized the need for enormous quantities of military as opposed to economic aid. It is common, therefore, to identify the Mideast with Soviet military presence.

⁷⁰"Mid East: Arms for Embracing," Time (Canada ed., January 19, 1968), p. 24. All information from the next four paragraphs, unless otherwise specified, is from the same source.

⁷¹Legvold, op. cit., p. 222.

⁷²See Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, "Why the Soviets Chose Sides," Africa Report (February, 1968), p. 47.

⁷³Legvold, op. cit., p. 222.

⁷⁴Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Changing View of Sub-Saharan Africa," Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, p. 76.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 77.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 78.

⁷⁷See Klinghoffer, op. cit., p. 48. Also see Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa, p. 222.

⁷⁸Klinghoffer, op. cit., p. 48.

⁷⁹Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Changing View of Sub-Saharan Africa," op. cit., p. 78.

⁸⁰Ibid., pp. 78-79. Also see Klinghoffer, op. cit. (1968), pp. 48-49.

⁸¹Klinghoffer, op. cit., p. 48. For another splendid analysis of Soviet involvement in Nigeria, see John de St. Jorre's: The Nigerian Civil War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972), chapter 7.

⁸²The reason for anti-Biafran sentiment is obvious: to curb inter-tribal upheavals and prevent secessions of the Biafran type. Tribalism, overt or covert, has been a big problem in Black Africa. Only a few African countries lent Biafra their official recognition: Tanzania, Zambia, the Ivory Coast and Gabon.

⁸³See Kommunist (Moscow), No. 12, 1960, quoted in Schatten, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

⁸⁴For some information about the Soviet Union's general attitude toward tribalism and its place in the Nigerian crisis, see Mizan, Vol. 9, No. 4 (July-August, 1967), pp. 174-177.

⁸⁵See John de St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 182. Also see Nielsen, op. cit., p. 214.

⁸⁶Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Changing View of Sub-Saharan Africa," op. cit. p. 79.

⁸⁷Klinghoffer thinks this could probably be the \$45 million referred to earlier. Klinghoffer, op. cit., p. 49.

⁸⁸Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Changing View of Sub-Saharan Africa," op. cit., p. 82. For a short, but fairly detailed information about Soviet-Nigerian relations since 1960, see "Soviet Views on Nigeria," Mizan, Vol. 9, No. 2 (March-April, 1967), pp. 70-74.

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